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Abstract 
 
The following research revisits, re-examines and builds on previous and ongoing critical 
work into the rise of non-traditional fruit exports in Chile. The work is principally concerned with 
the negative distributional impacts on small-scale producers in light of the country’s extensive 
neoliberal reforms of the mid 1970s and 1980’s and their continuation under successive 
Concertación governments since 1990. Attention is placed on revisiting and better understanding 
the phenomenon observed by Murray (1997) ten years earlier, that saw small-scale producers 
enter into grossly uneven bargaining relationships with large fruit export firms that tended to 
expose them to a disproportionately high proportion of the risks associated with exporting in the 
global marketplace. At the time, these processes were shown to be driving many small-scale 
producers into a cycle of debt- resulting in land concentration and greater inequality in the 
locality. In the absence of government intervention, it was predicted that these patterns would 
continue to threaten the livelihood and economic sustainability of the Chilean peasantry.  
The following dissertation demonstrates that in the ten years since 1994 significant land 
concentration has indeed continued to take place as predicted within the original research locality, 
El Palqui. But unlike in the past, where land was dominated by large haciendas, today, it is 
equally large, capital intensive producers – including a handful of internationally owned export 
firms – who are progressively extending their grip over the Chilean countryside. In light of these 
changes, it could therefore be argued that the Chilean countryside is developing a character 
gravely reminiscent of Chile’s pre-reform ‘semi-feudal’ system. With even those small producers, 
who have supposedly ‘successfully inserted’ into the global economy facing serious financial 
hardship, the future looks bleak for the Chilean peasantry. This thesis argues that the continuation 
of land concentration is a by-product of successive Chilean governments’ persistent failure to 
assist small-producers during and after the critical transitional phase from an inward oriented 
development model to an outward oriented export-led model. This failure to act represents a 
missed opportunity to effectively integrate smaller producers into the export sector in a manner 
which might have been conducive to growth with equity.  
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1.0 Introduction and Topic Rationale 
 
The following section seeks to explore the rationale for undertaking this study and outlines the 
central aims of the work. I will begin by outlining how Chile has become a favoured destination 
of study over the last three decades, yet information remains scarce in terms of  
neoliberalism’s effect on the ground and within diverse economic sectors.  
 
1.1. Topic Rationale  
Due to the enormous changes, and the purity with which the neoliberal model has been applied in 
Chile since the early 1970s, in a sense, Chile has become somewhat of a favoured destination for 
researchers eager to track the political-economic changes of the last three to four decades. 
Murray’s (1997b) inquiry into Chile’s political economy began during the mid-1990s, not long 
after civilian rule had been restored. At the time Chile was amidst an economic boom after 
recovering from two serious economic recessions under – and arguably as a result of – the 
military government’s dogmatic neoliberal restructuring (Kay, 2002). Since this time, Murray’s 
work has been principally concerned with the evolving interdependence between global economic 
forces (particularly those mediated through fruit export companies) and their “conditioning’ 
impact (though not necessarily full ‘conditioning’ impact) on change at lower scales of 
resolution” (Murray, 1997a, p.1). 
 
During the 1990s Murray was motivated, by among other things, a call for a more in-depth 
inquiry into the ‘Chilean experiment’ by such academics as Barham et al (1992). Barham et al 
(1992), Murray and others (Gwynne and Kay, 1999) witnessed the Chilean debate in many ways 
being captured by an overly simplistic discourse that placed far too great an emphasis on the 
‘positive’ macro-economic indicators and rapid economic growth occurring in Chile at the time. 
Whilst not denying such positives, it was however noted, that there existed a paucity of research 
into the negative socio-economic effects of the outward-oriented model at different geographic 
scales and among different socio-economic groups, especially as it related to the ostensibly 
vibrant non-traditional export sector. Indeed, as Barham et al (1992, p.43) commented at the time, 
“Despite the zeal with which its advocates have promoted non-traditional exports (NTAX) in 
recent years, we found no studies that provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of such 
strategies on Latin American development”. 
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Hence, Murray’s research in many ways represented a concerted effort to try and fill the ‘void’ 
identified by Barham et al (1992) and others. Murray’s work constituted an active attempt to 
provide a more rigorous investigation into the impact of the free-market model at different 
geographic scales or within different geographical spheres, with the aim of providing greater 
depth and clarity to the convoluted debate surrounding non-traditional agricultural exports, 
neoliberalism and globalisation within Chile and Latin America in general. Critically, this meant 
examining ‘the model’s’ impact from the perspective of a particular productive sector and within 
a specific locality. Given the hype at the time surrounding the miraculous ‘success’ of Chile’s 
non-traditional fruit exports, naturally, the fruit export sector seemed a logical place to start.  
 
A small rural Pueblo (village), El Palqui, situated in Chile’s Norte Chico (fourth region) was 
selected as the locality for investigating the impact of NTAX. The locality was notable for its 
almost wholesale adoption of table grapes production, extensive global orientation and capital 
penetration, particularly of the international fruit export company variety (Gwynne, 2003). 
Consistent with this ‘global-local framework’, Murray’s (1997b) ensuing research focused 
particularly on the ‘dependent’ relationship (under contract) that formed between large- often 
foreign owned and  globally connected export firms who helped convince small-scale, capital 
starved peasants, to convert (reconversión)1 from traditional crops to table grapes for export. In 
the absence of state intervention, these large export firms were the primary agents controlling 
small-scale farmer insertion into the global economy offering credit, technical advice and market 
access in exchange for producer supply contracts (Gwynne, 2003).  
 
Accustomed to meagre incomes, growers were quick to embrace reconversión for the chance of 
becoming modern progressive exporters and the prospect of a better life. For a time it may have 
seemed like all their dreams had come true at once, but by the 1990s external economic conditions 
began to take a turn for the worse. Increasingly, returns were inadequate to repay credits and charges, 
water shortages drove up the price of this vital resource and many farmers experienced declining 
yields. As growers plunged further and further into debt most could not afford to switch back to 
traditionally less volatile agriculture. For many there was little option but to sell their land to the 
export companies- more often than not at below market value. By 1994 Murray (1997b; 2002b) 
                                                 
1
 Reconversion, or reconversión as it is known in Chilean policy circles, refers to the process whereby growers are 
encouraged- depending on the ideological orientation of the government of the time- by either the state, export firms 
(via contracts), market imperatives or a combination of these forces, to switch from traditional crop production towards 
competitive, higher value, non-traditional export crop production (such as fruits; grapes, apples and citrus. Underlying 
this policy is a commitment to free-market resource allocation and hence the need to focus on those sectors and regions 
which are deemed to have a comparative advantage within the global market place (Gwynne, 2003; Murray, 2002a).  
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found that six out of 26 sampled producers had already sold their land to their creditor company to 
relieve debt and the 20 remaining parceleros had particularly precarious debt to asset ratios.  
 
As a consequence, these economic pressures were “leading in turn to a significant concentration of 
land ownership” (Murray, 2002b, p.207) within the locality as larger players consolidated their 
holdings at the expense of smaller and more vulnerable producers. This led Murray (1997a) to 
conclude, that, despite the astounding macro-economic successes of the last few decades [within 
Chile], “the distributional impacts of growth in [the fruit export] sector have been, and continue to 
be, regressive in their nature” (p. 1). He also made a daunting prediction that “it is quite possible, 
six years from now after the completion of the original fieldwork, that the remainder of the 
parceleros will have been fully proletarianised”. It is within this context that my research seeks to 
return to El Palqui to perform a longitudinal study in order to track changes occurring in the locality 
since the mid-1990s.   
 
1.2 Aims and Key Research Questions  
From the outset, the research was guided by three broad central aims; firstly, to re-investigate - 
using primary sources- the extent to which socio-economic differentiation (particularly land 
concentration) within rural Chile persists to this present day and to try and provide an 
explanation; secondly, when combined with relevant secondary sources, to try and develop a 
greater understanding of the complex links between economic processes at the global and national 
scale and their impacts at the local scale in Chile; and finally, to contribute to the wider debate 
vis-à-vis the impacts of non-traditional fruit exports, neo-liberalism and globalisation within 
Chile. 
 
In order to realise these aims, one central question and three contingent sub-questions were asked. 
They are as follows;  
Central research question 
(1) How has land tenure transformed in El Palqui since the mid 1990s, and to what extent has 
land-concentration2, semi-proletarianisation and full-proletarianisation continued to 
characterise the region? 
                                                 
2
 Land concentration is defined as: the process whereby a minority of- usually larger land owners- due to various 
reasons- progressively acquire greater and greater amounts of land over time, often at the expense of smaller growers.  
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Objectives:   
(1)What factors explain the continuation or discontinuation of land concentration; and what 
structural barriers may have inhibited small-scale producers from taking full advantage of the 
fruit export boom? 
 
(2)What roles have export companies and their contract systems played in El Palqui? 
 
(3) To what extent might past and present policy structures at the national level- particularly 
neoliberalism- have contributed, influenced or conditioned the present state of affairs in El 
Palqui vis-à-vis land ownership, socio-economic differentiation and the role of the fruit export 
sector?  
 
1.3. Thesis Structure 
Having already introduced my research topic and general background to this thesis, the following 
provides a brief discussion of the structure of this thesis and the areas I intend to focus on 
throughout. In keeping with the political-economy approach that guides this research, the idea is 
to situate the changes taking place in El Palqui, Chile, within the wider global, regional and 
national context. This is achieved by gradually tracing the historical political-economic events 
that have taken place at each of these geographical scales over time, in order to determine how 
external structures have conditioned the ‘local’, and indeed, how the ‘local’ has responded in turn.  
 
However, before doing so, Chapter 2 provides an overview of my research’s scope, 
methodological underpinnings, philosophical perspectives and theoretical approach, including an 
attempt to justify my choice of topic, site selection and methodological limitations.  
 
Chapter 3 looks at globalisation as a term, a process and a discourse. It traces the historic 
emergence of a number of ‘waves’ of globalisation since colonial times, with particular emphasis 
on the latest, arguably neoliberal wave of globalisation, which has had a particularly dramatic 
effect on Latin America as a region from the mid-1970s to present day. In addition, particular 
attention is paid to globalisation’s tendency to, on the one hand, reach almost every conceivable 
part of the globe, whilst, on the other hand, manifest itself differently according to the prevailing 
physical and human geographies for which it comes into contact with. Ultimately, the purpose of 
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this chapter is to provide a global-historical context for the phenomenon of globalisation and to 
take the opportunity to clarify the term for its use in subsequent chapters.   
 
Chapter 4 traces the political-economic history of Latin America from colonial times to present 
day. It begins with a discussion of the colonial economy under Spanish rule and tracks the regions 
development as it moved from economic dependence on the Iberian core to a new from of 
dependence on the industrial core nations of the Northern Hemisphere following independence 
(early- mid-1820s), after which most Latin American nations embraced outward-orientated 
export-led growth, only to be devastated by the Great Depression of the 1930s. Following this, it 
is explained how Latin American nations responded to this external crises by rejecting ‘free trade’ 
in favour of ‘structuralist’ inspired Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), only to be forced to 
return to a new form of economic-liberalism (neoliberalism) following the debt crisis. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the negative impact of neoliberalism within Latin America 
and outlines CEPAL’s ‘neo-structuralist’ challenge to the neoliberal model.   
 
Chapter 5 builds on the contextual background of chapter 4 but does so from a Chilean 
perspective. Chile’s colourful political-economic history is explored from colonial times to 
present day. Specific attention is given to examining the roots of Chile’s grossly inefficient, 
unequal and antiquated hacienda system which remained firmly entrenched from the mid-17th 
century up until the early 1960s. The chapter then goes on to explain how this system was not 
only socially unjust but economically backward, and ultimately, collapsed under the weight of 
populous pressures and successive land reforms, despite military intervention to halt the reforms. 
Following this, the chapter will explain how the military government utilised earlier land reforms 
and state investment in the agricultural sector, particularly in fruit and forestry, to reinsert Chile 
back into the global economy as a primary-product exporter (as in the 1850s-1930). Then it will 
be shown how three successive democratic and nominally socialist governments (since 1990) 
have done little to alter the central tenets of the military’s economic strategy. Thus, 
notwithstanding the enormous growth in non-traditional exports, the chapter concludes by 
outlining the human cost of neoliberalism and explains how the model has, in the main, favoured 
medium to large scale farmers while excluding or forcing out small-farmers.  
 
Chapter 6 presents quantitative and qualitative data generated from field research carried out in 
El Palqui, Chile, 2004. It will be shown how due to a range of structural constraints, El Palqui’s 
growers have had little choice but to pursue a form of ‘dependent capitalisation’ or ‘dependent 
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development’ by relying on transnational fruit export companies for credit, expertise and market 
access. In particular, it is demonstrated how firms have used their asymmetrical position of power 
to transfer much of the market risks associated with exporting in the global economy on to small-
producers, creating proletarianisation and land concentration within the locality.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 refers to the findings in terms of the aims and key questions of this thesis. The 
focus is on land concentration, its causes, its relationship to wider structures, and the role that the 
fruit export companies have played. Explicit is an attempt to analysis the goings on in El Palqui 
since 1994 from neo-structuralist perspective by focusing on a number of important structural 
constraints faced by growers and by recommending a number of interventionist tools to address 
these structures. The chapter concludes by arguing that due to successive Chilean governments’ 
hands-off approach to reconversión (particularly in the post-reconversión stage) these structural 
constraints have been given free rein, resulting in social-economic differentiation within the 
countryside. Finally, a call is made for greater state intervention in this area so that the Chilean 
government may finally be able to match its ‘growth with equity’ rhetoric with reality.  
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2.0. Epistemological Perspectives  
 
While the purpose of the section above was to outline my topic’s rationale, aims, central question 
and sub-questions, it is also important to discuss the epistemological position and epistemological 
limitations of my thesis. Therefore, in order to present my findings in later chapters it is necessary 
to outline the scope of my research and lay down what I consider to be knowledge and how this 
knowledge might be attained, analysed and expressed.  
 
2.1 Epistemologies  
From the outset of this research I have been under no elusion that my findings will represent pure, 
objective, impartial, and value-free facts, nor facts that will be immediately applicable to all 
countries, regions, societies, or cultures across time and space; as often the natural science seeks 
to create. In general I tend to agree with Sayer (1998, p5) that “social science is somehow 
different and requires differentiated foundations and tools from the natural science”. This is not to 
imply however, in a historical-hermeneutic sense, that “facts do not exist independently of 
experience” (Murray and Overton, 2003, p.6), nor is it to suggests in a strictly empirical-
analytical sense that science should only seek to focus on observable entities and avoid making 
normative judgements. This research takes place at the juncture of these two epistemological 
poles.  
 
Thus, I am conscious that because all knowledge is in essence humanly generated and interpreted, 
all knowledge must therefore necessarily pass through a variety of subjective filters laden with 
personal biases, predispositions and values. For instance, even the decision to choose this 
particular area of study was not value free, nor was it value free when my supervisors selected the 
project and study region ten years earlier. I am also aware that my ‘positionality’ as a foreign, 
non-fluent, Spanish speaker, who at times relied on ‘gatekeepers’ for my information (see 
methods) (Murray,1997a; Murray and Overton, 2003) may have potentially biased the type and 
depth of information collected as would my own assumptions and world view I entered the study 
with. Therefore, to reiterate, I do not anticipate that my findings will stand the kind of test and 
scientific rigor ‘positivism’ demands, and however revealing, will certainly not constitute 
universal laws. 
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That said, so long as I am transparent in regard to my positionality, theoretical underpinnings and 
methodological framework, I hope to create a context whereby my findings may to some extent 
tell us something of the reality of the vast changes which have taken place within El Palqui since 
the mid-1990s. And furthermore, go someway to helping us better understand how globalisation 
(particularly under neoliberalism) conditions the local, as well as offering some tentative lessons 
that may help us to better analyse, interpret, and potentially predict and prevent similar outcomes 
in different localities.  
 
2.1.1. Critical Realism  
In light of the above discussion, my epistemological approach is best described as ‘critical 
realism’. That is to say, that one accepts that a ‘real world’ exists, but at the same time remains 
mindful and cautious by employing ‘post-modernist’ ideas that argue that all knowledge is 
essentially filtered and tainted, whether intentional or not, by human bias and cognitive 
limitations. Implicit therefore within a critical-realist approach, is an understanding that we can, 
at least within reason, seek to uncover true phenomena in both the natural and social realm. But 
by implication, if things can be said to be essentially ‘true’ then there must in turn be space to 
argue that something can be better or worse, just or unjust, right or wrong, moral or immoral. If 
so, as free thinking knowledgeable human agents we are not only capable of envisioning a better 
state, but we are also capable – if not morally compelled – to act on our vision to bring about a 
more desired outcome. Thus, like all critical theory, inherent to a critical-realist epistemology is a 
reformist vein that in some way desires to go beyond solely “…adding to our knowledge of the 
geographic world….but aims to change it for the better” (Kitchin and Tate, 2000).  
 
2.1.2. Structuration Theory  
In addition to critical realism, my research is also influenced by Gidden’s ‘structuration theory’. 
Structuration theory seeks to reconcile two competing streams of thought within the sociology 
discourse; (1) one that assumes that it is primarily ‘structures’ that shape societies in a 
deterministic sense, (2) and another that places far greater emphasis on ‘human agency’- or in 
other words, the ability of ‘knowledgeable agents’ to not only recognise structures but to act to 
restrict, remodel, change or re-structure these ‘structures’. Structuration theory might be said to 
offer insight as to the mechanism of external structures and to what extent they have a conditioning 
influence over different economic spheres (Bilton et al, 1997). Thus, applied at an international 
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level, structuration theory would recognise the power asymmetries and external conditioning 
forces inherent in the global-political economy. But unlike more deterministic epistemologies and 
social theories (e.g. Dependency Theory: see chapter 4.3), it would not discount the ability of 
nation-states (or other ‘agents’ such as communities, and non governmental organisations 
(NGOs) etc.) to alter, to a certain extent, their internal conditions in order to break free of, or 
mediate, external conditioning forces.  
 
Another advantage of structuration is that it can be applied to all geographic scales. At the 
national scale, for example, it can help us to understand how various Chilean governments have at 
times attempted to resist external forces (particularly under Allende), and in other times allowed 
external conditioning forces to modify production systems and society virtually unchecked; as 
was the case during the early neoliberal phase. Further down the geographic scale, and in terms of 
the case study area of El Palqui, structuration directs us towards uncovering the techniques and 
livelihood strategies that “disorganised, small-scale and disempowered” (Murray, 1997a, p.6) local 
producers might have assumed in their dealings with much larger “virtually un-regulated multi-
nationals” and as a result of being rapidly plugged into the rather precarious global capitalist 
system.  
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework   
Having already outlined my topic rationale, and epistemological underpinnings, the following 
section seeks to make clear the macro-intellectual approach (e.g. political-economy) and policy 
approach (e.g. neo-structuralism) which will inform my analysis for the remainder of this thesis.  
2.2.1. Macro-intellectual Approach: Political Economy 
Although political economy analysis has its intellectual roots in Marxist type analysis, it can 
provide a valuable prism for exploring past and present political-economic conflicts without 
necessarily advocating purely socialist style solutions (Peet and Thrift, 1989). Its strength is that it 
forces us to examine political, social, economic and environmental changes at the international, 
national and local scale not so much in a ‘neutral’ descriptive sense but rather as “political act[s] 
carried out by different agents in different classes and social groupings” (Peet and Thrift, 1989, p.13). 
Thus a PE approach has particular appeal in terms of Chile, because it compels us as to view Chile’s 
past and more recent economic and production changes – such as the dismantling of the formally 
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dominant, regressive and repressive hacienda system3 under Frei and Allende, and the systems 
virtual resurrection by, arguably, equally powerful and influential export firms under Pinchot’s 
military rule – as fundamentally connected to the nation’s underlying ‘political struggles’(Haggard 
and Kaufman, 1995). 
 
2.2.2. Policy Approach: Neo-Structuralism  
Neo-structuralism is a relatively new theory which developed in response to the tumultuous 
development experiences within Latin America; first under structuralism and more recently (since 
the mid-1970s) under neoliberalism. Neo-structuralism will be discussed in greater detail in later 
chapters; however, essentially it aims to provide a middle ground between structuralism and 
neoliberalism. It accepts, therefore, the need to maintain macro-economic stability and 
acknowledges the gains to be made from international trade (Dietz, 1995; Lewis, 2002). Yet, 
having its roots in structuralism, its does not view the international political-economy in entirely 
benign terms. Unlike with neoliberalism, it is not enough to simply get ‘prices right’. Neo-
structuralism is well aware of the structural barriers peripheral economies must try and overcome 
when operating within the international economy. Thus, it retains a key enabling role for the state 
in fostering more holistic economic development whereby the State is crucial in helping to bend 
the allocation of resources in a manner that can improve on market outcomes and, ultimately, 
improve a nation’s trade competitiveness and development prospects (Gwynne and Kay, 1999; 
Kay, 2002; Dietz, 1995l; Lewis, 2002).    
 
The two approaches outlined above complement each other. For example, given neo-
structuralism’s overriding concern for ‘structures’, implicit therefore is the need to unravel those 
historical and current political-economic factors (e.g. class struggles) which have given rise to 
and which sustain these structures over time. Furthermore, both approaches, but neo-structuralism 
in particular, dovetail nicely with a broader ‘structuration’ epistemology. For instance, 
structuration theory like neo-structuralism recognises how external conditioning forces can 
condition an economy or productive base. But unlike neo-structuralism’s more radical and 
deterministic cousin ‘dependency theory’ (see chapter 4.3) it also retains a degree of optimism in 
that ‘agents’- be they states, institutions, NGOs, communities and even individuals- can help 
temper or even repel such structures (Green, 1995) albeit with some difficulty given the forces of 
globalisation (Gwynne and Kay, 1999). 
                                                 
3
 For a description of the hacienda system refer to chapter 4. 
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2.3.  Methodology  
2.3.1. Methodological Rationale 
This thesis takes a hybrid methodological approach incorporating both a qualitative and quantitative 
approach. Both methods have their own relative strengths and weaknesses. Ordinarily, quantitative 
methods aim to uncover relationships between two or more ‘measurable’ variables with the aim of 
unearthing certain statistical patterns, or even laws (especially in the natural sciences), that might 
give us insight as to why a particular statistical relationship exists (causality). Assuming causality is 
revealed, such findings may then be used to form a model, which in theory aims to predict certain 
outcomes in similar situations where similar variables and parameters exist. On the face of it, 
therefore, quantitative data appears to offer a superior synthesis of reality and prides itself on being 
objective and detectable to the senses.  
 
This may be so (although this is still a highly debated subject within the philosophy of science) in 
terms of the natural sciences, where generally bias only infiltrates the research process either as a 
consequence of the researchers own conscious or unconscious subjectivity or due to the limits of 
human cognitive abilities to adequately understand and interpret the complexities of the natural 
world. But within the social sciences the objects of investigation are often free thinking human 
agents, making reality far more difficult to tie down (some would argue impossible)4. For instance, in 
the case of this thesis, while quantitative data may be able to tell us that land sales have increased 
among smaller farmers within a given period, it does not necessarily tell us why. It may be able to 
make a connection between other observable phenomena such as debt levels per-hectare farmed, but 
still, it cannot tell us why some farmers decided to take on debt in the first place or why others have 
managed to avoid debt and succeed. Thus, qualitative research seeks to uncover what factors might 
explain why a particular person decided to take a particular course of action (e.g. borrow from an 
export company). Presumably, no rational person sets out to accumulate debt to such a level that they 
lose their asset base. Thus in the case of El Palqui, qualitative enquiry might involve an attempt to 
uncover what parceleros expectations were leading up to the signing of a contract. What information 
did they base their decision on? To what extent was their decision based on the information of other 
influential groups with superior information (e.g. export companies)? [These issues are explored in 
greater detail in chapters 6 and 7]. 
 
                                                 
4
 For instance, those of a Historical-Hermeneutic persuasion would argue that external reality does not exist, only each 
individual’s perception of their own reality (Murray and Overton, 2003). 
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There may be many reasons underpinning a grower’s decision to reconvert and which explain grower 
failure. Not all individuals would have started from the same financial foundations or knowledge 
base. Perhaps some had outstanding prior debts, health problems that required immediate attention, 
were exploited or cheated by another person or legal entity (e.g. an export firm), were incredibly 
unlucky, or lacked the requisite skills – such as written and numerical literacy – to effectively 
manage their parcela. Here ‘reality’ is far harder to tie down, as in many ways we are concerned not 
so much with reality, but with how a given individual perceived his or her own reality at a given time 
and place, and how this perception then influenced them to take a particular course of action.  
 
This creates a dilemma of sorts. Qualitative research, because it takes place within the social realm, is 
grounded in a specific time, location and socio-cultural context which one could argue precludes 
qualitative findings from being adopted and applied in any another context. I have already described 
how a researcher, whether intentionally or unintentionally, may further distort the findings by 
allowing their own world view to interfere with the research process, by deciding the terms of inquiry 
in the first place and the way in which questions are constructed and construed. Does this then mean 
that qualitative scientific inquiry into the social world, in particular, is a fruitless endeavour? As from 
a scientific viewpoint, what would be the rationale in trying to understand some phenomena if it is 
merely subjective and has no relevance in any other context? As Murray (1997a, p.7) pondered, how 
do we avoid being stuck in such a “quagmire of relativism”? 
 
While one must remain wary of these factors when performing qualitative research, especially when 
making cross study comparisons, it is the author’s position that the experiences of people under 
certain conditions are often (although certainly not entirely), applicable and useful in similar 
situations – and we are indeed capable of identifying where such similarities and lessons may apply. 
Thus, it is the author’s contention that both forms of inquiry, qualitative and quantitative, have their 
merits, and when combined, complement each other as qualitative inquiry can help uncover why 
quantitative phenomena, such as land sales, may have occurred. Furthermore, if questions are direct 
and unambiguous it is even possible to present qualitative findings in a quantitative form. Once 
again, as long as the researcher declares his or hers intention in an honest and transparent fashion and 
does not claim immunity from his or hers own worldview, then there is no reason why a reader 
should not be able to take onboard findings from both the qualitative or quantitative forms of inquiry.  
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2.4. Topic and Site Selection 
In what follows, I will describe the methodology used to collect information for fulfilling the 
aims and objectives of this thesis; including my rationale for choosing Chilean agriculture; and in 
particular, the decision to focus on the evolution of Chile’s table grape exports.  
 
2.4.1. Why Study Chile? 
Compared with other nations, Chile has been subjected to the first and arguably the most pure and 
aggressive neoliberal restructuring to date (Kay, 2002; Murray, 2002a). This makes Chile a 
particularly interesting destination to study from researchers’ point of view as there exists a 
substantial time frame for which to examine the implications of the outward-oriented development 
model. However, despite the considerable time frame that has passed, politicians, policy makers, 
academics and grassroots organisations- both within and outside of Chile- continues to debate the 
merits of neoliberal restructuring. Part of the problem derives from the fact that while there has been 
an abundance of investigations hailing the macro-economic successes of the reforms, inadequate 
attention has been paid to the impact of neoliberlism in different geographical spheres or localities.  
 
2.4.2. Why Non-Traditional Fruit Exports?    
Although a number of Latin American countries have experienced a rise in non-traditional 
agricultural exports since the introduction of neoliberalism, the growth of fruit exports in Chile has 
been nothing short of spectacular (Collins and Lear, 1995; Korovkin, 1992; Kay, 2002), tempting 
some to refer to the process as the ‘Chilean fruit miracle’. Yet, in reality, Chile’s experience with 
non-traditional fruit exports also demonstrates the great contradictions of the neoliberal model. On 
the one hand the Chilean fruit sector is lauded by adherents of un-feted market capitalism for its 
‘miracle’ like growth, dynamism and productive efficiency. But on the other hand, it is also a sector 
that has been subjected to a rather hostile form of economic darwinism which has perpetuated 
inequality within the Chilean Countryside (Kay, 2002; Murray, 2002b). The debate is complex and 
ongoing, and I would argue can only be resolved by uncovering the real experiences of those living 
in specific localities involved in the transition.  
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2.4.3.Why Chilean Table Grapes? 
Of all the fruits produced in Chile, grape exports have shown some of the most dramatic growth 
within Chile. During the 1980s, a number of pre-coup institutional reforms and agrarian 
infrastructural developments interacted with low labour costs and a non interventionist state to 
unlock Chile’s comparative advantage in the area of grape exports (see chapter 5.8) (Gwynne and 
Kay, 1997). The combination of these institutional and geographical factors, particularly the 
government’s pro-business stance, provided the kind of business conditions irresistible to both 
domestic and foreign investment (Murray, 2002a; 2002b).  
 
Thus, in the absence of any meaningful government agricultural policy, large export firms effectively 
filled a void once occupied by state agencies such as INDAP (Institute for Agricultural 
Development) by providing credit, technical expertise and marketing facilities to many small peasant 
farmers (Collins and Lear, 1995). As a result, the private sector, especially foreign capital, was 
instrumental in transforming the hitherto traditional and ‘inward-looking’ Chilean countryside to one 
that relied heavily on the outside world (Gwynne, 2003). Within Chile’s Central Region in particular, 
foreign capital drove the reconversión process, producing highly visible ‘production clusters’ of 
small-scale producers specialising in almost complete monocultural grape production (Murray, 
1997b). Hence, the corresponding interrelationship that developed between foreign investment and 
local producers in many ways epitomises the expanding global-local linkages unleashed in Chile as 
result of globalisation. This makes the grape export sector an ideal sector for exploring the influence 
of neoliberal restructuring within rural Chile.  
 
2.4.4. Why Study Parceleros? 
By virtue of their central role in the extensive and abrupt changes that have taken place within rural 
Chile, parceleros have become a particularly interesting group to study as their lives, experiences and 
misfortunes in many ways reflect the wider story of agrarian change in Chile. It is worth noting, 
however, that parceleros were not the only group to invest in table grape production. Many large 
owners and corporations have either converted existing land or bought new land in order to plant 
table grapes for export. But what makes parceleros unique is that among Chile’s peasant population 
they were among a select few with enough land to consider reconversión as a ‘viable option’. 
According to Murray (1997a, p.15) generally, “minifundistas, due largely to lack of financial 
collateral, have been precluded from participation in this sector” [also Collins and Lear, 1995 and 
Kay, 2002]. But most importantly, parceleros insertion into the global economy has been almost 
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entirely ‘dependent’ on global capital or local firms operating in the global economy. For these 
reasons they represent a highly global, highly integrated group of producers in which to track the 
local implications of the globalisation of grapes within Chile.  
 
There are also good practical reasons for choosing to focus on parceleros. Thanks to the systematic 
nature in which parcelaciónes were formed during the counter reform process, they now make up a 
relatively homogenous and geographically defined group of producers to study. This has two 
benefits; first, their geographical concentration makes them suitable to interview within a narrow 
time frame and at a reassemble cost. The second relates to the quality of the findings. In effect 
parceleros represents a defined cohort, or population, with similar life experiences within a similar 
socio-economic group. This, I would argue, makes it easier for a researcher to uncover the influence 
of specific external influences within the locality, compared with had the population and land 
distribution grown up organically over time which would have likely produced far greater socio-
economic diversity.  
 
2.4.5. Why El Palqui?  
As I have already mentioned, setting out to perform a longitudinal study of a discreet population of 
farmers I was necessarily compelled to return to the site selected previously by Murray (1997a) 
during his initial investigation; that being El Palqui, a small rural settlement in the region of 
Coquimbo (in Chile’s fourth region (see figures 3 and 4). However, besides this, there are number of 
reasons why El Palqui may be considered an excellent site for studying changes within the Chilean 
countryside.  
 
• Political/Economic History  
Most importantly, El Palqui is a region that has been highly influenced by the wider political-
economic changes in Chile since the mid-1960s. Typical of Central Chile, El Palqui was once 
dominated by a minority of powerful hacienda owners up until the mid-1960s. Following this the 
locality witnessed extensive expropriation and collectivisation projects under Frei and Allende, only 
to be drastically halted, and in some cases reversed, by the Military Government’s counter-reforms 
(Murray, 2002b). Still, despite the counter-reform, under Pinochet, 144 new parcels of land, in five 
reform units (parcelaciónes) were formed out of the previous collectivised land by 1977; on average 
they were 9-10 basic irrigated hectares (BIH) in size (Murray, 1997a; Kay, 2002). Most of the reform 
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beneficiaries were new landowners, with few business skills and little managerial experience, yet 
they were thrust into one of the most uncertain and precarious times in Chilean economic history 
(Collins and Lear, 1995). 
 
Initially, the drastic social-political upheavals, and the harsh economic conditions brought on by the 
Military Government’s extreme neoliberal reforms, were enough to force many reform beneficiaries 
to sell their land. For those who chose, or perhaps more accurately, were able to remain, they got 
down to producing what they new best- traditional crops- mostly vegetables (tomatoes and green 
beans) geared for the domestic market. Yet as the macro-economic situation altered, especially given 
the devaluation of the Chilean peso, as elsewhere in Chile, market forces drew in local and foreign 
investors who scrambled to unlock El Palqui’s unique comparative and competitive advantage, 
precipitating the much heralded fruit boom (Murray, 2002b). 
 
• Natural and Institutional Endowments  
As a locality, El Palqui has a number of natural advantages that contributed to its growth. Lying 
within the Guatulame Valley, within the wider Limari system, El Palqui is blessed with a unique 
topography and geographical positioning which provides a very favourable climate for growing 
grapes. For example, according to Murray (2002b, p. 200) “El Palqui’s distribution of temperature 
and isolation characteristics throughout the year means that the harvesting period, from mid-
November to mid-February, has generally coincided with peak prices  (around the Christmas 
festivities) in northern hemisphere markets...thus the produce can command excellent prices”5.  
 
Not surprisingly, given such favourable natural endowments, when suitable institutional-economic 
conditions coalesced during the 1980s, El Palqui received some thing akin to a ‘gold rush’ (Murray, 
2002b) as large fruit export companies penetrated the region eager take advantage of the locality’s 
natural and institutional endowments. The subsequent transformation was spectacular. Between 1962 
and 1988 in the Guatumlame Valley grape production ballooned from a mere 70 to 1,500 hectares 
(Murray, 2002b, p.202).  
 
Underpinning and driving this extremely rapid and complete transformation were a number of large 
transnational agri-businesses who were responsible for connecting local producers with global 
                                                 
5
 Although Murray (2002b) notes that since the late 1980s the maximum price period has slipped back to late November. 
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markets (Gwynne, 2003; Murray, 2002a). The primary mechanism underpinning this 
producer/export firm relationship was the credit-consignation-contract system (CCC), a system first 
pioneered by Chilean owned fruit firm David Del Curto in Curicó, that was later (in the 1980s) 
adopted by other Chilean and non-Chilean export firms (Barton and Murray, 2005). According to 
Gwynne (1995) and Murray (2002b) the CCC system works in the following way; export firms 
lend considerable sums of money to fund the initial setup costs and any subsequent running costs 
for those parceleros whishing to ‘convert’ their parcelas to table grapes for export. In return, 
growers are legally obligated to sell their produce exclusively to the creditor firm. However, 
growers are not paid upfront for their produce. Instead, payment is withheld or delayed until such 
time as the grapes are sold in overseas markets. Once the grapes have been sold, growers receive the 
‘market price’ less the initial advance, interest payments and commission (for export). Growers who 
fail to pay in full- almost a forgone conclusion in the initial years- are legally bound to sell 
exclusively to their creditor firm until such time as they can settle their outstanding debts. The 
implications of the CCC system will be discussed in greater detail in latter chapters. However, suffice 
to say, this system helped El Palqui evolve from a traditional agricultural locality to “one of the most 
rapidly transformed exporting areas in the whole of Chile” (Murray, 2000b, p.204). 
 
In summary, the key benefits of studying El Palqui is that the region’s experience under 
neoliberalism has been so pure and so complete with the majority of parceleros embracing grape 
production. It is thus a truly transformed locality which stands as a testament to the awesome 
conditioning power of globalisation, especially when global economic forces are allowed free rein 
under neoliberalism. And as a region naturally blessed to grow grapes with a high degree of 
population and socio-economic homogeneity (at least in the early years), it should in theory be 
possible to isolate those institutional and political-economical structures which have shaped the 
locality since the mid-1960s.  
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Figure 1. Chile Regional Map                      Figure 2. Chile’s IV region. 
Source: GoChile (2006)                                   Source: Biblioteca del Congreso 
● El Palqui  ●El Palqui 
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                  Figure 3. El Palqui Chile: Field Study Site Right North-East Corner 
Source: Google Earth (2006) 
 
Figure 4. El Palqui Chile. Research Site and Separate Parcelaciónes 
Source: generated from Murray (1997a) 
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2.5. Field Work and Data Collection Methods  
The following section outlines my methodological approach used for satisfying the aims and 
objectives of this thesis. As previously discussed, I elected a ‘hybrid methodology’ which included 
both qualitative (part a) and quantitative data (part b). The quantitative data was derived from 
examining los roles (the land tenancy register) which track land tenure changes over time according 
to each plot. The qualitative data, was derived almost entirely from a series of interviews with local 
growers, and is intended to complement the quantitative data by unravelling the underlying causes 
behind land sales and acquisitions within El Palqui. The location specific mixed data was then 
combined with an array of contextual secondary sources in order to situate the ‘local’ in terms of the 
wider political transformation that have taken place within Chile.  
 
2.6. Quantitative Primary Data: (Part a) Los Roles  
In order to track the changes in land tenure for 144 parcelas in El Palqui, I consulted the local roles 
which track the changes in land ownership within the locality over time. For each parcel of land the 
roles give the name of the owner, size of the plot and a corresponding reference or parcela number. 
Where a person or company owns two or more plots, as is often the case, the roles continue to 
categorise the parcela as if it is a separate entity- even though in reality multiple plots are likely to be 
administered by their owners as whole entities, especially when adjacent to one another. Nonetheless, 
this categorical peculiarity is extremely useful from the point of view of this research as it allows us 
to see just how many parcels of land have been acquired, by whom, and within which timeframe.  
 
For the purposes of my research, rolls were used to examine land changes within the locality in five 
discrete periods, 1983, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 2004. For period 1983-1994 I relied on Murray’s 
(1997a) previous roles information collected in 1994. I was able to up date the roles by attaining the 
data for 2004. Unfortunately, data for the period 1994-1998 did not exist.  
 
Nonetheless, combining the past and present data I was able to calculate, update and compare critical 
changes within the locality over time, such as the overall velocity within the land market6 (i.e. land 
transfers per period), and more specific indicators such as the number of original parceleros 
remaining by 2004 and their percentage land ownership within the locality. Likewise, I was able to 
                                                 
6
 Land market velocity is a term I have used to describe the rate of transfers or the degree of fluidity within the land market 
over time. When the number of transfers within a given period appear to exceed that of previous intervals, the market can be 
said to display greater velocity. 
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calculate, for instance, the number of individuals or companies who have acquired more than one 
plot. These were just some of the methods used in demonstrating whether land concentration has 
continued since 1994. Microsoft Excel, with its spread sheet format, was essential for organising, 
tabling and presenting my findings graphically (see chapter 6).  
 
2.6.1. Problems Encountered  
There are a number of problems pertaining to the data collected and the manner in which the data 
was obtained. Firstly, it is crucial to point out that no data was able to be obtained for 1982 meaning 
the first period (1983 to 1986) consists of only three years as compared with the following two 
periods that have intervals of four years (1986-1994). Of course, this data gap is inherited from 
Murray’s (1997a) previous research. However, the author accepts this admission is likely to bias the 
information by understating the number of land transfers within this period by approximately one 
quarter (e.g. 1 year), especially when making cross period comparisons. That said, I would contend 
that the data is still useful and comparable so long as the reader is made aware of this statistical 
discrepancy.  
 
Of greater concern is the period 1994–2004 as there are no records for the middle period 1994-1998. 
An attempt was made to obtain this data but this proved unsuccessful. In previous years Murray was 
granted access to the roles but I was not afforded the same access. Somewhat understandably, the 
authorities were not comfortable in providing such personal information to the public, let alone a 
foreign researcher. The roles were online, but only for the year 2004, and they required a password 
from an authorised person. Fortunately, I was assisted by an authorised local from El Palqui involved 
in the agricultural industry, who kindly provided me with the information for 2004. 
 
Still, not having the data for 1994–1998 creates a similar dilemma to that described above. How 
could I compare the last 10 years’ data with past data organised according to 4 year intervals (with 
the exception of one three year interval 1983–86)? There lies no simple answer to this quandary. I 
could, for instance, attempt to disaggregate the data by dividing the latest 10 year interval by two 
creating two five year intervals (1994–1999 and 1999–2004) to compare with the remaining two four 
year intervals and one three year interval. Such a technique would, however, be based on a rather 
optimistic assumption that the land market remained more or less constant during the last 10 years. 
Yet, this is a highly unlikely scenario and a rather arbitrary assumption.  
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In order to address this problem, when referring to the periods between 1983 and 1994, changes will 
discussed in terms of one three and two four year intervals, as doing so provides greater analytical 
debt. Yet, when making comparisons with 2004 findings, the data will be aggregated and presented 
in one 11 year (1983–1994) and one 10 year (1983–1994) period. It is reasoned that over this greater 
time frame the missing year of 1982 will be less likely to prejudice my findings. Moreover, as the 
majority of data is presentable in graphical form, most graphs displaying changes over time will 
include both columns’ from the three and four year intervals, as well as an 11 year aggregate (1983–
1994) column so as to make comparisons with the latest 10 year period (1994–2004).  
 
Another concern relates to the difficulty in uncovering who owns a particular parcel of land. 
According to Murray (1997b) -– who discovered this point during an interview -– some companies 
have on occasion bought land in the name of their manager or executives making it difficult to assess 
the amount of land owned by specific export companies. The extent of such tactics is unknown, but I 
suspect it is relatively rare given the large number of company names that appeared on the roles as of 
November 2004. 
 
Finally, as was the case in Murray’s (1997a) prior investigation, one serious flaw of the roles is that 
they do not tell us the degree to which ‘semi-proletarianisation’ has taken place. From 1983-2004, 
the roles assume that each parcela retained its original size. However, as later chapters will show, we 
know this not to be the case. We know that many, perhaps even the majority, of parceleros have at 
some stage sold a part of their parcela. But the roles maintain the same number of hectares for each 
allotted piece of land. Thus I would strongly suggest that unfortunately the roles are likely to 
understate the extent of land concentration within the region. This is undoubtedly a serious gap in my 
research, and I call upon the reader to make up his or her own mind when presented with the 
qualitative evidence, which although of a smaller sample size, appears to show that the majority of 
parceleros have at one stage or another engaged in partial land sales. If any thing, this highlights the 
importance of qualitative data in telling the El Palqui story, which I will turn to now.     
 
2.7. Qualitative Data: EL Palqui Interviews 2004 (Part b)  
In October/November 2004 I carried out a series of interviews with small-farmers within El Palqui. 
The aim was to interview some 25–30 farmers in regard to their production and output situation, 
tenancy status, marketing methods, credit sources, debt levels, investment levels, technology use, 
labour sources and their future intentions. In orde
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interview approach was selected which included closed ended questions and open ended, 
opinion/experience based, questions. Semi-structured interviews were aimed at collecting a rich 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data, and were deemed most suitable given my limited 
time frame and language issues.  
 
Upon arriving in El Palqui, my first goal was to make contact with those farmers interviewed during 
Murray’s 1994 investigation from the three separate parcelaciónes. However, as expected, some of 
the original interviewees had by this stage sold their land, passed away, or moved to a different 
locality. In fact, six had already sold their land by the time of Murray’s investigation. Still, relying on 
the list of names provided by my professor, I attempted to contact as many of the farmers 
interviewed in 1994 as was possible.  
 
Although the survey consisted of a number of questions aimed at understanding the general 
production situation of small-growers, in those cases where an interviewee no longer owned his or 
her land, I endeavoured to establish when it was sold, to whom and for what reason (e.g. debt, prices 
etc). On most occasions I was able to contact the person directly. Where this was not feasible or 
possible, I spoke with friends, family and other growers to collect my information. Wherever 
possible I sought to corroborate such information by asking the same questions to a number of people 
within the locality. One person in particular, Robinson Laffarte, the son of a former interviewee and 
small business owner who provides administrative services to growers, proved to be an essential 
guide throughout the duration of my stay.  
 
Of the 20 owners still retaining their land in 1994, I was able to interview 15 directly (6/9 from LL, 
3/5 from SA, and 6/7 from SR). Information for the remaining five growers (of which 4 out of 5 had 
sold completely) was gained by questioning friends, family, and other growers and of course ‘my 
guide’. The information was organised and collated so as to make comparisons with past findings.   
 
In addition to the longitudinal aspect, I also performed another four interviews. Of course, the 
purpose of these extra interviews was not for comparative purposes but rather to add additional debt 
to my findings, so they are analysed separately throughout. All in all, 20 full interviews were 
performed from a population of 73 owners. However, crucially, 18 of the interviewees are single 
parcela ‘small-owners’ of which there remain only 61 remaining, meaning approximately one third 
of the entire population of individual parcela owners were interviewed.  
2.7.1. Issues Encountered During the Interview Process  
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During the course of my research I faced a number of challenges; some of which were expected but 
many were not. For instance, before leaving New Zealand I was aware of my limited research 
timeframe, but there was no way of knowing just how challenging such research would be. As an 
English speaking New Zealander, with little prior exposure to Latin American cultures and a limited 
command of the Spanish language, I tried to prepare myself to the best of my abilities by studying 
Spanish before I left. Yet on arrival, I soon found my command of the language wanting when 
confronted with a difficult Chilean accent combined with the general pressures that come with 
researching out of one’s comfort zone. Fortunately, for the first 5 or 6 interviews I was assisted by 
my partner, who as a fluent Spanish speaker from Argentina, helped me ease into my research; 
although for the most part my Spanish was far more limited than I would have liked.   
 
Once on my own, I simply had to make do with my limited language skills. I had a range of set-
questions that I asked and all replies were taped for later analysis. But although taping allowed me to 
capture the interviewees’ responses, on many occasions I was not able to understand the response, 
which regrettably meant I could only assume that the question was first, understood, and second 
answered appropriately. My lack of Spanish also precluded me on a number of occasions from 
asking important follow up questions that may have offered greater insight.  
 
As a result, following translation, it became apparent to me that on several occasions some questions 
had been misconstrued, answered in a confusing manner, or even missed out completely. For this 
reason, on a number of occasions I have been forced to adjust my results accordingly. For instance, 
instead of having a sample size of 20 for each question, the results are framed according to ‘the 
number for whom a response was attained’ rather than the total number interviewed. Thus, although 
a fixed number of interviews were carried out, many of the finding will be framed like so…7 of 15 
who answered this question stated that…, or 10 of 18 have received…etc. No doubt these gaps in my 
investigation prejudice the strength of my qualitative data and overall findings. However, in my 
defence it is important to make clear that although the sample size is indeed small so too is the whole 
population. In hindsight, however, my largest regret is that I did not appreciate just how long 
research can take when working within a foreign culture and where major language barriers exist.  
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2.8. Additional Information and Secondary Sources  
2.8.1. Location Specific Secondary Data, and Informal Information Sources  
In addition to collecting land tenure statistics and carrying out interviews, a number of additional 
interviews, anecdotes and documents were gathered. For example, an interview was performed 
with a representative from the multinational export company, Unifruti, who kindly took me on his 
daily visits to various vineyards and orchards throughout the region and provided me with some 
important background information regarding the changes in El Palqui and the role of the export 
companies in the wider region. 
 
Furthermore, I also received a copy of a CCC contract that belonged to my ‘guides’ father, and for 
which I was told- by both my guide and growers- was typical of CCC producer contracts within El 
Palqui. Finally, throughout the course of my investigation, by spending time with the locals and 
enjoying their warm hospitality I heard many personal anecdotes from growers and their families. 
Although they were not necessarily obtained in a strictly scientific sense, they have still been very 
useful in helping me contextualise my findings. Throughout the results chapter some of these 
anecdotes will be used to add meaning and context to the more discrete scientific data.  
2.8.1. Non-location specific Secondary Data 
In addition to the locality specific data collected, a range of secondary sources have been considered. 
They include statistical information (grape export and price statistics) from various Chilean and non-
Chilean governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as INDAP, the United Nations and 
CEPAL (United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean: also ECLA). I have also 
consulted the extensive development literature relating to Chile and the wider Latin American 
continent. 
2.9 Limits to my Analysis- ‘Some Thoughts’ 
2.9.1 Explanation of Aims and Justification of Research Scope  
Of course, the areas and question outlined above are but a few of the many modes of inquiry and 
areas I could have touched on throughout the research process. However, due to time, logistical 
limitations, and the fact that many questions would require skills in some areas of the social-
sciences of which I have no direct prior experience, I have decided to, for the most part, examine 
the effect of neoliberal restructuring on visible phenomena such as land concentration and socio-
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economic differentiation, rather than provide a sophisticated philosophical critique of the free-
market model from a moral or ethical perspective. This does not mean the ‘model’ will be 
immune from criticism, however, but merely states that I accept that this thesis cannot hope to try 
and nail down the final judgement as to the merits of neoliberalism.  
 
For instance, it is not my intention to uncover to what extent neoliberalism has increased or 
decreased the overall wellbeing of the community. That is to say, given the terms of reference for 
my investigation, I cannot objectively say that neoliberalism has made the community worse or 
better off. Although qualitative and anecdotal information attained during the interview process 
and my stay will help to illuminate the opinions and experiences of various individuals, such an 
inquiry was not the centre point of my research. Yet I do believe they are essential in helping to 
explain much of the goings on and provide a crucial human element, whilst ultimately leaving it 
up to the reader to form his or her own opinion.  
 
Moreover, at no stage do I pretend not to have my own perception and opinion in respect of the 
effects of neoliberalism in El Palqui or indeed Chile. I am comfortable in declaring that the 
driving force behind my interest in development studies, and indeed the decision to partake in this 
thesis stems from a deep personal belief that we can improve our wellbeing and that of others by 
learning to appreciate and understand the structures and power dynamics that exist within the 
social world which we inhabit. While it is my personal belief that the litmus test of any set of 
reforms or policy initiatives is the impact on individual and collective ‘wellbeing’, I also accept 
that ‘wellbeing’ is a rather elusive concept. That is to say, one is eager to avoid the ‘reductionist 
trap’ often fallen into by many in the economics profession, who are notorious for their persistent 
attempts to reduce human ‘utility’ or ‘wellbeing’ to one ‘convenient’ but extremely narrow metric 
‘income’. 
 
One cannot simply rely on such proxies to measure wellbeing. Beyond certain ‘biological bottom 
lines’ (diet, health, shelter) which few would dispute have an objectively verifiable negative 
impact on ones happiness; to a certain degree, each individual is essentially the final arbiter of 
their own happiness or wellbeing, which is not necessarily a function of ones physical 
surrounding or external reality, but rather how one perceives his or hers own wellbeing or 
‘reality’.  
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Thus, although at an intuitive level it would seem to me that the loss of land in El Palqui, greater 
income inequality and increased debt burden would place undue stress on a community, and one 
would suppose, represent a loss of quality of life, such losses would have to be balanced (if even 
possible) against other important variables such as; financial stability, incidence of crime, 
environmental quality; access to employment, markets, new opportunities and economic 
freedoms, the degree of social mobility, material wealth, capital and income; not to mention less 
observable- but equally important concepts- such as social cohesion, cultural identity, self esteem 
and stress levels.  
 
But because my research cannot provide such a detailed and holistic analysis of ‘wellbeing’, I 
intend to limit the scope of this thesis to measuring the degree of ‘land concentration’ that has 
taken place in El Palqui since the mid-1990s and its relationship with grower debt and foreign 
capital. The idea is to present the evidence as it stands. Where opinions and views of interviewees 
are presented the reader is invited to make up his or her own mind as to the more holistic impacts 
of neoliberalism in El Palqui and the Chilean countryside. 
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3.0. Globalisation 
 
3.1. Introduction  
An essential aspect of this thesis concerns the ever controversial and often misunderstood 
phenomenon of globalisation. In essence, the entire academic/intellectual pursuit which this thesis 
represents is an attempt to better understand the forces and mechanism of globalisation, its 
primary agents, and in particular, the way in which globalisation is played out or manifested 
within unique geographical spheres. It could be argued that ever since colonial times inaugurated 
the first ‘wave’ of globalisation, Chileans have fluctuated in terms of their attitudes and responses 
to globalisation, at times resisting the force (e.g. indigenous resistance against the Spanish 
colonists, and during the early 19th century with Creole resistance against the Spanish monarchy), 
at other times welcoming it (at least among the Chilean elite) as was the case during Chile’s first 
outward-orientated free-trade area (1830s–1930s), only to turn their back on global integration (at 
least of the laissez-faire variety) for nearly half a century following the Great Depression.  
 
For the most part, however, with the exception of Allende’s rule (see section 5.6), whether 
globalisation has been embraced or eschewed in Chile has seldom been a democratic affair but 
rather the prerogative of the elite. Never has this been truer than in recent times. Indeed, under 
military rule (beginning in 1973) the Military Junta- without the mandate of the people- 
unleashed the most transformative and rapid wave of globalisation yet (thanks to neoliberal 
restructuring); a wave which has continued to reverberate under successive democratically elected 
and nominally socialist Concertación governments. These ‘waves’ will be explored in greater 
detail in the following chapter. Before this is done, however, given the central importance of the 
term globalisation to this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the controversy surrounding 
globalisation the ‘term’, globalisation the ‘process’ and globalisation the ‘discourse’- especially 
as it relates to the discipline of geography.  
 
3.2. Globalisation the ‘Term’  
According to Johnston, Pratt, and Watts (2000, p.532) the term ‘globalisation’ first surfaced 
“around 1960 when Canadian media scholar Marshall McLuhan coined the term ‘global village’ 
to capture the impact of new communications technology on social and cultural life”. Since the 
1990s, however, globalisation has developed into something of a household name (Murray, 2006) 
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- although there remains much debate, controversy and confusion over the term. This is because 
like other terms within the development studies discourse such as ‘development’, ‘sustainable 
development’ and even ‘poverty’, globalisation is a rather amorphous and convoluted term that 
often eludes definition. Indeed, as we will come to see, some even deny the existence of the 
phenomenon altogether preferring to see the present state of affairs as an extension of 
internationalism rather than some new and profound change deserving the name ‘globalisation’ 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1996).  
 
However, putting this polemic aside for the moment, few would deny that there is a process or 
processes underway that are progressively linking the earths peoples via the expansion of 
economic, political, social, and environmental links; and most would agree that these ‘links’ are 
growing in strength, reach, velocity and intensity due to the seemingly limitless development of 
faster and safer transport modes and more efficient communications technologies. Further, there 
is little doubt that these developments are progressively reducing global spatial and temporal 
barriers (‘time-space compression’) (Murray, 2006), contributing to a new and unique awareness 
of not only being part of a nation state, region, city or village, but also a global society (Waters, 
2002).  
 
Within this context of an ever shrinking world, there is a concomitant awareness that actions and 
events that take place thousands of miles away can have drastic and even magnified ramifications 
for individuals and communities throughout the entire globe or in seemingly unrelated localities 
(Johnston, et al, 2000; McGrew, 1992). The war in Iraq’s effect on the global price of oil and the 
world economy in general is a case in point. Sometimes these actions can also have unintended or 
unforeseen outcomes as a consequence of being part of such a complex and integrated global 
system. For example, by contributing to an increased price for oil, US foreign policy has 
inadvertently strengthened Hugo Chavez’s regime of Venezuela, whom the US regard as a threat 
to the ‘free world’.  
 
Therefore, it would appear that the world today is an increasingly complex, uncertain and 
interconnected place. As individuals, consumers, and voters- whether we like it or not- we cannot 
go about our lives without reference to the global- even if we do not always realise it. However, 
depending on one’s world view, ideological beliefs, socio-economic position, culture, nationality 
or religion, this increasing interconnectedness may be seen in both a negative and a positive light, 
as an opportunity or a threat, a process to be embraced or resisted.  
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It is my belief that there is indeed such a process taking place and it presents both opportunities 
and threats; and I intend to refer to this process as globalisation throughout this thesis. However, 
due to the words elusive character, the following seeks to illustrate the rationale behind the claim 
that globalisation is indeed at work in order to arrive at a working definition to use as a reference 
point for remaining chapters.  
 
3.3. Globalisation’s Antecedents  
It is a common misconception that globalisation is a new process that has emerged over the last 
two to three decades, when in reality globalisation is part of an ongoing process that has been 
underway for centuries (Cloke et al, 1999; Murray, 2006). Arguably, ever since humans left 
Africa to spread out across the globe in search of new lands and resources to conquer, people 
have been establishing ever greater ties through trade, migration, cultural exchange and empire. 
One need only think of the magnificent empires of the Greeks, Romans and Ottomans, or the 
great civilisations of the Maya, Inca and Aztecs of pre-Columbian times (Bulliet et al, 1997).  
 
Notwithstanding the significance of these empires and civilisations, it is, however, important to 
distinguish between those processes that have ‘contributed’ to globalisation versus the ‘processes’ 
of globalisation itself. By definition, in order for us to talk of some process being ‘global’, it 
necessitates a situation whereby humans have; firstly, the technological capabilities to traverse the 
entire globe and discover new lands; secondly, the military might to defend such lands; and 
thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the motivational, institutional and administrative capacity 
to either settle or retain meaningful contact for an extended period of time in order that social, 
political, environmental and economic links may develop, feed back into a global system and 
have long term global influences.  
 
The first peoples to not only possess such capabilities but put them into practice were the Western 
Europeans who began their expansionary drive just before the close of the 15th century, but by the 
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mid-17th century had charted almost every (at least coastal) inch of the globe7. However, as 
Bulliet et al (1997) maintains; 
 
[W]hat made Western European expansion unprecedented had less to do with what 
happened between 1450–1500 than with what happened later…European exploration led 
to the opening of the worlds three major oceans, establishing regular contact among all 
the continents for the first time in world history….and showed the ability to move beyond 
conquest and capture of existing systems to create a major new trading system that could 
transform regions almost beyond recognition”, [that is]…, the Europeans did not turn 
their backs on the world after an impressive burst of exploration [unlike the Chinese for 
example] (Bulliet et al, 1997,p. 509). 
 
Since this time, it is useful to think of globalisation as occurring in waves rather than as some 
steady linear process (Murray, 2003). The first of these waves we might call the 
‘mercantilist/colonial wave’ (1492 to the early 1800s); the second, the outward orientation ‘free 
trade’ wave (1850s to the 1930s); third, the ‘developmentalist wave’ (1930s-1980s); and finally, 
the neoliberal wave (1980-to the present day). Of course it is acknowledged that these ‘categories 
are somewhat arbitrary in nature. However, I would argue that there is sufficient consistency 
within each period to warrant such labels. As stated at the beginning of this section, these waves 
are best described later in the Latin American and Chilean context. Although, due to its 
unprecedented impact and central relevance to this dissertation, the following offers a more 
detailed exposition of the latest neoliberal wave  
 
3.4. The ‘Fourth Wave’: Neoliberal Globalisation (mid-1970s–2000)   
 
Some countries globalise, and others are globalised… the Third World belongs in 
the latter category (Humala, O. 2006, Peruvian Presidential Candidate).   
 
                                                 
7
 At the time the Arabs and much earlier the Chinese, had similar or arguably superior navigational skills to make such 
long journeys of discovery, but showed little interest in doing so. Historians debate the exact reasons as to why, but it is 
generally accepted that both the Arabs and the Chinese with their rich trading routes, vibrant cultures and abundance of 
luxury products simply lacked the motivation to conquer and settle new far away lands (Bulliet et al, 1997: Murray, 
2003) 
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The above quote by Peru’s left leaning opposition leader Ollanta Humala, in many ways defines 
this most recent period of globalisation (or ‘hyper-globalisation’), and reveals the negative 
manner in which globalisation is often viewed within much of the ‘third world’. However, 
Humala goes on to talk of the evils of what he calls "the neo-liberal economic model that has 
failed to benefit our nation" and is critical of the role of multinational companies that he argues 
"offer no benefits" to the people of Peru, and speaks of a “new division” in the world.  
 
Thus, as the article progresses it becomes clear, then, that Humala is using neoliberalism and 
‘globalisation interchangeably, as if they are synonymous’ with each other. But if we accept, as I 
already have, that globalisation is not a new process, then it would in fact be misguided to refer to 
‘neoliberalism’- a relatively new paradigm (albeit one based on 18th century classical-economic 
theory) - with the much older process of ‘globalisation’. Thus it seems Humala is not so much 
talking about globalisation per se, but more specifically, the latest wave of ‘neoliberal 
globalisation’ which many would agree has had a profoundly negative effect on the Latin 
American continent8.  
Humala can be forgiven for confusing the two phenomena given their close relationship over 
recent years. Although neoliberalism and globalisation may not be the same thing, neoliberalism- 
with its emphasis on restricting the nation state in order to encourage freer international trade and 
foreign investments flows9- has unquestionably been the pivotal force in driving the extremely 
rapid globalisation phase since the late 1970s; whereby the ‘developing world’ was indeed 
actively ‘globalised’ according to the ideological values and economic interests of the 
‘globalisors’ (see chapter 4.4).  
 
These ‘deliberate’ structural reforms were instrumental in assisting some of the worlds largest 
corporations in their efforts to branch out from their formerly stagnant ‘Fordist type’ production 
systems to ones based on flexible factors of production which are inherently global (Bilton et al, 
1997; Murray, 2003). Thus, firms came to possess not only the financial resources and technical 
capacity to act strategically at the global level but now enjoyed the kind of ‘economic freedoms’ 
(Johnston et al, 2000) necessary for searching out those localities which offered the most 
                                                 
8
 For instance, it is unlikely that Humala would lament the spread of Latino culture, music and language throughout the 
world and the fact that he can make such as quote one day and it be transmitted by global telecommunications systems 
to be included in this dissertation the following day; however, these are all possible due to globalisation.  
9
 Via the rolling back of tariffs and subsidies regimes, deregulation, government social spending, and the promotion of 
privatisation and liberal foreign investment laws.  
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beneficial ‘investment climate’. Effectively, this meant those areas with lower labour costs poor 
worker protection and limited environmental regulation (Bilton et al., 1997, p.64).  
 
Nowhere is this new wave of globalisation better epitomised than in the numerous ‘free trade 
zones’ throughout the developing world whereby firms operate within a virtually stateless 
business climate insulated from the rules and regulations of the nation state in which it is 
physically located. Moreover, the fact that firms that chose to locate in such de-regulated zones 
can leave with relative ease means they can, in a sense, hold governments to ransom; demanding 
that polices and conditions meet their expectations- ultimately weakening the economic 
sovereignty of the recipient nation10. Because of this Ohmae (1990, p.65) argues that these 
corporations “operate globally without any real concern for place”. And their ability to alter and 
temper the nation state according to Bilton et al (1997) makes TNC the ‘true global actors’ and 
the primary “shapers of the global economy” (Dicken, 1998, p.7). This is certainly the case in 
Chile where according to Gwynne (2003, p.314) “fruit TNC are becoming the main agents 
linking local spaces of production to global markets, investment and technology” 
 
Thus, I would argue that neoliberalism and globalisation are two separate but interrelated forces, 
with neoliberalism steering, and some might even argue bulldozing- the way for a particularly 
rapid phase of globalisation. Certainly, the result of neoliberalism restructuring in both the ‘first’ 
and ‘third world’ and former communist Eastern Europe has seen a rapid and sometimes ruthless 
shattering of time and space and has contributed to the feeling that we are now inhabitants of a 
profoundly different world.    
 
3.5. Debate within the Globalisation Discourse  
 
It has been argued that globalisation is not a new phenomenon but a process that continues to gain 
in velocity as it rides the crest of global capitalist expansion. It is also apparent that although 
globalisation is at work this does not mean the world is now a globalised one.  
 
In examining the extent to which today’s world is globalised, a good place to start is to try and 
envision what a ‘truly globalised’ world would look like, that is, in essence, a world where the 
                                                 
10
 Although it is claimed by many that Multinational Companies (MNC) actively lobby and influence government 
policy. States are inclined to meet their standards anyhow in ‘a race to the bottom’ to receive investment capital (Bilton, 
1997). 
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nation state ceases to exist. Whilst acknowledging the limitations in imagining such an alternate 
reality, one might envision a world which essentially functions much in the same way that 
individual nation states currently do. This would mean a world whereby a world government has 
the role of protecting its ‘global citizens’, collecting taxes, allocating public resources, and 
maintaining the rule of law (Bilton et al, 1997; Johnston, 2000). It might also necessitate the more 
or less free mobility of people, goods, services and capital throughout the globe.  
 
Envisioning the world like this forces us to accept that today’s world is far from globalised. As 
Johnston (2000) rightly states, at present “the nation state is not merely passive and market forces 
are not simply rampant” (p.534). This has led a number of thinkers to conclude that globalisation 
is a myth; a mere extension of internationalism (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). But although the 
world is not yet, and may never be, truly globalised, there is every indication it is a rapidly 
globalising one (Murray, 2006). 
 
Indeed, according to Giddens (1990) and Robertson (1992) the evidence is simply overwhelming 
that “the dynamics of contemporary globalisation are not reducible to what goes on at the level of 
the national state” (paraphrased in Bilton et al. 1997, p.59). In other words the “global whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts”. Today there are global intuitions and global events that 
challenge the ability of the Nation State “to practice its claim to a sovereign monopoly over its 
bounded space and to protect its citizens from external incursions” (Johnston, 2000, p.534). Thus 
we see supranational bodies such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) to name but a few, and 
phenomena such as global climate change, the Asian financial crises and the surge in global oil 
prices as a result of the political instability in the Middle East, all serve to remind us of our 
increasingly integrated existence11. Furthermore, as already discussed, since the 1980s in 
particular, TNCs have been able to use their huge financial and political leverage to force states to 
adjust to meet their business requirements; and in a similar vein, the WB and the IMF used the 
debt crisis to remodel whole economies- often against the will of the majority of people.  
 
Even those groups of organisations who often claim to be opposed to globalisation harness the 
power of this phenomenon when convenient. For instance, NGOs such as Greenpeace, who 
                                                 
11
 The WTO organisation, with its ‘rule based’ trade liberalisation agenda, already has the ability to check the economic 
sovereignty of states by enforcing binding trade agreements. 
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lament many aspects of ‘globalisation’, also use the latest communications technologies such as 
the internet to rally support and mobilise ‘global citizens’ from hundreds of nations on issues 
which transcend the nation state such as global climate change, deforestation or bio-diversity loss.  
 
It is also increasingly the case that individuals, not just nation states, TNCs and NGOs, act 
globally too. Individuals are increasingly aware that they are influenced by the global as much as 
the local and they act accordingly. According to sociology, they act ‘reflexively’ “by examining 
the behaviour of the self and others” in response to “the social conditions and experiences of late 
modernity”; where late modernity could easily be substituted for the term globalisation (Bilton et 
at, 1997, p.668).  
 
3.5.1. The Globalisation Paradox: The Importance of Place in an Increasingly 
Integrated World  
Given this seemingly limitless interconnectedness, and time space compression, some claim the 
world is becoming increasingly homogenised tending toward a monocultural world- a world 
characterised by ‘placelesness’. Within the geography discipline this discourse has been referred 
to as the ‘end of Geography thesis. Proponents of this philosophy question the role of Geography 
given its overriding concern for space, and its focus on ‘place’ in a world which is increasingly 
characterised by events and actions taking place at the global level (Murray, 2006).  
 
But as Murray (2003, p. 19) points out, it pays to see globalisation not so much as a ‘blanket’ but 
rather as a ‘net’, as globalisation “does not affect everybody equally and is not making 
everywhere the same [although] everything is increasingly defined in relation to it”. Thus, no 
matter how powerful such global forces might become, these forces must still interact and 
manifest themselves within the local. Therefore according to Bilton et al, (1997, p.318) with 
globalisation we are experiencing; 
 
 Simultaneous integration and fragmentation” [which] “need not necessarily mean 
greater unity and uniformity… [because]…the particular character of individual 
countries, of regions and localities interact with the larger scale general processes to 
produce quite specific outcomes.  
 
Thus, if anything globalisation is creating a world “where no clear new structures are 
discernible…” wherein “unevenness in development, greater inequality, increased division and 
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difference” are the norm (Bilton et al, 1997, p.319) [also Cloke et al, 1999; Murray, 2006]. 
Precisely because of this de-fragmentation and spatial unevenness, I would agree with Murray 
(2003) that- perhaps now more than ever- the study of geography is critical to helping us better 
understand and track the complex, widespread and rapid changes occurring in diverse spaces or 
within different geographical spheres (Murray, 2003)12.  
 
Importantly, if this is so, it also means that nations, communities and individuals are not merely at 
the mercy of some globalisation juggernaut. Certainly some aspects of globalisation are difficult 
to combat but it does not pay to see the process of globalisation as completely deterministic 
(Murray, 2006; Lewis, 2002). As Johnston (2000, p.534) maintains, “[t]here is a general 
consensus among political theorists that while the power of the state has been eroded….it is a 
myth to claim that the state has no influence over the impacts of such globalising process” 
(Johnston, 2000, p.534).  
 
To view globalisation in this sense brings the analysis inline with Giddens’s ‘structuration 
theory’. According to Giddens (as paraphrased in Bilton et al, 1990, p.670), ‘structures’, defined 
as “the frameworks and patterns of organisations which, in some way, contain or direct human 
behaviour”, play an important role in defining our lives. But as individuals, or collectively as 
communities and states we are also “knowledgeable agents” who can, and do, possess human 
agency. That is, we posses the ability to reflect on our present situation, analyse prevailing 
structures and act to “change and influence events”. Such a dual process is said to be at work with 
globalisation where “structural features are indissolubly bound up with actions, being either 
reproduced, or transformed, by these actions” (pp.521).  
 
Therefore, as global links grow it is unlikely that we will see the demise of either distinct cultures 
or the importance of place. True, the consolidation of telecommunication networks, socio-
political and socio-economic links may lead to easier and greater convergence of cultural ideas 
and norms, yet it seems inherent to the human condition that people will always- perhaps out of 
                                                 
12
 For instance, Chile has been notable for its foreign investment driven ‘fruit export miracle’ that transformed the 
countryside. However, due to the logic of international commerce most foreign investment has been concentrated in 
specific regions and has affected socio-economic groups differently. Within Chile foreign investment penetration is 
manifested in clusters, transforming some areas while other nearby towns are effectively bypassed and remain 
producing traditional crops for local markets. And within such clusters globalisation has had a profoundly different 
effect on different socio-economic groups. Large farmers have managed to cash in on the ‘fruit miracle’, but many 
smaller farmers have struggled to meet payments and have been forced to sell land and rely on low paying precarious 
seasonal work (Murray, 2002a). These types of processes are mirrored at the global scale, with people, capital and 
resources penetrating some regions while bypassing others.  
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resistance to the hegemonic power or culture- define themselves, not necessarily by the nation 
state, but by the localities they live in, as is already the case within many current loosely arranged 
nation states (Quebec, or even within the USA).  
 
3.6. Globalisation Defined  
Having examined globalisation, it is now possible to develop a working definition which will 
form the basis for further reflections on this phenomenon throughout the remainder of this 
dissertation. The definition is loosely based on Cloke et al (1999) and is somewhat unwieldy, but 
is necessarily so due to the intrinsic complexity of the phenomena. Thus, globalisation;  
 
(1) refers to the ongoing process whereby by the world’s economic, political, social, 
cultural and environmental spheres - as a result of progressive advancements in 
transport and communications technologies and economic motives - are increasingly 
converging on one another fostering ever greater interdependence between the earth’s 
peoples (Cloke et al, 1999). (2) And although some still deny its existence, “in the 
contemporary world the scale and extent of social, political and economic 
interpenetration [particularly the power, reach and scope of TNC] appears to be 
qualitatively different to international networks in the past (Cloke, 1999, p.337). (3) But 
contrary to common belief, globalisation is not necessarily making every locality the 
same; indeed, it is just as likely to produce spatial unevenness, fragmentation and 
exacerbate power-asymmetries within and between nations, regions, communities and 
different socio-economic groups. (4) Nor must it necessarily be conceived as an 
inexorable force, as to some extent its conditioning tendency’s may be tempered and 
actively mediated by different agents including individuals, communities and nation 
states (albeit with some difficulty).  
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4.0. The Latin American Political Economy  
 
The following chapter begins with a brief explanation of Latin America’s political-economic 
changes from colonial times to the end of World War II (WWII). The intention is to provide a 
wider context in which to examine the more recent development experiences within the region 
latter in the chapter; in particular, the rise and influence of structuralist economics, its eclipse by 
neoliberalism during the 1980s (or early 1970s in Chile) and both models contribution to the more 
recent neo-structuralist discourse.  
4.1. From Discovery to Revolt (1542–1820s)  
When Columbus inadvertently discovered the ‘New World’ in 1492, the Americas were inhabited 
by a ‘mosaic’ of peoples and cultures ranging from the great empires of the Inca and the Aztecs to 
the hunter-gather tribes of the Amazon and the nomadic warriors of the temperate north and 
southern cone (Newson, 1996). Yet armed with guns, germs, an insatiable thirst for gold and 
silver and religious zeal, the Iberian nations, particularly Spain, rapidly laid waste to once great 
ancient empires, subjugating the indigenous peoples and their cultures in the process (Ward, 
2004; Blouet et al, 1997). In doing so they set in motion a process that would, in time, see the 
continent cast in a shadow of European domination, and lay the ground work for what would 
eventually become a truly global economy (Newson, 1996).   
 
The first key agents of Spanish colonisation were the conquistadores, whom on behalf of the 
Spanish Crown, were granted various privileges in exchange for their work exploring and 
breaking in the continent (Newson, 1996). Conquistadores enjoyed a high degree of freedom in 
these early years, but once lands had been conquered the crown moved to centralise its control 
over the New World as “the prime aims of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were…to ‘civilise’ 
and convert the native population, as well as to exploit it and the regions natural resources as a 
source of profit (Newson, 1996, p.18)” 
 
With these goals in mind the Iberians promptly began plundering the treasures of the indigenous 
peoples in heavily populated regions. Plunder required little effort or investment and so at this 
stage in the colonial process mining was favoured over agriculture (Dietz, 1995); the colonist 
preferring to rely on Indian tribute to meet their needs. Such plunder was short lived however. 
Once these sources were exhausted the crown turned its attention to more capital intensive mining 
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in the Mexican and Peruvian highlands (Newson, 1996). In the 16th Century Potosi in upper Peru 
and Zacatecas and Guanajuato in Northern Mexico became Spain’s jewels of the Americas. By 
the last quarter of the 16th century silver bullion accounted for about 90% of Latin America’s 
export value (Newson, 1996).  
 
The establishment of large mining towns had a simulative effect on other economic sectors, such 
as basic manufacturing and agriculture which came to supply food and other basis commodities to 
miners (Newson, 1996)13. But as Ward (2004, p.2) states;  
 
          despite their apparent natural advantage- rich mineral deposits and extensive areas of fertile 
land- the Latin American colonies did not achieve sustained growth in output per head of 
population, or in manufacturing and commercial activity as a share of output. By the early 
nineteenth century the region’s economic development compared unfavourably with that of 
Britain or the US, where rapid industrialisation was in progress14  
 
There are numerous competing explanations as to why Latin American development lagged 
behind other areas of the ‘New World’ during the period of Spanish rule. Some note the Spanish 
Crowns heavy handed mercantilist polices which actively discouraged the production of goods 
such as wine, wool, oil and other manufacturers in the colonies (Newson, 1996; Blouet et al 
1997)15. Others refer to the overly burdensome taxation, legal barriers and limited transport 
facilities which stymied investment and trade (Ward, 2004). But most would agree, however, that 
the highly inequitable and inefficient hacienda system, which tended to concentrate the best 
agricultural lands among a select few elites who managed their estates “carelessly”, militated 
against the adoption of more modern and efficient agricultural techniques (Newson, 1996, Ward, 
                                                 
13
 Up until 1549 when it was outlawed, labour was organised under the encomienda system- a system that granted 
colonists, churches and agents of the state the right to extract tribute from Indian communities in the form of labour 
services or goods in kind (Bernstein, 2000; Newson, 1996; Ward, 2004). Unfortunately this was not the end of forced 
labour practices. Replacing the encomienda system was an equally oppressive forced labour regime, the repartimiento 
system (Bernstein, 2000; Newson, 1996) which still compelled native communities to supply workers for mines and 
farms, but attempted to provide protection by limiting working hours and requiring encomenderos to pay them a fair 
price. Another was debt peonage whereby poorly waged peons were actively encouraged to incur excessive debts and 
were effectively bound the land until such time that the debts could be repaid (Bernstein, 2000; Newson, 1996; Sachs, 
2005). In Portuguese Brazil and the Guiana’s were the relative scarcity of indigenous labour and the particular 
production structure of the sugar plantation system led to the importation of millions of African Slaves from the Central 
Congo and Angola (Ward, 2004; Newson, 1996) . 
14
 This point is also supported by (Bulliet et al, 1997)  
15
 It is widely believed that Spain’s relative abundance of ‘easy mineral wealth’ enabled Spain to delay reforming its 
antiquated feudal system and mercantilist trade policies, which in turn delayed the industrial revolution, and ultimately 
led to the decline of the Spanish empire (Bernstein, 2000; Dietz, 1995). 
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2004) (See chapter 5 offers a more detailed assessment of the inefficient hacienda system in 
Chile).   
 
4.2. Independence and the Era of Commercial Expansion  
From 1808 Latin American colonists fought fierce independence struggles against the crown and 
by the mid-1820s had successfully brought independence to the region16. Nevertheless, following 
independence, territorial disputes and political instability blighted the regions economic 
development until the mid-1850s (Blouet et al, 1997; Dietz, 1995; Ward, 2004)17.  
 
After the mid-18th century the region resumed its economic interaction with the outside world. By 
this stage, however, the emerging international economy had undergone a revolutionary 
transformation. Western Europe, particularly Britain, and newly independent North America, 
where now the world’s undisputed power players and these rapidly industrialising powerhouses 
had an insatiable thirst for primary products (Bernstein, 2000; Blouet et al, 1997). Rich in natural 
resources, the Latin economies seized the moment- substituting their hitherto ‘dependence’ on the 
Iberian core, for a new type of dependence, this time with the core industrial economies18.  
 
Under Spanish rule transport limitations had restricted Latin America to the exportation of mainly 
silver, gold and a few non-perishable commodities such as sugar (Bernstein, 2000; Newson, 
1996). New advances in transport and communications- namely railways, steam shipping and the 
telegraph- were rapidly compressing time and space making possible the shipment of ‘bulk 
cargos’ such as coffee, wool, grain, meat, cotton, nitrates, and base metals (Bebbington, 1996; 
Murray, 1999; Ward, 2004). Crucially, this meant that the formally peripheral or economically 
backward areas of the Spanish empire, such as those countries of the Southern Cone, Argentina, 
                                                 
16
 By the late 18th century, a number of external events were critical in fostering Latin America’s independence 
movements. First, there were the examples of the successful independence movements of the North Americans against 
the British and the Haitians against France (Blouet et al, 1997) and the enlightenment ideas which underlay the revolts- 
particularly the liberal critique of absolute monarchy which appealed to the increasingly ambitious Creole elite who 
were eager for greater political and economic autonomy (Bernstein, 2000; Bulliet et al, 1997; Dietz, 1995). Thirdly, 
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsular in 1808 weakened Spain militarily, but perhaps more importantly, 
severed any remaining loyalties to the Spanish throne as Napoleon proceeded to remove the ‘legitimate crown’ 
installing his brother to the throne. Thus, in 1810, soon after Napoleon invaded Spain, Spanish Latin America erupted 
in revolt against the Spanish Crown and by 1826 most of the continent was no longer under direct Spanish rule (Blouet 
et al, 1997).    
17Territorial disputes eventually lead to the creation of 15 independent states (Dietz, 1995; Ward, 2004).   
18
 Despite Spain’s bests efforts, by the 18th century already nearly 90% of manufactures were imported from outside. 
Thus, even prior to independence it was becoming apparent to the colonial elite that the underdeveloped Iberian core 
perhaps needed the Americas more than the Americas needed Spain (Blouet et al, 1997; Newson. 1996). 
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Uruguay, Chile and southern Brazil, became Latin America’s leading economies19 and a preferred 
destination for British capital (Bulliet et al, 1997; Newson, 1996)20.  
As Latin America became more integrated into the global economy, the comprador classes (Latin 
America’s elite) and northern industrialists became bound in a relationship of commercial 
convenience (Parpart et al, 2000). Underpinning this relationship was a particularly persuasive 
economic doctrine- neo-classical economics. According to this doctrine, it was assumed that so 
long as each country produces those products for which they have a lower opportunity cost (i.e. a 
comparative advantage in), then trade will be maximised to the benefit of all involved (Sachs, 
2005). For Latin America this meant producing primary product exports in exchange for 
manufactures and luxuries produced in the core (Green, 1995; Murray, 1999). As the wealth 
poured in Latin America’s elite felt vindicated in their support for the ideals of economic 
liberalism (Dietz, 1995). But underlying the model were serious equity and structural weaknesses.  
 
The export booms provided exorbitant wealth to a select few landed elite. But by 1900 the vast 
majority of ordinary Latin Americans saw little in the way of material advancement or greater 
living standards (Murray, 1999). If anything inequality intensified. Consequently,  the “widening 
income disparities between rich and poor held back industrialisation by limiting the demand for 
simple manufactures…[with] the elites preferring luxury imports” (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994)21. As 
a result, even the most prosperous economies of Mexico, Chile and Argentina, “failed to achieve 
high levels of domestic investment in manufacturing late in the 19th century, despite rapid 
accumulation of wealth from traditional exports” (Bulliet et al, 1997, p.663)22.  
 
For the time being, however, the booms disguised the structural limitations of relying on a select 
few, seemingly lucrative, primary-product exports (Bulliet et al, 1997). This was all to change 
however in the early 20th century when a series of external shocks precipitated the decline of the 
free-trade laissez-faire model and brought an end to the absolute dominance of the export 
oligarchies.  
 
                                                 
19
 Chilean wheat exports increased 14 fold between 1845-1895 and Brazilian Coffee 13.5 fold between 1832-1870 
(Bebbington, 1996). 
20
 By 1914 Britain was still the main trading partner of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, and owned over half of all long-
term foreign capital investments in the region (Blouet et al, 1997).  
21
 Also, hacendados (owners of haciendas) preferred to practice extensive agriculture and rely on their cheap and 
abundant supply of rural labour rather than adopt more modern efficient practices. 
22
 Only Argentina managed to raise its per-capita wealth to a level comparable with the USA and Canada, although it 
lost ground after 1914 (Bulliet et al, 1997). 
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4.3. The Crisis of the Free-Trade Model  
World War I (WWI) was the first serious external crisis to hit the continent. The war closed off 
markets to the north, and with the Allied economies geared to the war, imports were scarce. This 
hurt many Latin American producers and middle men, but had the unintentional bonus of 
stimulating new nationally owned manufacturing industries. Then, in 1929, the New York stock 
exchange crashed generating a ‘Great Depression’ which reverberated around the world leading 
to a 60% decline in international trade. Primary producers, highly integrated as they were into the 
global economy, were hit particularly hard23. But again, in somewhat of a silver lining, the crisis 
did at least offer a further impetus for Latin America’s burgeoning manufacturing sectors which 
grew prosperous substituting local manufactured goods for those products formerly procured 
from the core industrial economies of the north (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995; Ward, 2004)24.  
 
The growth in manufacturing had political-economic ramifications for the region altering the 
traditional political balance of power within many Latin American countries. Manufacturing led 
to a greater concentration of people living in and migrating to the cities, and critically, helped 
stimulate a new class to rival the traditional elite- the ‘middle-class’. Then, if there was ever any 
question that the export oligarchs might regain their control of the state and its institutions, the 
outbreak of the WWII put this beyond doubt.  
 
4.4. Post-World War II and the Emergence of State ‘Developmentalism’  
For manufacturing, the war years were a time of growth. As in WWI, during the second ‘Great 
War’ the Allied economies had little spare capacity to export manufactured goods to the ‘New 
World’ (Alexander, 1995; Kay, 1989). Shielded from foreign competition the domestic 
production of spare machine parts and consumer goods continued to increase25. By the end of 
WWII many Latin American economies were virtually self-sufficient in terms of processed 
foodstuffs, textiles and shoes, pharmaceuticals, cement and paints (Alexander, 1995). In the larger 
                                                 
23
 According to Green (1995), during the 1930s, most Latin America countries “experienced growing poverty, social 
unrest, repression, recession, and default on debt” (p.16). 
24
 During this time a number of manufactures in Mexico, Columbia, Brazil, Argentina and Chile were successful in 
expanding their operations in footwear, clothing, household goods and agriculture machinery (Blouet et al, 1997). 
Between 1928 and 1938 Brazil’s industrial sector grew an astonishing 45%, Chile 39% and Argentina a still very 
respectable 35% (Heenan et al, 2002, p. 24). 
25
 According to Blouet et al (1997), “the Manufacturing sector of most LA countries grew in excess of 5% per annum 
during the war years, [although he concedes]…that the starting base was low”. 
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economies of Mexico, Argentina and Brazil there was an enormous increase in steel production 
(Blouet et al, 1997), and other heavy industries (Alexander, 1995). 
 
However, despite experiencing significant growth during the war years, memories of the Great 
Depression continued to play on the minds of politicians, primary producers and industrialists 
alike (Lewis, 2002). Most Latin American governments considered it prudent to play a greater 
role in the economy to reduce dependency on the more industrialised North and avoid another 
depression (Alexander, 1995; Heenan et al, 2002). Understandably, therefore, economic autarchy 
was increasingly viewed by Latin American leaders, economists, industrialists and citizens alike 
as an attractive alternative to the unbridled capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
(Heenan et al, 2002). So from this point onwards, state intervention and Import Substitution 
Industrialisation, which initially began as an ad-hoc response to an external crisis, developed into 
a conscious and coherent regional development strategy based on the precepts of the newly 
established theory of structuralism, to which I turn to now (Alexander, 1995; Kay, 1989; Green, 
1995; Heenan et al, 2002).  
 
4.5. The Ascendance of Structuralism 
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with the agrarian sector, given the interrelated nature 
of economic development, structuralism has had an important- albeit not always positive- impact 
on Latin America agriculture and the Latin American peasantry. Most notable, has been 
structuralism tendency to promote Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) which is widely 
regarded as having favoured the industrial/urban sectors whilst neglecting the countryside (e.g. 
‘urban bias’). As such, the following discusses the two sectors in relation to one another in order 
to arrive at a more complete picture of agrarian change in Latin America26.  
 
As outlined above, between WWI and WWII Latin America underwent a tremendous economic 
transformation. Not surprisingly this transformation was closely paralleled by academic inquiry 
into the mechanics of this significant ‘structural’ shift and its potential consequences for the 
                                                 
26
 Unfortunately, due to space limitation my analysis of this earlier historical period is necessarily terse. This is in no 
way to imply, however, that Latin American countries’ complex histories are reducible to a mere five pages. On the 
contrary, to borrow the words of Ward (2004, p. 19) “Latin America is a large and diverse region. Thus, this short study 
cannot do justice to the great range of variation between particular countries” and within countries. However, chapter 5 
will offer at least a detailed assessment of Chile’s unique political-economic history.  
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region. Driven by the rise in multilateralism characteristic of the post WWII global-political 
economy, and under the auspices of the newly established United Nations, the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA) was established in 1947 and charged with the role of 
providing policy advice and strategic direction for the region. Headed by the exceedingly 
competent executive director Raul Prebisch, the ECLA came to have a profound influence over 
the region’s economic development (Ward, 2004).   
 
As head of the ECLA, Prebisch’s intellectual contribution to Latin American development theory 
was nothing short of revolutionary. Prebisch was enthused and excited by the region’s recent 
industrial expansion, and less than two decades since the Great Depression devastated the region, 
was unsurprisingly pessimistic towards the supposed benefits of ‘outward-orientation’ preached 
so dogmatically by neo-classical economists and free-traders27.  
 
Consequently, Prebisch and his colleagues sought to develop a ‘holistic’ and distinctively ‘Third 
World’ development theory (Kay, 1989) that, unlike the popular modernisation theories of the 
time, or the formerly influential neo-classical theories of Smith and Ricardo (Ranis, 1981), 
recognised the unique historical ‘conditioning’ factors which had driven the region’s economic 
development since colonial times to independence and determined Latin Americas ‘positionality’ 
within the international economy (Kay, 1989; Ocampo, 1995).  
 
Attacking neoclassical economics, Prebisch rejected the assumption that the international 
economy was made up of various states voluntarily engaging in mutually beneficial trade for all 
(Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989; Ward, 2004). On the contrary, he argued the international economy was 
a hierarchical system, consisting of a powerful industrialised core (exporting manufactured 
products) and a comparatively weak and economically dependent periphery (exporting primary 
products). Thus, given the ‘unequal exchange’ inherent in this ‘global-division of labour’, he 
maintained that free trade would only serve to deepen the periphery’s subordination and 
dependency on the industrialised core (Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989; Ward, 2004).  
                                                 
27
 Some have argue that this theory was politically convenient as it very much suited the interests of industrial UK at 
the time who required an abundant and steady supply of raw materials to fuel its industrial growth and agricultural 
products to feed the swelling urban labour force that such rapid industrialisation created. By the same token, the free 
market system also suited Latin America’s powerful landed elite who specialised in producing agricultural products in 
exchange for manufactured goods and luxuries products produced within the industrial core. Moreover, the theory 
proved politically convenient in the sense that it absolved the State from any responsibility to its citizens as it was 
assumed that the market would provide for their economic and social wellbeing. Besides it was argued that any 
government intervention would only create inefficiencies that would stand in the way of material progress for all  (Kay, 
89; Green, 1995; Gwynne and Kay, 2000)  
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It was this disillusionment with the ‘a-historical’ and overly optimistic assumption ridden neo-
classical orthodoxy, which led Prebisch to seek empirical support for his centre-periphery 
subordination model. By examining trade statistics Prebisch discovered his ‘smoking gun’ which 
confirmed his suspicions; that over time the ‘terms of trade’ tended to shift against primary 
product exports in favour of manufactured goods. Prebisch had thus uncovered what he deemed 
to be the mechanism for which the international economic system discriminated against the 
periphery in favour of the core. As a consequence, no longer was ‘development’ seen as a merely 
linear or ‘mechanistic’ process whereby a particular economy moved from an economically 
backward state (or traditional society) to one characterised by the era of mass consumption as 
modernisation theorists maintained at the time (Kay, 1989). Quite the reverse, ‘development’ and 
‘underdevelopment’- in the words of André Gunder Frank- were ‘two sides of the same coin’. 
That is to say, it was ‘development’ itself within the industrial core which created and reinforced 
‘underdevelopment’ in the periphery (Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989).With this in mind, Prebisch then 
returned to the realm of theory were he proceeded to articulate an original, empirically grounded, 
development discourse which would have wide spread ramifications for the entire continent.    
 
4.5.1. The Prebisch Secular Decline Hypothesis  
Prebisch’s investigation into the ‘reality’ of the global trading system uncovered a disturbing 
trend of primary product exports declining in value relative to manufactured goods over time 
(Kay, 1989; Ward, 2004). The decline was not to be taken lightly as according to Prebisch it 
effectively ensured that technological progress would remain concentrated and diffused within the 
core in a virtuous cycle of technological development and capital accumulation (Ocampo, 1995). 
Meanwhile, the periphery languishes in a cycle of boom and bust, with export demand and prices 
being determined by forces beyond their control as the Great Depression so brutally demonstrated 
(Ayres, 1995).  
 
But if the decline in terms of trade described the process for which the core maintained its 
dominion over the periphery, what mechanisms caused the decline? Prebisch articulated a number 
of reasons, both on the demand side and the supply side.  
 
Firstly, on the demand side, he discovered that primary product exports (PPEX) were generally 
income inelastic. This meant as incomes rose in the core economies, demand for Latin American 
exports would not increase proportionally- resulting in declining terms of trade for Latin America 
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exports vis-à-vis manufactured imports produced in the North (Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989). Second, 
he argued that the market for manufactured goods was characterised by oligopolistic producers 
who kept prices high. The market for PPEX was in contrast highly competitive (within and 
between nations) and characterised by numerous substitutes which ensured PPEX producers were 
essentially at the mercy of world prices, or in economic speak, were merely ‘price takers’ (Ayres, 
1995; Ward, 2004).  
 
To make matters worse, according to structuralist thinkers, there was also a tendency for 
technological innovation in the core to either replace or reduce the quantity demanded of primary 
products as new innovative production techniques emerged (Ocampo, 1995; Kay, 1989; Ward, 
2004). The sudden collapse of the Chilean nitrate industry following the German discovery of 
synthetic nitrates after World War I is often cited as a case in point (Collier et al, 1996). 
 
These issues were further aggravated by problems on the supply side. Prebisch argued that while 
technological progress benefited the core in the form of higher profits and increased wages (due 
to pressure from unions), in the periphery the abundance of surplus labour and a lack of unionism 
(due to political repression, social convention or the generally disorganised nature of agriculture) 
meant that technological progress, if anything, reduced labour demand, depressed wages and did 
not lead to higher prices or greater technological diffusion (Ayres, 1995; Kay; 1989; Love, 1995; 
Ocampo, 1995).  
 
Wider political-economic changes within the international political economy were also of grave 
concern for structuralists. The historically peculiar situation which saw high demand for Latin 
American exports during the war but low competition from the ‘Old World’ and the United States 
was not expected to persist (Lewis, 2002, Murray, 2002b). Especially considering the war had led 
to the eclipse of the formerly open British economy by the much more ‘inward-oriented’ self-
reliant US economy (Love, 1995), who Structuralists considered to have a far lesser propensity to 
import primary products (Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989). In light of these findings structuralists 
recommended “the periphery become more like the centre” (Ayres, 1995 p.86). Thus, 
governments were advised to intensify their already pre-existing ISI policy until such time as they 
could compete with the core on an even keel (Ayres, 1995; Kay, 1989; Murray, 2002b; Ward, 
2004); although no specific time frame was mentioned.  
 
4.5.2. Structuralism: From Theory to Revolutionary Development Model  
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Before discussing the details of the ISI model and its implications for the region, it is important to 
clarify that structuralists were by no means anti-market, anti-business, or anti-trade (Kay, 1989; 
Lewis, 2002). They were well aware of the dynamic efficiency that international market forces 
can facilitate, but believed that these benefits could only be attained by first tackling the 
‘structural barriers’ inherent within the international division of labour. Structuralism, therefore, 
merely called for significant structural changes to the economy (esp. industrialisation), “to make 
the market work” (Murray, 2002a, p.194) in order to prepare the Latin American economies for 
their eventual reinsertion into the international economy on their own and more equal terms 
(Lewis, 2002).  
 
The ECLA recommended that states adopt a variety of interventionist policy tools in order to 
reduce the region’s economic dependence on the industrial core (Kay, 1989; Lewis, 2002). The 
subsequent adoption, intensity and time scale of ISI differed across Latin America according to, 
among other things, population size, political systems, and the political will of leaders and 
industrialists. However, for the southern cone economies at least, there was a surprising degree of 
uniformity of purpose and consistency of method to the model’s implementation. 
 
Latin American governments responded with a range of protectionist tools including  significant 
tariff and non-tariff barriers (e.g. quotas and licensing restrictions) on imported manufactured 
goods that threatened to out compete fledging domestic producers (Kay, 1989; Green, 1995); 
maintained an artificially high exchange rates so as to discourage exporters and bring down the 
cost of capital goods and other necessary inputs (Green, 1995)(this was also achieved by 
maintaining multiple exchange rates for certain key capital inputs like machinery (Lewis, 2002); 
controlled banks and other credit institutions in order to steer cheap credit and state subsidies to 
key sectors or key industries (McMichael, 2004); invested heavily in infrastructure and 
established powerful state run enterprises (Kay, 1989; Green, 1995; Lewis, 2002) and in the areas 
of electricity and pharmaceuticals; nationalised strategic sectors such as the oil, steel and iron 
industries (Green, 1995)28; and often included a considerable welfare component, with states 
subsidising food and fuel whilst promoting education (Lewis, 2002). 
 
Naturally then, ISI polices resulted in a ballooning of the state sector which necessarily grew in 
order to manage, direct and implement state intervention on such a large scale (Lewis, 2002). In 
                                                 
28
 It what McMichael (2004) refers to as the ‘paradox of protection’; often protectionism- which was in theory designed 
to stimulate domestic production- had the effect of attracting significant foreign investment.  
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doing so ISI also drove the evolution of a new urban political alliance between industrialists, 
white collar workers, public servants, multinational business and unions (Angell, 1993). 
 
4.5.3. Successes of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
The initial stage of ISI, which some have dubbed the ‘easy phase’, or ‘horizontal ISI’, whereby a 
country substitutes relatively low-tech consumer goods for a known pre-existing market 
(Alexander, 1995; Dietz, 1995), initially triggered a tremendous growth spurt that transformed the 
region and seemed to confirm the virtues of the state-led model (Green, 1995). Indeed, from 
1929-1983 the Latin American region averaged a respectable GDP rate of 2.63 % per year- 
although this fell short of South Korea and Taiwan whose growth rates averaged 4.89 and 3.8% 
respectably during the same period. Of all the Latin American economies, Brazil was the standout 
achiever; averaging a remarkable GDP of 5.32 % between 1929-1983 (Lewis, 2002, p.32). By the 
early 1960s both Mexico and Brazil were virtually self-sufficient in terms of consumer products, 
in part due to their comparatively large domestic markets (Green, 1995 p. 17).  
 
According to Green (1995) and Lewis (2002) ISI welfare achievements were also substantial 
(Lewis, 2002, p.32; also Green, 1995). For example, across the region, infant mortality fell from 
107/1000 in 1960 to 69/1000 in 1980, life expectancy rose from 52–64 between 1960-1969 and 
unions helped achieve significant gains for workers (Green, 1995; Lewis, 2002). To what extent 
these improvements were attributable to ISI rather than broader developmentalist policies 
however is debatable. Nonetheless, significant reductions in absolute poverty were achieved 
despite an increase in relative poverty until the ‘lost decade’ when both relative and absolute 
poverty rates skyrocketed (Green, 1995; Lewis, 2002).  
 
4.5.4. The unravelling of the Import Substitution Model  
According to Dietz (1995 p.193) “all development strategies eventually encounter diminishing 
returns”. Thus, although ISI continued as the regions pre-eminent development model up until the 
onset of the debt crises in the early 1980s (Green, 1995), it is generally accepted that cracks in the 
model were already beginning to appear as early as the late 1950s (Green, 1995; Ranis, 1981) or 
1960s (Alexander, 1990; Sunkle, 1993). 
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Guided by the state, the private sector- including many TNC that relocated to the region to take 
advantage of protected domestic markets- became highly concentrated, monopolistic and 
inefficient in nature29. Part of the reason, especially for the smaller Latin American economies, 
can be attributed to the small domestic markets which left little room for competitive forces to 
discipline inefficient, uneconomical industries which were notorious for producing poor quality 
over priced goods (Green, 1995)30.  
Markets for manufactured goods were typically small for a number of reasons. Firstly, many 
Latin American economies had relatively small populations (e.g. Chile and Uruguay) which 
placed natural limits on any domestically geared industrialisation policy; secondly, expanding 
into foreign markets was either made difficult or actively discouraged by a tendency to over value 
exchange rates which made Latin American exports artificially expensive (Green, 1995; Lewis, 
2002)31; and thirdly, as a consequence of the highly unequal distribution of wealth that continued 
to blight the region during the ISI era creating a society whereby few had the wherewithal, 
particularly in rural areas, to afford the very goods ISI sort to stimulate (Green, 1995; Murray, 
2002b; Ward, 2004). It also did not help that firms tended to produce goods far above the world 
price, and governments’ systematic neglect of the countryside played a major role (Alexander, 
1995; Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995). Indeed, this last point deserves deeper elaboration because in 
many ways the issue of inequality and the distribution of wealth has been, and remains to this 
day, at the heart of many of Latin Americas political-economic woes. And arguably any model 
that neglects this reality is unlikely to succeed.   
 
4.5.5. Import Substitution Industrialisation’s Urban Bias and Agrarian Neglect  
Of course, ISI did not cause Latin America’s endemic social inequalities. The regions inequality 
owes it origins to a myriad of complex socio-economic and socio-political factors bequeathed to 
the region by its former Iberian masters and which remained relatively unchanged by the time ISI 
was introduced following the Great Depression. Indeed, since colonial times Latin American 
agriculture had been characterised by an almost semi-feudal or ‘bimodal’ land tenure system 
which acted as a perennial ‘structural constraint’ to increasing productivity (Gwynne and Kay, 
                                                 
29
 In Brazil, for instance, Johnson and Johnson produced dysfunctional over priced nappies purely because it was a 
protected industry operating within a small market with no real competitors (Green, 1995 p.13). 
30
 In 1969 the Chilean domestic price of electric sewing machines, bicycles and refrigerators were respectively 3, 5, and 
6 times higher than international prices (Green, 1995, p.18) 
31
 However, given the highly protected markets that both domestic and foreign own industries operated within, it is 
doubtful whether they would have been internationally competitive anyway (Green, 1995). 
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1997; Murray, 2002b, p192). Within this grossly unequal land tenure structure the landed elite or 
hacendados (estate owners) were notorious for underutilising their productive base. They 
preferred to practice inefficient extensive agriculture relying on the abundant supply of cheap, or 
in the case of inquliinos (permanent workers), effectively free labour, rather than adopt modern 
agricultural methods and intensive farming techniques (Alexander, 1995; Gwynne and Kay, 
1997). Most would agree, however, that ISI aggravated these existing inequalities within Latin 
America, particularly between rural and urban populations (Ward, 2004; Heenan et al, 2002).  
 
Indeed, with an overemphasis on expanding the industrial sector Latin American governments 
displayed an unabashed ‘urban bias’ which neglected the already underperforming, unequal, 
agrarian sector (Dietz, 1995; Murray, 2002b; Ranis, 1981; Sunkel, 1993). Primarily, this involved 
imposing prohibitive price controls on agricultural products so as to provide a cheap food supply 
to the privileged urban/industrial sectors. The combination of this overt ‘urban bias’ on top of an 
already highly concentrated and inefficient land tenure system, created a situation whereby 
agricultural output continuously failed to keep up with population growth. Inevitably, this forced 
Latin American economies to import ever greater quantities of food which aggravated existing 
balance of payment problems (Kay, 2002; Murray, 2002b) - ironically, one of the very things ISI 
was supposed to alleviate.   
 
Thus, the structural neglect of the countryside during the ISI era had the deleterious effect of 
reducing aggregate demand and shrinking already inadequate domestic markets (Alexander, 
1995; Dietz, 1995; Murray, 2002b). The squeeze on the small farmers in particular, forced many 
rural peasants to move to the cities in search of work which put great strain on already stretched 
infrastructure and state services (Green, 1995). To make matters worse, while ISI was squeezing 
the countryside it was not creating concomitant opportunities in the cities either. This was in part 
because of the small market constraint described above and made worse by growing inequality, 
but also because ISI tended to promote capital intensive industries rather than labour intensive 
industries.  
 
Yet, if the private sector proved woefully inadequate, producing sub-standard products at inflated 
prices, the public sector fared little better. Free from the ‘discipline’ of the free market, and 
backed by a unabashed interventionist state willing to bail them out at almost any cost (Lewis, 
2002), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and bloated government departments were typically 
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inefficient and unwieldy concerns that were a constant drain on state coffers’, leading to 
imprudent fiscal policy and endemic destabilising inflation (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995).  
 
Perhaps ISI’s most serious failing, however, was its inability to reduce the regions economic 
dependence on the core, even though this was ostensibly the ultimate goal of the development 
model. Even though by the 1950s most of the larger economies, particularly of the Southern Cone 
and Mexico, were relatively self-sufficient in terms of manufactured consumer goods (durables), 
as their economies progressed up the production chain towards heavy manufacturing and the 
production of capital goods they encountered a new form of dependency (Lewis, 2002).  
 
The conundrum was that ‘vertical ISI’ (or ‘IS deepening’ as it is sometimes referred to) 
necessitated the importation of ever more sophisticated and expensive inputs and capital goods. 
But having failed to establish a viable competitive manufacturing export sector which otherwise 
might have provided sufficient foreign exchange to fund the transition from the ‘easy ISI phase’ 
to the intermediate ISI phase, somewhat ironically32, Latin America economies had to rely on 
“plundering their natural resources” to fund the process (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995 p.185).On top 
of this, the subsequent production of heavy industry and capital goods that ensued proved even 
more prone to concentration and even less labour intensive than those industries formed during 
the initial ISI phase (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995).  
 
4.5.6. Addressing a Crisis: Structuralism Responds  
From the 1960s onwards, in response to ISI’s contraction, structuralists were busy critiquing 
theorising, and adjusting their own assumptions in search of new ways to reinvigorate the ailing 
model (Kay, 1989; Sunkel, 1995). Crucially, this involved a new appreciation of the somewhat 
neglected agrarian sector, not just in terms of rural development, but industrial development. It 
was argued that land reform, increased government assistance and infrastructure development in 
the rural sector would simultaneously reduce inequality and increase peasant’s purchasing power 
for manufactured goods, whilst stimulating agriculture and reducing the need to rely on 
agricultural imports which strained existing balance of payments problems (Dietz, 1995; Kay, 
1989; Murray, 2002b; Sunkel, 1995). In addition, structuralists also called for a greater emphasis 
on promoting exports and greater regional integration (Kay, 1989; Sunkel, 1993). Even Prebisch, 
                                                 
32
 Due to their relatively large domestic market, Brazil, and to some extent Mexico, were the few Latin American 
economies where ISI was able to function successfully (Green, 1995).   
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who as Alexander (1990) points out, had always intended for ISI to be “just a phase” in the 
development process, accepted that certain industries were ready for the post-ISI stage, and was 
noted as saying “I challenge the countries of the centre to practice the free trade ideas they had for 
so long been preaching to the nations of periphery” (Prebisch in Alexander, 1990, p.161)  
 
Unfortunately, many of the revised structuralist recommendations were either ignored, watered-
down or applied in an ad-hoc manner by states afraid of the political ramifications of seriously 
addressing Latin America’s extremely skewed wealth distribution (Green, 1995). For instance, 
attempts to promote greater regional integration had limited success due to political divisions and 
the perception among smaller countries that such integration would disproportionately favour the 
larger Latin American economies (Alexander, 1990; Kay; 1989; Green, 1995). Chile under Frei 
demonstrated perhaps the best application of the revised structuralist paradigm, pursuing 
extensive land reform and modernisation programs, whilst helping to establish the Andean trading 
bloc, but ultimately failed to satisfy the expectations of an increasingly class conscious and 
frustrated rural sector (Alexander, 1990) who proceeded to vote for a more radical socialist path 
only to see most of their gains reversed following a right wing military coup (see chapter 5 for 
details). 
 
The 1960s and 1970s were, therefore, a testing time for Latin American governments. The 
‘perceived’ failure among many disenfranchised groups of structuralism to tackle the regions 
endemic inequalities, as in Chile, led to a more radical version of the core-periphery dichotomy, 
in the form of ‘Dependency Theory’.  
 
4.6 Dependency Theory  
Dependency theorists such as Frank, Amin and Wallerstein, borrowed much of their conceptual 
frameworks and terminology from structuralism, such as the core-periphery dichotomy and the 
secular decline hypotheses (Love, 1995; Ward, 2004), but advocated a more extreme structural 
shift. More influenced by Marxist-Leninist concepts of ‘historic materialism’ (Ward, 2004), 
dependency theory saw an international system not just dominated by an exploitative industrialist 
core, but a trans-national class alliance between the core and Latin America’s elite (the 
comprador bourgeoisie). Therefore, whereas structuralists emphasised re-structuring economies 
via ISI with the ultimate intention of reinserting back into the global economy on more equal 
terms, dependency theorist’s were far more sceptical, advocating ‘de-linking’ (Love, 1995), class 
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struggle and even socialist style revolution if necessary to break down internal social-
stratification. Structuralists were often sceptical of foreign investment, particularly of the enclave 
variety (e.g. as in mining), but dependency theorist’s were diametrically opposed to foreign 
investment which they saw as merely the core’s attempt to directly extract ‘surplus value’ from 
the periphery (Ward, 2004). Thus, dependency theory tended to view the world economy in zero-
sum terms, whereby a powerful predatory core built alliances with peripheral elites in order to 
entrench their dominance over the world economic system.  
 
Dependency theory was influential in fermenting revolutionary fervour within Latin America but 
most governments- with the exception of Chile (under Allende) and Cuba- either did not heed its 
politically radical prescriptions or actively repressed the movement- often with the support of the 
fiercely anti-communist United States. The majority of Latin American governments continued to 
pursue a kind of watered down structuralism that paid insufficient attention to exporting and 
regional integration, neglected the countryside, practiced macro-economic imprudence and a lack 
of fiscal restraint, and did little to mend the deep socio-economic fissures that ISI tended to 
exacerbate. As such, growth was becoming increasingly sluggish. Latin American states may 
have been forced to restructure their economies in the 1970s had it not been for the world oil 
crisis (Green, 1995), which I will turn to now.   
 
4.7. The Debt Crises, the Eclipse of ISI and the Neo-Liberal Era  
In 1973 Latin America was struck by the first of two major oil shocks that hit the world economy 
hard. The crisis led to exorbitant profits being made in oil producing nations and flooded the 
world’s largest financial institutions with ‘petro-dollars’. However, with the industrial core 
economies suffering recession, banks had nowhere to lend their hoards of ‘petro-dollars’. Credit 
institutions attempted to solve this ‘problem’ by lending to the developing world in which Latin 
America was seen as a particularly desirable lending destination. Millions of dollars in loans were 
channelled to Latin America at outrageously low, and in some cases negative interest rates 
(Green, 1995). Little consideration was given to the kind of political regimes in power at the time 
or indeed the manner for which they spent the money. 
 
For many Latin American countries suffering from the contraction of the ISI model, the flow of 
money could not have come at a more opportune time. Indeed, the oil crises allowed Latin 
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American economies to delay the inevitable by providing the capital necessary to maintain ISI 
deepening and bloated state sectors (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995). The unwillingness of Latin 
American economies to make structural reforms during this time when an abundance of capital 
could have eased the transition, according to Sunkel (1995), makes the 1970s the “real lost 
decade” of development (p.358)33.  
 
Sure enough the ‘gravy train’ could not last and did not last. In 1979 the second oil crises struck 
causing a further contraction of world trade and inflation in the core economies (Dietz, 1995). Yet 
by this time the core economies were working under a different ideology. Monetarism and 
neoliberalism were coming into vogue, and both viewed inflation as public enemy number one. 
Thus, accordingly, interest rates were raised in the core economies to combat inflation and almost 
instantly Latin American countries found themselves burdened with massive unpayable interest 
charges on their debts (Green, 1995; Sunkel, 1995). With the core economies in recession, Latin 
America could not export its way out of the situation either (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995). The 
pressure reached a fever pitch when Mexico defaulted on its debt in 1982 triggering the so called 
‘third world’ debt crises (Green, 1997). 
 
4.7.1. Ideological Coup: The Rise of Neo-Liberalism  
The ‘debt crisis’ was more than just a ‘third world’ debt crisis but rather a global economic crisis. 
Beginning with the Mexican default in 1982, it threatened the integrity of the world financial 
system and ultimately led to what has been referred to as ‘the lost decade of development’- or 
‘development in reverse’ (Ward, 2004). It was a decade which witnessed the final demise of the 
‘Statist’ ISI model and the rise of neoliberalism (Green, 1995) as the “proactive state was 
displaced by the market-friendly state” (Lewis, 2002)34. It was a decade when the Bretton Woods 
institutions, particularly the WB and the IMF- institutions formally established to promote 
development and international economic stability- would be used as conduits by the world’s most 
                                                 
33
 Sunkle’s argument that 1970 was the ‘real lost decade’ is also supported by Green, (1995) 
34
 Neoliberalism is a term used to describe the resurgence of neo-classical or classic liberal ideas first articulated by the 
classical economist Adam Smith (1723-1790) and David Ricardo (1772-1823). It emphasises the mutually beneficial 
gains assumed to be created by producing those goods and services for which a country is deemed to have a 
comparative advantage in (Gwynne, 2002).  It thus incorporates a belief in the ability of self-regulating free markets to 
generate maximum overall economic welfare for a given society, and advocates a limited role for the state (Murray, 
2002b). 
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powerful creditor nations, to remodel the continent according to the vision and political-economic 
bias of the North (Green,1995)35 . 
 
In an effort to protect the integrity of the world financial system, or perhaps more candidly, to 
ensure western creditors got paid, the IMF and the WB agreed to negotiate debt schedules with 
debtor nations. In return, debtor nations were expected to enact a series of drastic ‘structural 
adjustments policies’ (SAP) to their economies along neoliberalism lines (Murray, 2002b). These 
polices were intended to stimulate economic dynamism and efficiency in what were considered 
by neoliberals to be stagnant economies (Green, 1995).  
 
The adoption of neoliberal polices in Latin America and their consequences for the region have 
been covered by many academics. It is not possible given the space limitations of this thesis to 
outline all of the paradigms impacts in detail and among all Latin American nations. However, 
chapter 7 gives a more detailed consideration of neoliberalism in Chile- which is widely regarded 
as the first Latin American nation to wholly adopt the theory and apply it with unparalleled purity 
(Ward, 2004). While it is acknowledged that different Latin American countries applied 
neoliberalism at various levels of purity and at different in times, such has been the influence of 
the doctrine, that it is at least possible to outline the broad policy implications of the model for the 
region.  
 
Typically, this entailed significant market liberalisation, which included; reducing or removing 
tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade such as quotas and licensing restrictions (Ward, 2004); 
de-regulation of domestic industries and a relaxing of controls on foreign investment; 
privatisation of state owned enterprises and an end to subsidy regimes and price controls 
(including a relaxing of labour laws); exchange rate devaluation to encourage exporting and a 
decrease in the money supply to control inflation (Dietz, 1995); massive downsizing of the public 
sector and serious cut backs on social expenditure in an attempt to reduce debt and fiscal deficits 
(Dietz, 1995; Lewis, 2002); and a greater emphasise on export lead growth, by agreeing to the 
World Trade Organisations rule based trade agenda and by joining regional trading blocks such as 
MERCOSUR (Common Market for the Southern Cone) (Lewis, 2002).  
 
                                                 
35
 However, as Green (1995) has pointed out, although structural adjustment was to a large extent an imposition from 
the core countries, still, it would have not have been possible without local elite ‘buy in’. For instance in Chile the so 
called ‘Chicago boys’ who orchestrated Chiles neoliberal experiment, were trained and influenced by the likes of Von 
Hayek, Friedman and Harberger at the infamous Chicago School of Economics, which at the time was at the fore front 
of the “new liberal crusade”. 
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The initial imposition of neoliberal policies led to economic contraction and precipitated a decade 
of low to negative economic growth for the region (Dietz.1995)36. The structural shift had a 
‘liquidating effect’ on many formerly protected sectors that were unable to compete with the 
more competitive foreign imports (Alexander, 1990 p. 159; also supported by Green, 1995). 
Despite the economic turmoil, neoliberals viewed this process as a painful, albeit necessary, cost 
if economies were to learn to live within their means. After all, the goal was to force capital and 
resources from “artificial and inefficient industries” towards new efficient and dynamic sectors 
(Alexander, 1990 p. 159)37.  
 
In this context, ‘development’ became “devastatingly simple” (Dietz, 1995 p.192). As long as 
states successfully realigned their economies according to the ‘universal rules’ of ‘comparative 
advantage’, distributional issues would take care of themselves via the wonder of the ‘trickle 
down effect’ (Lewis, 2002). Any suggestion that the state could improve on the market- if not 
considered blasphemous- was passed off as nothing but an absurd utterance from a waning 
philosophy of a bygone era (Green, 1995). 
 
For some, although mainly those with the requisite economic means, new opportunities did 
indeed arise, particularly in the area of primary products exports. Export led growth was seen as 
the way out of the economic doldrums and a way to generate foreign exchange for which to repay 
foreign debt (Dietz, 1995). After initial declines in agriculture, some countries such as Chile and 
Paraguay achieved tremendous growth in agriculture during the 1980s, but the majority of 
countries within the region had to wait until the 1990s to see a recovery (Murray, 2002b). Still, 
despite some gains, in the countryside modernisation via the application of ‘non-scale neutral 
technologies’ for the most part  “favoured medium and large scale producers…and led to 
increasing differentiation in rural areas of South America” (Murray 2002b. p.197; also Green, 
1995). Thus, overall, for the majority of Latina Americans ‘structural adjustment’ meant greater 
unemployment, low labour standards, and a reduction in essential services which created growing 
poverty and exacerbated inequality within the continent (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995; Murray, 
2002b).  
 
                                                 
36
 Throughout the 1980s, as a region, Latin America’s GDP averaged a dismal -1.0% compared with 3.3% achieved in 
the previous decade (Dietz, 1995 p.16).  And only by 1993 had per capita growth regained its 1980 value (Green, 1995, 
p.2001). 
37
 This point is also backed up by Green (1995) 
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By the early 1990s, academics, NGOs, grass roots organisations and annalists within the UN, to 
name but a few, where documenting and protesting the tremendous human costs of neoliberal 
restructuring. As the evidence poured in, even formerly staunch supporters of neoliberalism like 
the WB were forced to temper their policy approach- at least rhetorically- by referring to poverty 
and slogans such as ‘growth with equity’ in their reporting. Meanwhile, in the halls of CEPAL, 
the former bastion of structuralism, theorists and policy experts were working on a new 
development theory that would on the one hand acknowledge some of the follies of the ISI model 
but also accept some of the efficiency enhancing merits of neoliberalism. The name of this model 
has been loosely referred to as neo-structuralism, which I will turn to now.  
 
4.8. From Neoliberalism to Neo-Structuralism: CEPAL ‘Strikes Back’  
 
Successful industrialising countries like Taiwan and South Korea break into computers, not 
Kiwi Fruit, yet neoliberalism has ignored the lessons offered by the Asian Tigers (Green, 
1995 p.204) 
 
In the “Silent Revolution”, Green (1995) notes a crucial turning point in the neoliberal ‘redoubt’ 
which began in the early 1990s with the election of Bill Clinton in the United States. Of course, 
well before Clinton Cepalismos (CEPAL neo-structuralists) had been critical of neoliberal 
restructuring and were busy looking at pragmatic ways of fusing aspects of neoliberalism with 
structuralism. However, campaigning on a platform critical of the ‘savage capitalism’ of 
‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’- much as the ‘Chicago boys’ had influenced Latin American 
political-economy during the 1970s and 1980s- the new economists and policy makers that 
circled the Clinton administration at least made criticising the neoliberal model a more ‘legitimate 
activity’ (Green, 1995). A number of catch phrases, ‘neoliberalism with a human face’, the ‘social 
market or the ‘third way’ came to account for this tinkering of neoliberal ideology. The Aylwin 
administration of Chile during the early 1990s which combined export led growth with new tax 
laws and a concerted effort to try and alleviate the ‘deuda social’ (social debt) bequeathed by the 
Pinochet era, was seen by many as a star student of this new orthodoxy (Green, 1995)38.  
 
                                                 
38
 However, in light of the military’s continued presence in Chilean politics, Alywin was in many ways restricted to 
merely window-dressing neoliberalism so as to not jeopardise the delicate democratic transition underway (Kay, 2002). 
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CEPAL took inspiration from a range of sources, but the ‘economic miracles’ of the ‘East Asian 
Tiger economies’ were especially influential. However, contrary to the opinion of many 
neoliberals, neo-structuralists argued that the ‘Tigers’ owed their remarkable economic 
transformation not so much to the blind application of neo-classical economic theory, but rather 
by confidently picking and choosing between those aspects of market and state led growth that 
best suited their ‘own’ national development goals (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995; McMichael, 2004, 
Ranis, 1995; Ward, 2004)39.  
 
4.8.1. Neo-structuralism: A Paradigm Explained  
Although it is difficult to exactly pin down a purely ‘neo-structuralist approach’, it is however 
possible to outline a number of important themes and policy tendencies that underpin neo-
structuralism. Critically, neo-structuralists have not forgotten their structuralist roots; thus the 
world economic system remains, as it always has, an essentially asymmetric system wherein 
power structures continue to have a conditioning effect over peripheral nations. That said, unlike 
‘dependency theory’, it is somewhat optimistic- especially given the success of the ‘Tiger 
economies’- that governments, can at least, through sensible and targeted state intervention, 
improve on market outcomes and generate greater collective wellbeing40.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, neo-structuralists have had time to consider, reflect, and learn from 
the past follies of both structuralism and neoliberalism. As such Sunkel (1993), a leading neo-
structuralists, referring to neoliberalism remarked, that some aspects of neoliberalism have been, 
“unquestionably necessary”, in terms of creating;  
 
 …new dynamic forces of export growth; the raising of productive efficiency, competition, 
increased savings and investment; the reduction, rationalisation, flexiblisation, and greater 
efficiency of the state apparatus; the achievement and maintenance of a reasonable degree of 
                                                 
39
 For example, the state played a key role in both South Korea’s and Taiwan’s economic development; firstly, by 
initiating extensive land reforms prior to industrialisation which raised peasant purchasing power and helped stimulate 
demand for fledging domestic manufacturing industries; secondly, by investing heavily in public infrastructure, 
education, and research and development; thirdly, by directing capital towards strategic domestic industries and 
promoting joint ventures between foreign and domestic firms; fourthly, by selectively protecting key infant industries 
on their path to industrial maturity; and lastly,- having successfully completed the primary ‘easy phase’ of ISI- the state 
was instrumental in fostering a viable ‘primary manufacturing export industry’ (or primary export substitution in labour 
intensive food processing and textiles ) for which to fund the more capital intensive and technology based secondary 
ISI (e.g. the production of heavy capital and intermediate goods such as steel, ship building, machinery and 
petrochemicals) (Dietz, 1995; Green, 1995; McMichael, 2004; Ranis, 1981; Sunkel, 1993; Ward, 2004). 
40
 As opposed to ‘dependency school’ writers who emphasised de-linking, and in its more radical interpretation, class 
revolution, as the only way forward. 
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macro-economic balances, and expansion in the role of the market and private economic 
management (Sunkel, 1993, p. 368). 
 
Others such as Dietz (1995) and Ranis (1995) also admit that the ‘development state’ was overly 
interventionist and prone to rent-seeking from special interest groups. But believe this is different 
to suggesting that states can never positively contribute to national development (Dietz, 1995). 
 
Therefore, Dietz, (1995), Green (1995), Ranis (1995)  Sunkel (1993) and Ward (2004) all 
maintain that states have a key role in creating and sponsoring what Sunkel calls ‘development 
from within’. In this context, the state retains a valuable enabling role in creating key pillars 
sectors for industrialisation, accumulation and technological diffusion, developing human 
resources41 and communication between sectors in order to create an “endogenous nucleus of 
technical dynamism, for which to launch re-insertion” (p. 368)42.  
 
Naturally then, for neo-structuralists, some protectionism is seen as justifiable and growth 
enhancing as long as it is appeals to the ‘national interest’ rather than simply propping up ‘private 
interests’, and so long as protectionist regimes are not “far too high” nor kept in place for “far too 
long’ (Ranis, 1995, p.146)43.The ultimate aim remains, as it always has for structuralists, re-
insertion into the global economy on a more ‘competitive’ and even playing field. For this reason, 
regional integration is considered to offer a “platform from which to export to the rest of the 
world” (Green, 1995, p.198). 
 
However, unlike neoliberals, neo-structuralists do not view economic growth as an end in itself. 
This does not mean that neo-structuralists deny the importance of growth, rather they recognise 
that economic growth and ‘development’ are not the same things and that “equity and growth are 
not mutually exclusive, but complementary” (Green, 1995, p.245). Not surprisingly then, neo-
structuralists are suspicious of the ‘trickle down effect’ of wealth distribution, recognising that 
not all groups have equal opportunities. Thus, neo-structuralism tends to stress ‘growth with 
equity’ and places far greater weight on human rights, labour laws, environmental issues and 
                                                 
41
 Dietz (1995, p.192) is especially concerned with education arguing that the solution requires a “substantial changes 
in the structure of economic, social, and political power to extend the benefits of education and growing income to a 
large number of citizens”. 
42
 Dietz (1995) builds on these points arguing that states can assist where externalities exist, and provide infrastructure, 
human capital, and some times missing factors like finance and international marketing “which can increase both 
private and social returns” (p192). 
43
 Green (1995) agrees that protectionism has a key role but must never become too entrenched.  
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social policy which they intend to fund through ‘progressive tax’ reforms (Kay, 2002; Green, 
1995). 
 
4.8.2. Neo-structuralism and the Agricultural Sector  
In terms of agriculture, according to Murray (2002c, p.196), a neo-structuralists approach would 
stress the “government assisted free market- and take into account the realities of the current 
world order, globalisation and environmental concerns”. This means that the original structuralist 
concerns regarding overspecialisation of exports, terms of trade declines and protectionism within 
core economies- despite their free trade rhetoric- remain relevant and of critical importance 
(Murray, 2002c). At a policy level, this might involve “environmental monitoring, assistance to 
small growers, while maintaining diversity, creating collective action- increase economies of 
scale, land reform, regional cooperation and respecting the needs of indigenous peoples”  
(Murray, 2002c, p.196). 
 
It is sometimes stated that Chile offers the best example of the application of the neo-
structuralism model (Ward, 2004); however, as Green (1995, p.190) points out;  
 
           While this view of neo-structuralism as merely ‘neoliberalism with a human face’, rather 
than a true alternative, may ring true in Chile, CEPAL’s policy framework goes farther than 
the Chilean government on critical issues like the need for wealth distribution, agrarian 
reform  and increased rates of tax. 
 
Clearly, neo-structuralism is an evolving theory, and when judging its efficacy it pays to separate 
the theory from how it is practiced. No doubt, as in the Chilean case, to date neo-structuralism has 
fallen short of its mark, but for the time being it provides somewhat of a pragmatic start to 
addressing the massive socio-economic turmoil unleashed by the neoliberal experiment. As Kay 
(2002) argues, Chile is somewhere between ‘neoliberalism with a human face’ and a ‘neo-
structuralist position’. To reach a neo-structuralist position the Concertación “would have to 
achieve better results concerning equity” and “put a greater emphasis on environmental issues 
(Kay, 2002, p. 474)”.  
 
With the election to office of the socialist leader Bachelet in 2006, it seems this could be Chile’s 
best chance yet to institute a truly neo-structuralist position. Bachelet (2006) has already declared 
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her administration’s intention to see Chile “as a major food supplier”, thus international 
integration is likely to remain of central importance. However, the government has declared that 
it intends to play a key role in promoting “public policies for quality control, public-private 
cooperation and a change in the productive focus”. There is also a recognition that as Chile’s 
comparative advantage in many products wanes, new technologies will need to be adopted and 
value added products explored as in the wine and salmon industries. Perhaps most interesting 
from the perspective of this thesis, however, is that Bachelet claims that "any policy we 
implement needs to be inclusive, in which everyone can be part of the achievements of 
development. The emphasis will be on small-scale family farming, to support the production base 
and strengthen productive chains (Bachelet, 2006)”.  
 
Clearly international integration and export led growth remains firm on the agenda but the 
governments ‘inclusive’ ideals are nonetheless encouraging. Still, it is easy to be sceptical of such 
statements in light of past Concertación governments’ failure to address Chile’s endemic 
inequality and worsening social-economic differentiation (these points will be taken up at the end 
of the following chapter). Thus, although encouraging, we can only sit and wait to see if 
Bachelet’s rhetoric can be converted into reality. 
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5.0. Chilean Agricultural History and Political Economy 
 
Chile can be regarded as a land of extremes, both in terms of its physical geography and political-
economic history. As a narrow land clinging to the Western Andes and stretching from the sub-
Antarctic Magellan’s to the dry deserts of the north, Chile boasts some of the world’s most varied 
climates making it suitable for a diverse range of agricultural products along side extensive 
mining in the north (Collins and Lear, 1995). Politically and economically speaking, throughout 
its colourful history, Chile has been notable for its tendency to adopt political ideologies and 
economic models from either side of the political spectrum with unparalleled purity in 
comparison with other Latin American nations.  
 
The previous chapter looked at Latin America’s political-economy from a regional perspective. 
The purpose was to provide a wider context for Chile’s own development experiences. It was 
shown how, despite the diversity between nations, there has been a surprising degree of policy 
continuity throughout the region since colonial times. Having established this, however, 
consistent with a neo-structuralist theoretical approach, the following chapter attempts to delve 
deeper into the Chilean experience, in order to understand Chile’s current position within the 
global economy as a primary product exporter. Of course, in order to this, it is first necessary to 
examine those historical ‘structures which have helped steer this unique nation’s socio-economic 
and socio-political make up from colonisation to present day (Kay, 1981; Murray, 2002b).  
 
5.1. From Colonisation to Independence  
As a nation, Chile grew from humble beginnings. Discovered by Magellan in 1520, Chile was 
only settled and conquered after 1540 (Loveman, 1988); with the exception of Araucaria where 
valiant Indian resistance held off the Spanish advance well up until the later part of the 19th 
century (Keith, 1977). Northern and Central Valley Indian populations were not so fortunate, 
however. They were captured and portioned out under the encomienda system- a system whereby 
conquistadores were granted the legal right to extract tribute (labour, food, or money) from their 
Indian subjects in exchange for ‘saving’ their souls by facilitating there conversion to Christianity 
(Collier, 1996; Keith, 1977; Steenland, 1977). However, by the late 16th century, old world 
diseases had severely depleted Chile’s native Indian populations. Short of labour, Mapuche 
slavery was briefly legalised in 1608 to help plug the shortfall but was abolished- at least on 
paper- in 1674 (Collier, 1996; Steenland, 1977).  
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For most of the colonial period Chile remained on the periphery of the Spanish colonial empire, a 
relative backwater compared with the ‘colonial core’ regions of the time which were concentrated 
in the lucrative silver mines of Peru and Mexico and the political cores of Lima and Mexico City 
(Loveman, 1988). Devoid of readily exploitable precious metals, hampered by the tyranny of 
topography, distanced from the both the colonial cores and the Spanish mainland, and forced by 
Spain’s mercantilist policies to pass all trade through Lima and the Panama isthmus, the Chilean 
economy developed slowly and dependent on Peru (Collier, 1996). By the 17th century ranching 
was the mainstay of the economy. Markets were limited however to servicing military garrisons, 
the city of Lima and the Potosi mining enclave (Collier, 1996; Keith, 1977; Loveman, 1988). It 
would be several centuries before the exportation of fresh produce would be feasible so trade 
consisted mainly of hides, mules, jerked beef and tallow (Collier, 1996).  
 
In the mid 17th Century, Central Valley Cattle Estancias began to emerge. In time these estancias 
began to shift away from cattle ranching towards wheat production with exports destined for 
Peru; thus estancias came to be known as haciendas (Collier, 1996; Joseph, 1984). As is to be 
expected, this change in the colonies production base necessitated a change in the labour relations 
which had formerly characterised the Chilean countryside, precipitating a decline of the 
exploitative encomienda system. However, to a certain extent this transition was already partly 
under way anyway as throughout the early 17th century estancia owners were already 
progressively renting land to either poor Spaniards or metizos (mixed raced Chileans) in return for 
their labour in managing the ranch. The switch to more labour intensive cereal production merely 
sped up and consolidated this change in labour relations as short-term contracts developed into 
year round and eventually permanent contracts (Collier, 1996).  
 
From the 1750s, permanent workers, or inquilinos as they are known in Chile, became widely 
recognised as a distinct and effectively hereditary class occupying a position not to dissimilar to 
the serf under the various feudal systems of Europe (Collier, 1996; Steenland, 1977). In exchange 
for theirs and often their family’s labour, inquilinos were typically granted a small area of land on 
which to build a house, grow crops and graze some cattle- direct  money transfers were rare. 
(Collier, 1996; Kay, 1975). The system tended to suit hacendados (hacienda owners), as given 
their huge tracks of underutilised or fallow land, it meant that inquilino labour was effectively 
free (Joseph, 1984). And for inquilinos and their families, they were at least offered a degree of- 
albeit limited- security and identity as compared to the many wandering landless peons or rotos 
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who roamed the countryside in search of fickle employment and barely earned enough to meet 
their basic needs (Collier, 1996; Keith, 1977).  
 
Although inquilinous had few, if any, formal rights, unlike serfs, they were not legally bound to 
the land (Collier, 1996; Kay 1981). That said, however, evidence suggests inquilinos were often 
at the mercy of their masters and, in general, were subjected to exploitation and extra-economic 
coercion which essentially ensured their options were few and bargaining power limited. For this 
reason the hacienda system has on a number of occasions has been referred to as a semi-feudal 
type production arrangement (Collier, 1996; Keith, 1977; Gwynne and Kay, 1997; Steenland, 
1977).  
 
Chilean haciendas, having originated out of stock raising estancias, tended to be especially large 
(Keith, 1977) and by far the largest and most politically influential were those concentrated 
between Santiago and Concepción where roughly 500 haciendas were in excess of 1000ha 
(Collier, 1996). Almost from the outset the owners of these grand estates effectively ruled Chile 
according to there own biases and political interests (Collier, 1996). But the hacienda was more 
than just a large profit maximizing production unit guided by the laws of supply and demand. The 
Chilean hacienda, as elsewhere in the Spanish Empire, played a critical social-cultural roll in the 
countryside and was very much the ‘social nucleus’ of rural Chile (Collier, 1996). 
 
5.2. Chile’s Era of Commercial Expansion  
Following independence, Chile wasted little time in taking advantage of the new economic 
opportunities of the time. Between 1810 and the 1830s alone the value of external trade doubled. 
Any Chilean living in the port city of Valparaiso at the time could not have helped but notice the 
more than 200 ships anchoring by the end of the 1820’s- up four fold since 1810 (Collier. 1996). 
Perhaps more significant, however, was the nationality of many of the vessels. Where once 
Peruvian merchants monopolised the seas, British, French, American and even some Chilean 
ships were increasingly present and began to displace the formerly dominant Peruvians. In an 
effort to provide some protection to domestic industries, the newly formed government made 
several attempts to institute neo-mercantilist polices but in general tariffs were reduced and 
economic liberalism embraced (Collier, 1996).  
Meanwhile, mining flourished in the north on the back of strong international demand. In the 
Norte Chico region towns grew up almost overnight creating a new- although limited- domestic 
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market for Central Valley agricultural products. Exports were still overwhelmingly in the form of 
minerals, however, with the Central Valley only accounting for one quarter of total trade (Collier, 
1996).  
 
The 1830s–1870s were an era of rapid economic expansion for Chile. New technologies in the 
form of steamships, railways and the telegraph where rapidly and ruthlessly smashing the tyranny 
of time and space. During this “time of progress” (Collier, 1996, p.71) Chile experienced a large 
increase in international trade and a leap in the number of joint stock companies and investment 
banks which “all played their part in solidifying Chile’s links with the fast expanding world 
markets” (Collier, 1996. p 88). 
 
As was the case with independence, the rapid expansion of international commerce was absorbed 
and embraced by Chile’s landed elite and if anything strengthened the hacendados grip over the 
Chilean political-economy (Collier, 1996; Heenan et al, 2002; Kay, 1981; Murray, 2002a). 
External demand for agricultural products led many hacendados to expand in size and increase 
labour intensive cultivation which led to the settlement of more permanent workers on Chile’s 
great estates (Kay, 1981; Murray, 2002a). By the 1850s three quarters of Chile’s agricultural land 
was occupied by a mere 850 landowners who collectively controlled two thirds of all agricultural 
income in Central Chile (Collier, 1996). 
 
Still, markets were relatively limited until the 1850s when the Californian gold rush stimulated a 
massive boom in demand for Chilean wheat which saw exports mushroom from 6,000 tones in 
1848 to 500,000 tones by 1850; eventually reaching 17% of foreign exchange earnings by 1860 
(Collier, 1996). In what proved to be an all too familiar pattern in Chilean agriculture, however, 
the market closed almost as quickly as it had opened. Temporary relief came when another gold 
rush- this time in Victoria, Australia- picked up the slack, but the Australian markets followed a 
similar progression of boom and bust. For a time Britain was there to plug the gap. But this only 
lasted until 1878 when larger scale and more efficient producers in Americas North West dealt a 
serious blow to Chilean agricultural exports (Collier, 1996). It would take over a hundred years 
(in the 1990’s) before agriculture would once again return to its former glory in the national 
economy (Kay, 1993).  
 
Part of the problem was that unlike in the United States, where agricultural booms stimulated 
investment in newer more innovative production techniques, in Chile agricultural methods and 
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labour relations remained essentially traditional with little mechanisation occurring despite the 
wheat booms (Collier, 1996; Kay 1981). This was due to the fact that within Chile’s wheat 
growing regions land was highly concentrated with population densities approximately 14–15 
times higher than that of her Australian and American competitors. Thus, rather than investing 
their windfalls in the modernisation of the hacienda system, landlords merely relied on their 
abundant land reserves, political influence and cheap labour supply to increase cultivation in 
formerly underutilised pastureland and settled a greater number of inquilinos on the land (Kay 
1981).  
 
While the booms created fantastic wealth for Chile’s landed class, for inquilinos and their 
families agricultural booms often meant a decrease in the size of their tenancy, a reduction in the 
number of animals one could raise and longer working hours (Collier, 1996; Heenan et al, 2002; 
Kay, 1981). Those without permanent work were even less fortunate. Rural peons- 
underemployed and in poverty- perhaps received a little more in booms- but many drifted to the 
urban areas usually to join and become ‘rotos’ (the urban poor: literarily the ‘broken ones’). 
Others were forced to endure the harsh conditions of the northern mines or seek backbreaking 
work among the many new infrastructure projects being pursued at the time (Collier, 1996; 
Heenan et al 2002).  
 
Thus, by the turn of the 20th century, despite the immense changes in governance and economy, 
the traditional bi-modal latifundia/minifundia dichotomy remained firmly entrenched. 
Hacendados controlled three quarters of Chile’s agricultural land and two thirds of production 
and exports. Chile was regarded as having a “greater monopoly of land than any other country” 
(Thomas Wright in Collier, 1982, p.125). Hence, according to Collier (1996, p.840) not only was 
“the world of Patron and inquilino…strengthened rather than undermined by the export 
economy” by entrenching the hacienda system the landed elite exacerbated rural inequality and 
effectively blocked “the transition to [modern] agrarian capitalism (Kay, 1981, p.492)”. 
 
The inefficient hacienda system also stymied industrialisation (Kay, 1981; Wright, 1975). Given 
the lucrative nitrate industry, which at the time generated the majority of the nation’s foreign 
exchange earnings, revenue could have been directed towards the emerging industrial bourgeoisie 
with the support of an initial tariff barrier. But instead, free trade ideology prevailed. As such, 
half of the nation’s nitrate wealth leaked out of Chile while the remainder was captured by the 
landed elite for their own opulent consumption purposes (Kay, 1981). Seduced by the free trade 
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ideals of the time, this appeared not to concern the government. President Santa Maria was 
reported as saying “let the gringos work the nitrate freely, I shall be waiting at the door” (Collier, 
1996, p.144).  
 
5.3. The Export Model Crisis: From WWI to the Great Depression  
In terms of agriculture the 1910s-1930s were a relatively productive time for Chile (Collier, 1996; 
Kay 1981).  The annual rate of production (including livestock) averaged a decent 3% as more 
land came under cultivation and viticulture and pastoralism thrived. Taking advantage of this 
economic window, hacendados expanded their influence over the countryside- with 0.45% of 
property owners controlling approximately 52% of the land. But yet again modernisation did not 
result. Simply put, machines cost, but inquilinos did not; the hacendados preferring to entrench 
the prevailing social structure rather than modernise their estates (Collins and Lear, 1995; Collier, 
1996).  
 
But no sooner was Chile enjoying renewed productivity when the Great Depression unleashed its 
savagery on the vulnerable economy. During the depression Chile’s already beleaguered nitrate 
industry was cut in half, while copper- by this time Chile’s pre-eminent export and leading 
government revenue maker- fell from 17.47 cents per pound in 1929 to a paltry 7.03 cents per 
pound by 1933 (Collier, 1996). Soon, US capital dried up and unemployment soared as the 
economic contagion spread to all sectors of the economy. Such was the severity of the crisis that 
in their 1923–1933 economic survey the League of Nations described Chile as the nation “most 
devastated by the depression” (in Collier, 1996, p.223). Partly due to the crises, a Socialist 
Republic came to power in 1931 but its term was short lived and generally ineffectual- although it 
did mark the emergence of socialism which “would forever retain a presence in Chilean political 
discourse” (Collier, 1996, p. 227). 
 
5.4. State-led development and Import Substitution Industrialisation 
(1930s-1973) 
The Great Depression had a profound effect on Chile’s political-economic landscape. The crisis 
had violently exposed the inherent vulnerabilities of the export-led growth model based on free 
trade and the principle of comparative advantage. With exports depressed and foreign exchange 
  
68 
scarce, in something of a silver lining however, the depression did at least offer a degree of 
‘natural protection’ against foreign manufactured goods, which helped stimulate domestic 
manufacturing. Therefore, rather than return to the free trade model, following the depression the 
Chilean government instituted “a whole range of new methods (multiple exchange controls, 
quotas, import licenses, and rationing of scarce foreign exchange)…in an effort to support and 
protect domestic industry (Collier, 1996, p.229)”.  
 
By 1937 the Chilean economy appeared to be in recovery. Unemployment was in decline and 
factories began to produce a much wider range of consumer goods from processed foods and 
beverages to clothing. Although mineral exports remained the central revenue maker for the 
government and the hacendados maintained their grip over the countryside, soon Chilean 
industries were producing durables and intermediate goods such as textiles, paper, chemicals, and 
metals (Collier, 1996). 
 
The outbreak of WWII offered a further stimulus to manufacturing. As foreign imports dried up 
Chile was forced to embrace greater import substitution which it did with considerable success in 
a number of key areas. For example, CORFO (Chiles Manufacturing Promotions Corporation), 
the government agency responsible for steering Chile’s industrial program, played a critical role 
in tapping Chile’s hydro electric potential and establishing a steal company in 1950 which had a 
tonic effect on the economy. Then as import substitution deepened, CORFO was instrumental in 
lending money to metal manufactures and industries producing everything from appliances, 
motors, electrical goods and chemicals to pharmaceutical products. The government also funded 
sugar beet mills, fish canning operations and cloth production. Together these government 
initiatives helped manufacturing increase by 18% between 1940-52 (Collier, 1996). While in 
agriculture, the government agency imported and rented out tractors to small farmers. The general 
economic climate was one of optimism. It seemed, at least on the surface, that the initial so called 
‘easy ISI phase’, the production of consumer goods, was a success (Collier, 1996; Green, 1995; 
Kay, 1981).  
5.4.1. The Crisis of the Import Substitution Model  
No sooner had ISI cemented itself as the pre-eminent development model of the post-WWII era 
than its weaknesses began to emerge (Cereceda, 1980; Green, 1995). As it turned out, the Chilean 
domestic market proved too small to foster competition and provide for efficient economies of 
scales. By the early 1950s concentration was evident in everything from furniture to foods to 
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textiles (Collier, 1996; Green, 1995). Consequently, many Chilean companies tended to produce 
poor quality goods at inflated prices, putting their manufactured items even further out of reach of 
the average Chilean and further limiting an already stagnant market (Collier, 1996; Green, 1995; 
Murray, 2002a)44.  
 
But not only did ISI breed inefficiency, it also failed to improve overall living standards, did not 
soak up labour and did not stimulate the economy in the long run. The government’s initial 
response was to expand the public sector which it did by 50% from 1939-53. Yet copper taxes 
and foreign borrowing proved woefully inadequate in funding the government’s ambitious 
industrialisation vision and bloated public sector. This, combined with a general unwillingness to 
institute progressive taxation, forced the state to resort to inflationary spending which caused 
further macroeconomic instability. The money supply doubled between 1932 and 1942 due the 
government borrowing from the central bank to fund CORFO’s excesses and due to a series of 
wage rises that exceeded the rate of inflation From the 1950s to 1965 the Ibañez administration 
(1952-58) and the Alessandri administration (1959-64) borrowed heavily and spent big to try hard 
to kick-start the ailing Chilean economy, but each succumbed to inflationary spending as the 
fiscal deficit continued to grow (Angel, 1993).  
 
5.4.2. The Agrarian Question? 
By the mid-to early 1960s it was becoming increasingly apparent that Chile’s economic woes 
were intimately connected to the nation’s sluggish agricultural performance, which many were 
increasingly blaming on Chile’s highly inequitable land tenure structure. Indeed, as late as 1964 a 
mere 2% of property owners still controlled some 55% of Chile’s agricultural land. Apart from 
being socially unjust, however, this highly skewed land tenure system had numerous wider 
economic effects (Collins and Lear, 1995). Firstly, with such a huge proportion of land 
concentrated within the hands of so few, and given the abundance of poor agricultural labourers, 
land owners had little incentive to pursue more modern agricultural practices. Instead, inefficient 
extensive agriculture was the norm meaning considerable amounts of Chile’s agricultural land 
was left either fellow or underutilised. Not surprisingly then, from the 1930s-to the mid 1960s, 
Chile’s agricultural output consistently lagged behind the nation’s population growth. To meet the 
short fall Chile had to import ever greater quantities of food in order to feed the expanding urban 
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masses, which soaked up scarce foreign exchange and strained the nation’s balance of payments 
deficit (Collier, 1996; Collins and Lear, 1995; Kay, 2002; Silva, 1988). Furthermore, with around 
70% of Chile’s peasant families barely subsisting on less than $100 U.S dollars per year, few 
Chileans had the wherewithal to buy manufactured goods, limiting an already small and 
underperforming domestic market for industrial products (Winn and Kay, 1974)45. 
 
Yet, despite being aware of the agricultural sectors lack of dynamism; successive Chilean 
governments persistently refused to tackle the issue head on. As long as minerals, predominantly 
copper, provided the state with a steady flow of revenue, little was asked of agriculture except to 
provide a cheap food source for the urban sectors (Kay, 1981). This was achieved not by 
stimulating greater agricultural productivity, however, but by building a ‘tacit-class alliance’ 
between the industrial bourgeoisie and the traditional land-owning aristocracy (Cereceda, 1980; 
Carriere, 1975; Silva, 1988). This involved the state using a mixture of public subsidies, price 
controls, legal barriers and outright repression in order to prevent the emergence of rural 
unionism and minimum wage laws (Cereceda, 1980; Collier, 1996; Kay, 1981, Silva, 1988), in an 
effort to satisfy the cheap labour requirements of the hacendados and guarantee the supply of 
cheap agricultural commodities for the urban sector (Kay, 1981; 2002).  
 
To be fair, Alessandri- with the encouragement of the United States- made some tentative moves 
towards reforming Chile’s severely inequitable land tenure structure, but under pressure from the 
landed elite, very little land was actually expropriated (Collier, 1996; Murray 2002b). 
Nonetheless, by passing Reform Law 15020 and establishing the two influential state agencies 
CORA (Corparacion de Reforma Agricola) and INDAP (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario), 
it could be argued that Alessandri did at least legitimise the concept of reform, in the process 
helping to lay the foundations for future reforms under the PDC (Christian Democratic Party) and 
UP (United Popular) government (Winn and Kay, 1974).  
 
Perhaps Alessandri’s most lasting impression, however, was not so much his contribution to land 
reform but rather his contribution to electoral reform. During his time in office Alessandri 
extended the franchise from 1,156,576 people in 1958 to 2,915,114 in 1964 (Collier, 1996). 
Crucially, many of the newly enfranchised were poor rural Chileans whom had traditionally been 
compelled to vote as their patrons demanded (Murray, 2002a). Most still lacked decent living 
conditions, had few educational opportunities, consumed an inadequate diet, suffered high rates 
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of infant mortality and were illiterate (Winn, 1974). Unsurprisingly then, armed with their new 
found political freedoms “it was only a matter of time before reformist political parties would 
take up their cause” (Collier, 1996, p.268; also Murray, 2002a). 
 
By the early 1960s the public were becoming restless. Protests demonstrations and strikes were 
on the rise and were gaining considerable support within Santiago’s sprawling shanty towns. The 
Christian Democrats jump in the 1963 municipal elections reflected this growing discontent. It 
was increasingly looking dire for the Conservative government to hold on to the reigns of power; 
“The scene was now set for the 1964 presidential election” (Angell, 1993, p.146) and the era of 
‘mass politics’ (Kay, 1981).  
 
5.5. The Rise of Chilean Mass Politics (1964–1970): The Christian 
Democrats (Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) 
In 1964, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), campaigning under the banner of a “revolution in 
liberty” (Winn and Kay, 1974), a strong platform of social-justice and the promise of ‘massive, 
drastic and rapid’ reform in the countryside (Brown, 1989) won a decisive victory in the Chilean 
election46. Headed by Eduardo Frei, the PDC’s rise reflected the growing phenomena which 
witnessed Chilean politics and society becoming “more ideologically dogmatic and intransigent” 
than any of the previous three and a half decades of civilian government (Angell, 1993, p.141). 
Indeed, for the first time since the establishment of the hacienda system, a government dared to 
openly challenge the “hegemony of the landowners” (Collier, 1996, p.313). However, this would 
prove to be no easy task. Expectations among the peasantry were high. The PDC faced the 
dilemma of attempting to lance centuries of socio-economic injustice whilst maintaining order 
among an increasingly polarised and class conscious populous.  
Land reform and rising class consciousness was not unique to Chile. Since the early 1950s, the 
Catholic Church, the left and the United States Kennedy administration had been calling for 
reform throughout Latin America. It was the Cold War after all and the US was wary of the rising 
social tensions throughout Latin America and was eager to avoid another Cuba (Collier 1996; 
Angell, 1993; Murray, 2002b). Given these concerns, land reform seemed a convenient way of 
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simultaneously allaying class tension whilst promoting a more efficient, modern and dynamic 
agricultural sector.  
 
Under the US government funded Alliance for Progress, aid flowed to those countries deemed to 
be acting within the broader interests of the United States and who showed an interest in 
stemming the tide of communism. Both the Alessandri administration, but particularly the 
reformist minded Christian Democrat Party, were seen as worthy recipients receiving some 
US$720 million in US aid between 1961and 1970. In fact, Chile received more aid per-capita 
than any other Latin American country which is indicative of the level of class-tensions and the 
geopolitical importance of Chile at the time (Angell, 1993; Collier, 1996; Joseph, 1984; Murray, 
2002a). 
 
Thus, while the Chilean people and the United States were steadily applying the necessary 
political pressure for reform, the United Nations Commission for Latin America (or CEPAL in its 
Spanish acronym) were busy re-working structuralism to include, among other things, an 
intellectual case for land-reform and agrarian modernisation (see previous chapter for details on 
structuralism) (Silva, 1988). Given the Frei government’s belief in the social-market, 
structuralism had an important intellectual influence over PDC policy. For example, structuralist 
argued that land reforms would help to reinvigorate the ailing ISI model by lifting agricultural 
productivity and increasing peasant purchasing power for manufactured goods, which they 
believed would augment the domestic market and allow for more efficient economies of scale; 
reduce the need to rely on imported agricultural products; and simmer class tensions by 
facilitating a more just distribution of wealth (Cereceda, 1980; Murray, 2002a; Silva, 1990; Winn 
and Kay, 1974). 
 
5.5.1. The Agrarian Reforms of the PDC 
In the words of Eduardo Frei himself, the PDC’s reforms “rested on four pillars – the 
expropriation of the large and badly worked estates, incentives for efficient producers, 
government sponsored organisation of the peasants and an increase in rural wages and job 
security” (Frei 1965 in Kay b 199? p 420). Thus, the PDC’s reforms were motivated by social 
concerns, but the overriding goal was to stimulate capitalist modernisation in an attempt to revive 
the country’s ailing industrialisation process (Kay, 2002; Silva, 1988; Steenland, 1977).  
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Under Frei (1964-1970), all farms of 80 basic irrigated hectares (BIH) were expropriable- 
although owners were allowed to keep a reserve of 80BIH, were compensated in cash and long 
term bonds, and were often permitted to retain animals and equipment (Collier, 1996; Winn and 
Kay, 1974). The PDC initially intended to resettle some 100,000 peasant families (Kay, 1975; 
Winn and Kay, 1974), however, in the end only a quarter to a fifth of Chiles 1,300 liable 
hacienda were expropriated and only 20,000 peasant families settled (Collier, 1996)47. 
 
Following expropriation, the reformed land was organised into collectives (or ‘asentamientos’), 
which in time the government hoped to divide into individually owned plots (Murray, 2002a). 
The state also offered its support to existing small and medium scale producers to try and induce 
more modern and efficient agricultural practices, including the provision of improved seed 
varieties, subsidised credit for machinery purchases, more productive cattle breeds and 
agricultural inputs (Kay, 1981). 
 
Controversially, however, not only were few families settled, but the main reform beneficiaries 
were arguably the already better off inquilinos; afueras (non-permanent workers) and 
minifundistas were effectively excluded (Angell, 1993; Bengoa, 1983; Kay, 1975; Murray, 
2002a). Naturally, in a nation already so polarised socio-economically, the slow pace and limited 
scope of the reforms led to considerable frustration within the peasantry. This is understandable, 
given that “the asentamiento…maintained and even encouraged the economic and social 
inequality among rural labourers” (Kay, 1975, p. 420). For instance, asendados came to own on 
average 10 irrigated hectares of land, more than 9-10 times that of the average minifundista, and 
often paid afuerinos no better than their former patrons (Kay, 2002).  
Many peasants chose to vent their frustrations by taking the reform process into their own hands.  
Tomas or land seizures began to occur with greater frequency (Silva, 1988) with some 400 tomas 
taking place between 1969 and 1970 (Collier, 1996). Thus, “by 1970 it was becoming hard to 
contain agrarian mobilisation” (Collier, 1996 p.314).  
 
Yet despite all the political turmoil that characterised the PDC’s rein, productivity increases were 
attained and real wages did rise (Collier, 1996); Kay, 1975; Winn and Kay, 1974). Combined, it 
seemed the PDC’s policy of expropriating large and inefficient estates, the provision of cheap 
credits, import assistance on critical machinery, and a favourable agricultural price policy 
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motivated many large estates to subdivide their land and increase their productivity. Field crop 
production rose at a rate of 5% per-annum from 1965–1970, more than double that of the 
preceding period (2.3%), while livestock production managed an average annual growth rate of 
5.5%, up from 3.5% from the previous period (Angell, 1993). Most of the productive gains, 
however, were made in the private sector rather than the expropriated sector. This is somewhat 
unsurprising given that the reformed sector consisted of less than 18% of total land (in BIH)48 
(Smith, 1975). The reformed sector did experience growth but had to be propped up by state 
support which stretched public financial, technical, and bureaucratic resources (Kay, 1981). 
 
Regardless of the increase in agricultural productivity food imports remained a burdensome 
weight on Chile’s balance of payments (Angell, 1993) while the rise in state subsidies and 
extension services strained public finances (Collier, 1996; Angell, 1993). Public expenditure, 
doubled during the Frei years (1964–70), but even with the ‘Chileanisation’ of copper,49 tax 
revenues only covered three quarters of government spending (Angell, 1993).  
 
By 1967/68 the economy was displaying serious structural weaknesses. The private sector was 
reluctant to invest for fear of further ‘redistributive reforms’ (Angell, 1993; Collins and Lear, 
1995), and foreign capital was drying up, especially within the copper sector. The states response 
was to augment the public investment from 50% to 75% (Kay, 1981). But in many ways this 
increase in public investment merely reflected the relative “weakness of private sector investment 
and an overall failure to improve the level of new investment in productive sectors of the 
economy” (Angell, 1993, p 150)50.  
 
As public expenditure continued to rise, the government attempted to curtail wage rises from 
unions in 1967 but faced the conundrum of restricting those very unions it struggled so hard to 
empower in the first place (Angell, 1993; Collier, 1996). When these large wage rises combined 
with the already existing public deficit and slow growth after 1967 once again chronic inflation 
ensued (Kay, 1981).  
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 The government took 51 percent ownership of the mines controlled by United States companies, principally those of 
Anaconda and Kennecott. Critics complained that the companies received overly generous terms, invested too little in 
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5.5.2. The Unravelling of the PDC  
Under Eduardo Frei, Chile’s underlying social, economic and political structural constraints did 
not disappear perhaps as rapidly as many Chileans had expected or hoped. Although Chileans 
were undoubtedly better off in 1970 in socio-economic terms (Angell, 1993; Collier, 1996) the 
old scars of  slow growth, inflation, inequality, and economic concentration remained (Collier, 
1996). Furthermore, polarisation and political instability were on the increase, particularly in the 
countryside (Silva, 1988). It was not so much that the reforms were a failure, but that the 
government had perhaps promised too much too soon, raising peasants’ expectation beyond that 
which was deemed politically feasible (Angell, 1993; Kay, 1981; Murray 2002). Strikes, land 
seizures, urban occupations, student demonstrations, and minor urban ‘terrorism’ on the part of 
the ultra left MIR (Revolutionary Movement of the Left), were all on the rise and reflected the 
tempestuous mood within Chile (Collier, 1996; Silva, 1988)51.  
As tensions grew, both the right and the left were busy mobilising, forming new coalitions and 
attempting to articulate a new vision for the nation (Collier, 1996). On the right, liberals, 
conservatives and some members of the nationalist right infuriated with the PDC’s reforms, 
banded together to form the National Party which by 1969 was capturing 20% of the vote in the 
congressional elections (Angell, 1993). Meanwhile, the left was also gaining in the poles, 
capturing 28.1% of the vote in 1969 while their radical allies achieved 13%. Significantly, some 
on the left, particularly within the socialist party, were increasingly colouring their speeches with 
the “language of the guerrilla struggle and popular insurrection” (Angell, 1993 p.155). Emerging 
from this political turmoil a range of disparate leftist parties ranging from the Communists to the 
Socialists formed what came to be known as the Popular Unity Party (UP). With an increasingly 
mobilised peasantry, and given the breakdown between the ruling Christian Democrats and the 
political right, a window of opportunity had opened for the Left, creating space for the UP’s 
historical rise in the 1970 presidential election (Silva, 1988) 
 
5.6. Allende and the Socialist Experiment 
In 1970 Salvador Allende, head of the Unidad Popular (UP) leftist coalition, assumed the Chilean 
presidency- albeit with a slim minority in congress. Taking advantage of the newly awakened 
class tensions stirred up during the PDC era (Collier, 1996) the UP openly declared its ideological 
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 For example, in 1960 there were only three strikes in the countryside.  By 1970 this number had exploded to 1,580 
strikes (Angell, 1993; Kay, 1981) and in 1970 there were 368 farm invasions compared with only 16 in 1968 (Angell, 
1993) 
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agenda which was to “…search for a replacement of the present economic structure….in order to 
initiate the construction of socialism” (Allende, 1973 in Angell, 1993 p.158). Specifically, this 
meant a commitment to “nationalise the economy, to implement a massive program of income 
redistribution, [and] to end the dominance of the Latifundia” (Angell, 1993 p.158). 
 
Wasting little time, in their first year alone, the government expropriated 80 key industrial 
enterprises52. The most notable seizure being the lucrative northern copper mines, which Allende 
intended to harness in order to fund his parties ambitious transition to socialism (Collier, 1996). 
 
In the countryside, with little regard to any efficiency criteria, the UP expropriated all estates in 
excess of 80BIH, abruptly ending hundreds of years of latifundia dominance (Kay, 1981; Murray, 
2002a). By 1972 all estates over 80 basic irrigated hectares (BIH) (Collins and Lear, 1995; 
Collier, 1996) – making up some 60% of all irrigated land – were in state hands ready for 
redistribution (Angell, 1993) and by 1973 two thirds of the peasantry were unionised (Kay, 1975). 
 
However, having expropriated the land, there was disagreement within the UP as to how the 
reformed sector ought to be organised. The Socialists favoured the establishment of large state 
run haciendas, mass mobilisation and a speedy reform process to consolidate power. The 
Communists preached caution, advocating a less ‘ambitious’ co-operative type arrangement that 
reassembled more the haciendas of old where peasants would be allowed their own garden plot 
within a familiar setting (Winn, 1974; Collier, 1996). 
 
Emerging out of this intra-party dialogue was a compromise of sorts in the creation of the Centros 
de Reforma Agraria or agrarian reform centres (CERA). These reform units were made by 
combining a number of nearby adjacent estates in order to form a large ‘rationalised’ production 
unit. The CERAs were also an explicit attempt to try and incorporate afuerinos and even some 
minifundistas into the reformed sector (Winn, 1974)53.   
 
In theory the CERA’s were to be a socialistic mode of production. But the UP faced political 
opposition especially from the asentados who resisted any attempt to water down their privileged 
position. This resistance forced the government to compromise and allow private ownership of a 
house and garden on the CERAs. Still, the formation of the CERAs proved a technical and slow 
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 By the time of the coup this number had risen to 400 companies making up approximately 60% of Chile’s GDP. 
53
 Afuerinos and minifundistas were effectively excluded from the PDC’s reform agenda and suffered job losses as 
capitalist farmers modernised their farms by employing labour saving technologies (Winn, 1974).  
  
77 
process – in the meantime the Comite Capesino (peasant committee) was erected which in time 
became the most numerous reform unit. But according to Kay (1981), the most successful models 
were the CEPROs (Centros de Produccion) production centres and the ‘intervened farms’. This 
was because within these units the government was unquestionably in charge and agricultural 
labourers paid in wages (Steenland, 1977), so the system tended to be better organised, 
centralised and encountered less conflict (Kay, 1981).  
 
5.6.1. The Cost of Reform: The Demise of the UP   
Under the UP the Chilean economy underwent several tremendously rapid structural changes. 
The first year Chileans enjoyed an economic boom on the back of generous government 
spending, price freezes and wage rises. The second and third years, however, were not so 
prosperous economically. Combined, falling copper prices, a thriving black market, and 
congressional resistance to tax reform meant that government revenue was well below 
government expenditure. By 1972 the fiscal deficit had doubled from 4% to 8% of GDP partly as 
a result of the government’s bloated public sector, acquiescence to wage claims from unions and 
its policy of price controls. What’s more, inflation was in the triple figures, the countries balance 
of payments account was severely in deficit, years of debt service had to be renegotiated and 
rescheduled, and real wages and real GDP per capita were falling (Angell,1993).     
 
In the agriculture sector, fear of expropriation, the development of a black market, rural unrest – 
particularly land seizures (Tomas) which the government appeared either unable or unwilling to 
try and put a halt to- created a highly volatile and unstable business climate which discouraged 
investment and led many farmers to de-capitalise their farms (Collins and Lear, 1995; Collier, 
1996). The reformed sector fared little better. The decision to allow individual titles backfired in 
the sense that it undermined the collective ideals of the reforms as peasants neglected the 
collectives in favour of their own individual plots. (Collier, 1996; Kay, 1981; Kay, 2002; 
Steenland, 1977). Consequently, wheat and potato production declined by a third while sugar beat 
slumped by more than 40%, precipitating a four fold increase in food imports at a time when 
foreign exchange earnings were already stretched (Angell, 1993).  
 
Furthermore, the opposition did everything it could to try and derail the UP by fermenting union 
resistance, supporting strikes, and fostering fear among the populous. Although it certainly did 
not help that the UP struggled to come to a consensus as to the nature, scope and speed of the 
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reform process. There was also a lack of coordination between those agencies directing the 
reforms, the government’s economic team and the politicians (Angell, 1993). Moreover, given the 
degree of social transformation planned, the UP really needed the support of the majority of the 
population – particularly the influential middle class (Angell, 1993), better control over the armed 
forces (Kay, 1981) and perhaps “a greater dose of gradualism” (Collier, 1996). Without such 
support the UP could only hope their “economic policies would be so successful that there would 
be a massive swing in its favour”, but this was not to be (Collier, 1996 p.160). By 1973 the 
economy was in crises, the social order in flux, and militaristic tensions on both sides of the 
political spectrum were becoming increasingly palpable (Angell, 1993; Collier, 1996). On 
September 11 1973 the military intervened abruptly and brutally ending over 50 years of civilian 
government and put an end to over 40 years of state-lead development. 
 
5.7. Return to the Market  
On September 11th 1973, Salvador Allende was deposed in a bloody coup headed by the soon to 
be Dictator General Augusto Pinochet. Almost immediately the military government set about 
outlawing union activity and any other opposition, “declaring any sectorial demands as an 
‘illegitimate act’, directed against the ‘general interest’ of the nation” (Silva, 1988). However, 
having little experience in economic policy themselves, the generals looked to the new liberal 
orthodoxy of monetarism and unrestrained laissez-faire economics emerging from the Chicago 
School of Economics for direction (Angell, 1993; Barton, 1998; Collier, 1996; Kay, 1981)54.  
 
Heeding the advice of influential neoliberals, Pinochet instituted ‘economic shock treatment’ 
(Barton, 1998; Collier, 1996). This included, among other things; curtailing public expenditure by 
half and reducing the money supply to raise interest rates; privatising some 400 state controlled or 
‘intervened’ companies (Lewis, 2002); liberalising foreign investment laws; and dramatically 
cutting tariffs and quotas on imports (Collier, 1996)55.  
 
                                                 
54
 Unbeknown to many at the time, these Chicago trained economists, or the ‘Chicago Boys’ as they are sometimes 
called (Green, 1995; Silva, 1988), were in the process of planning a coup of their own- an ‘ideological coup’- which in 
retrospect would go on to have far greater implications for the world than Chile’s military coup. However, for the time 
being, Chile was poised to become the world’s first neoliberal experiment (Murray, 2002a), and would latter be 
heralded by economists, governments and international financial institutions the world over as a bastion of ideological 
purity worthy of emulation (Collier, 1996; Murray, 2002a).  
55
 The military government cut tariffs from 70% to 10% in 1974- making them some of the worlds lowest (Collier, 
1996).   
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Predictably, recession ensued and by the end of 1975 GDP had slumped by one seventh and 
industrial output by a quarter. By the end of the decade manufacturing’s share of GDP was a mere 
one fifth of the pre-recession figure. Unemployment increased by 20 percent and for those lucky 
enough to keep their jobs, wages were slashed considerably (Collier, 1996). 
 
In the agrarian sector, land reform was brought to an abrupt halt. INAP and CORA- departments 
formally instrumental in the reform process – were deprived of government funding and 
underwent serious personal cuts (Collins and Lear, 1995; Cruz, 1993; Silva, 1988). Political 
activity was prohibited, wages cut, subsidies to small farmers terminated, and food prices were 
allowed to rise (Murray, 2002a and 2002b). Growers of traditional crops in particular faced 
serious financial hardship as cheaper food imports poured in and unemployment and wage cuts 
reduced domestic demand (Gwynne and Kay, 1997; Kay, 2002).  
 
As for the reformed sector, the military government had three main objectives; first, to break up 
the cooperatives and return land to the former owners; second, to suppress collective political 
power among the peasantry; and third, to unlock Chile’s comparative advantage by subjecting 
Chilean agriculture to the ‘discipline’ of the market in order to bring about a more dynamic, 
efficient, export-orientated agricultural sector (Murray, 2002a). Surprisingly this did not include 
resurrecting the hacienda system (Collins and Lear, 1995; Collier, 1996; Gomez, 1988; Murray, 
2002a and Ortega, 1987). Somewhat paradoxically, Pinochet used the earlier land reforms and the 
modernisation processes already set in motion by Frei and Allende to his advantage (Ortega, 
1987). Therefore, of the reformed sector only 30% was returned to its original owners, 30% was 
auctioned off privately, 7% was kept by the state, and the remaining 33% was parcelled out to 
campesinos (Chilean Peasants) (Collins, 1979). By 1979 the military government had achieved its 
counter-reform.  
 
5.7.1. Increased Production at a Price  
If the intention of Pinochet’s market reforms was to demobilise the peasantry and stimulate 
export-led growth, the military government’s structural reforms and the considerable foreign 
investment it engendered certainly produced this56 (Collins and Lear, 1995). Pinochet’s markets 
reforms and the de-unionisation of the peasantry proved an irresistible magnet for foreign 
investors who poured into Chile to take advantage of the countries abundant natural resources, 
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cheap labour and counter seasonality (Collins and Lear, 1995; Murray 2002a). Between 1975 and 
1976 GDP averaged an impressive 7% on the back of strong growth, particularly within the non-
traditional export sector (NTAX) (Loveman, 1988; Murray, 2002; Ortega, 1987)57 [see figure 1]. 
For instance, from 1973-1986 the area planted in fruit trees doubled with a massive 84% 
concentrated in Chiles Central Valley region between Aconcagua and Curicó (Cruz, 1993; 
Korovkin, 1992; Kay, 2002) [see figure 2]. Apples were being sold to the UK and wines to the 
US (Collier, 1996). Radiata pine plantations also underwent spectacular growth from 200,000 
hectares in 1965-73 to one million hectares by 1993 (Cruz, 1993). Fish exports followed a similar 
positive trajectory (Murray 2002). Thus, in just over a decade (1974-1987) agricultural exports 
went from 250 to 1300 million dollars. This ‘remarkable’ growth (Kay 1993) saw agriculture 
reach 27% of total exports in 1987 (Cruz, 1993) reducing Chile’s precarious reliance on copper 
exports which Collier (1996) has called “an obvious success story” (see figure 1). 
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Figure 5. Chilean exports and NTAX 1978-2000 (millions of nominal US$) 
Source: generated from Murray (1997a). 
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 Kay (1981, p.507) refers to the military government’s labour policy as “market repression” in the sense that its 
primary aim was to lower wages so that Chile could increase its international competitiveness and profits. Collins and 
Lear (1995, p.193) concur, preferring to refer to Chile’s lower labour costs as an “unnatural advantage” rather then 
comparative advantage. 
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Figure 6. Chilean fruit and grape exports 1971-2003 (Value in nominal US$000s) 
Source: Generated from Murray (1997a). 
For neoliberals, Chile’s miraculous growth in NTAXs is proof of the market’s superior resource 
allocating ability vis-à-vis the state. For sure, most commentators generally accept that the 
creation of a land market and a group of highly individualistic, profit motivated, small-to-medium 
sized farmers, helped drive increased agricultural efficiency and paved the way for the agro-
export led growth of the late 1970s and 1980s (Collins and Lear, 1995; Gwynne and Kay, 1997; 
Murray 2002a; Kay 1993). However, to attribute this growth solely to the wonders of the ‘free-
market’ represents a gross distortion of the situation leading up to the NTAX boom (Collins and 
Lear, 1995).  
 
The creation of an efficient land market, for instance, simply would not have been possible if it 
were not for the courageous land reforms of both Frei and Allende which dismantled the 
inefficient and antiquated latifundia system (Collins and Lear, 1995). Furthermore, Chile’s 
dynamic fruit industry owes as much to president Frei’s (Senior) 1966 National Plan for Fruit 
Development, which was aimed at stimulating the fruit export sector. Under the plan, the 
government surveyed existing orchards, conducted market research, set up nurseries and 
experimented with new varieties, established phytosanitary standards, partially subsidised credit 
facilities for orchard investment, and built critical research and development links with the 
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University of California and the Universidad de Chile (Barton et al, 2005; Collins and Lear, 1995; 
Gwynne and Kay, 1997). Chile’s multimillion dollar forestry industry also received a ‘hand up’. 
After all, the lion’s share of trees were planted long before the military government came to 
power (during the ISI years), plus the industry received considerable state subsidies (Gwynne and 
Kay, 1997; Kay, 2002)58. As for the traditional sector, after initially allowing foreign imports to 
devastate the sector, it was only once the military government established price bands, minimum 
prices and tariffs on some basic annual or traditional crops after 1983 (e.g. wheat, vegetable oil 
and sugar beet), that this sector began to recover (Gwynne and Kay, 1997; Kay, 2002; Korovkin, 
1992)59. 
 
Also, neoliberals ought not to forget the massive social-economic impact their policies had on the 
Chilean countryside (and also the urban sector). I have already mentioned the effect the structural 
reforms had on the traditional sector, but the ‘miraculous’ NTAX sector has been equally 
regressive spatially and among different socio-economic groups. The much vaunted fruit boom 
for instance was “largely concentrated in the Central Valley region” (Kay, 2002, p. 480), and 
within this region, it has been predominantly large capitalist fruit farmers and agribusinesses that 
have had the necessary capital and technical expertise to participate in the boom. As Ortega 
explains;   
 
[while those] few producers who could orientate their production towards the dynamic 
international markets [were] relatively successful in integrating into the new economic 
model…the overwhelming majority of peasants and agrarian entrepreneurs found it impossible to 
produce exportable crops due to a lack of capital and climatic factors and have been confined to 
producing for the local market (Ortega, 1987)60. 
 
Indeed, Bengoa (1983), Cruz (1993), Collins and Lear (1995), Kay (2002) and Silva (1988) 
estimate that half of all reform beneficiaries had lost their land within the first few years of 
neoliberalism. Crucially, however, even when small farmers have managed to convert their 
parcelas from traditional to export crops (e.g. reconversión), in the absence of government 
intervention, few have been able to remain viable over the long term due to excessive debts and 
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 According to Gwynne and Kay (1997, p.4), under military rule the forestry sector received up to 75%  of its 
reforestation costs from the government through generous subsidised government loans.  
 
60
 This point is also supported by Collins and Lear (1995), Collier (1996), Gwynne and Kay (1997), Kay 
(1981), Kay (2002) Murray (2002a; 2002b) and Silva (1988).  
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scale difficulties (Murray, 1997a; 1997b; 2002a; 2002b). With few options available to them, 
most have had little choice but to flock to nearby rural shanty towns in search of low paid, 
precarious, seasonal work (Collins and Lear, 1995). To illustrate the magnitude of this transition, 
Silva (1988) estimates that in 1970 almost 80% of the Chilean fruit industry workers held 
permanent work compared with only 10% of agricultural workers in the late 1980s61. Not 
surprisingly then, from 1981–1986 per-capita food consumption decreased 5% in calories and 
20% in protein (Gomez, 1988). Thus, during military rule while an elite few Chileans were 
basking in their new found economic freedoms, poverty was the reality for nearly half of rural 
Chileans during the tumultuous 1970s and 1980s (Collier, 1996). 
  
5.8. The Return to Civilian Rule: the Concertación Coalition 
In 1989 Pinochet stepped down as dictator of Chile and allowed for the return to democratic 
civilian rule and Chileans elected Patricio Aylwin as the head of the Concertación coalition. 
Campaigning on the “growth with equity” slogan, Aylwin and his Concertación coalition had the 
difficult task of maintaining Chiles’ international competitiveness and export led growth whilst 
attempting to address the nations ‘deuda social’ (social debt) left in the wake of nearly two 
decades of authoritarian rule and highly uneven ‘development’ (Barton, 1998; Hojman, 1993; 
Collier, 1996).  
 
In terms of economic policy, the first Concertación government showed little interest in altering 
the fundamental tenants of the neoliberal orthodoxy except to tame some of the more regressive 
aspects of the free market model (Murray, 2002b). Expropriation was off the agenda and export-
led growth remained the order of the day with the fruit and forestry sectors leading the way (Kay, 
1993). There was also no attempt to alter the “legal impediments to the unionisation of temporary 
workers and strikes by organised workers in the economically important fruit industry” (Collins 
and Lear, p.198). That said, however, in an effort to give a ‘human face’ to neoliberalism, the 
government re-established its role in assisting small farmers and cooperatives with credit and 
technical support and continued to offer price support for domestic crop producers. The 
government also invested in health and education in rural areas in an effort to try and address two 
decades of ‘economic darwinism’ and poverty in the Chilean countryside.  
                                                 
61
 Cruz (1993) offers a similar figure, estimating that up to ¾ of landless peasants relied on such irregular, temporary 
and unpredictable work- many of whom were woman. 
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By 1992 it was clear that the Concertación government had successfully managed to retain 
Chile’s export momentum. Commenting during Aylwin’s presidency Kay (1993) wrote that “a 
major structural shift [had]….occurred regarding agriculture’s contribution to foreign exchange 
and position within the national economy” and for “the first time since the mid 1930’s agriculture 
made a positive net contribution to foreign exchange”. Indeed, in the early 1990s agricultural 
exports contributed close to a fifth of total foreign exchange (FE) earnings in comparison to the 
pre-1973 period where agricultural exports contributed a paltry one fifteenth of total FE earnings 
(Kay, 1993).  
 
Domestic agrarian production also continued to recover under Alywin. A range of interventionist 
measures that first began under Pinochet’s ‘agricultural rectification policy’ during 1982/83, 
including price bands for key crops, higher tariffs on food imports, and greater purchasing power 
were continued and had by the nineties afforded Chile virtual self sufficiency in these areas (Kay, 
1993).  
 
Thus, the combination of a stable macroeconomic climate, entrepreneurial dynamism and 
considerable state subsidies to the forest sector had by the early 1990s worked to resurrect Chile’s 
perennial agrarian backwardness and inefficiencies (Kay, 1993). Somewhat ironically, according 
to Kay (1993), Chilean agriculture in the 1990s, based on a flexible but stable land market leading 
to an agro-export boom in many ways represents the realisation of those right wing reformists 
within the PDC who over two decades earlier wished to unleash “modernising capitalistic forces” 
within the Chilean countryside.  
 
5.9. NTAX, Reconversión and the Role of the State in the Post-Pinochet 
era 
From 1990, up until the time that my field research was carried out in October/November 2004, 
Chile has maintained strong democratic leadership under three successive Concertación 
governments, first Aylwin (1990-1994), followed by Frei (junior) (1994-2000), then Lagos 
(2000-2006). During this period each administration had attempted to address Chile’s persistent 
social-inequalities to varying degrees whilst being careful to not jeopardise Chile’s much 
heralded export led growth (Kay, 2002). Most recently, Lagos – arguably the most left-leaning of 
the three leaders – has carried out the most concerted anti-poverty, anti-inequality measures since 
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the military regime left power. But as Murray (2002a, p. 426) points out, like the two leaders 
before him, Lagos has attempted “to tackle this persistent problem…whilst being wedded to 
neoliberalism, which, to some commentators (Gwynne and Kay, 1997), is the fundamental cause 
of the deep rural differentiation which has taken place over the last three decades”. 
 
The apparent ‘continuity’ and persistence of the neoliberalism model under three supposedly 
leftist democratic regimes may seem surprising, but is largely explained by the fragile political-
economic environment bequeathed by the military government which included;  
 
[t]he powerful influence of international capital and the desire of the government to maintain 
investor confidence; the role of the military-aligned business elite and their opposition to the 
social reform and high taxation… the legacy of the 1980s constitution which swung the balance 
of power in the parliament and senate towards the right wing; and the wish of the democratic 
governments not to antagonise the military …” (Murray, 2002a, p. 430). 
 
In terms of the countryside, this has meant an implicit adherence to reconversión; whereby it has 
tended to be agro-business, rather than the state, that has mediated the process of inserting small-
scale producers into the global economic system (Korovkin, 1992; Kay, 2002). This is not 
altogether surprising, however, given the continued growth in non-traditional fruit exports since 
the mid-1990s, particularly table grapes, as shown in figure 3 below.  
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Figure. 7  
Chilean Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Exports (1996-2005) 
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*Includes Fisheries and Silviculture  
Source: Banco Central 2006 
Note: see figure 2 for pre-1996 periods.  
 
Through the use of contract farming in particular (Chapters 2.4.1. and 7.3.), agro-business, much 
of it foreign owned, has become the key driver of change within the Chilean countryside 
channelling finance and advice to small-scale producers in an effort to promote ‘reconversión’ 
(Korovkin, 1992; Gwynne, 2003; Murray, 2002b).  
 
Where the state has provided its limited support, it has tended to be directed towards reconversión 
itself rather than the obstacles and needs that the ‘reconverted’ may face once they have 
converted their plots (Murray, 2002a). Furthermore, because assistance for reconversión has 
generally only been offered to those growers the Chilean government considers as ‘viable 
producers’, minifundistas have effectively been left out creating “a geographic [and indeed a 
socio-economic] concentration of exclusion” (Murray, 2002a, p.433; Korovkin, 1992).  
 
Thus, despite some superficial government assistance, small-growers wishing to partake in 
reconversión have for the most part had to rely on agribusiness for credit, technical expertise and 
market access. This process has been underway for some time and has tended to create a situation 
whereby small ignorant peasants are entering into contracts with much larger international firms, 
creating a vast power asymmetry between producer and exporter (Gwynne, 2003; Murray, 
1997b).  
 
Since the early 1990s Murray (1997b) has explored the nature of these power relations within 
different Chilean localities. His investigations show that for many- perhaps even the majority of 
parceleros- exporting grapes and apples has not being as lucrative as agro-business would have 
initially had them believe. Companies have been able to use their position of power and superior 
information flows to force farmers into rather unfair bargaining positions. For example, in El 
Palqui it was observed that from 1990 onwards, as international prices worsened, “through the 
economic mechanism of prices and contracts…many growers were unable to shift out of grape 
production, as returns consistently failed to cover credits and charges” (Murray, 2002b, p. 206). 
As such, a large number of small producers have been effectively forced to sell their land, on a 
number occasions to the export companies who have seized the opportunity to expand their 
productive base (Murray, 2002a). These are concerning findings as it shows that even those 
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farmers that have ‘successfully reconverted’ and ‘successfully inserted’ into the global economy 
have still faced tremendous structural barriers (Murray, 2002b.p 197).   
 
Therefore, if the mid-1990s are anything to go by, it would appear that there remain numerous 
post-reconversión issues and equity consideration which have yet to be addressed. For instance, 
in El Palqui, by 1994, 32 of an original 144 parcelas had fallen into the hands of companies, more 
often than not due to unsustainable debt levels. Writing during the time of Lagos, Murray (2002a. 
pp. 438-39) commentated that without;  
 
monitoring of fruit procurement contracts; legal aid for small-scale growers in contract disputes; a 
system of financial provision and debt re-negotiation for small growers; more effective non-company 
owned technology transfer; provision of impartial information; and, incentives to organise and 
bargain collectively, [then rural poverty and inequality are likely to persist].  
 
To summarise, the rapid changes among the Chilean fruit export sector is thus, arguably, one of 
the more revealing stories to emerge out of Chile’s neoliberal experience. On the one hand, this 
highly modern, highly capitalised, dynamic and globally integrated sector is synonymous with the 
‘new rural Chile’ so eagerly received by economists, politicians and industry leaders. Yet by the 
same token, this sector is also indicative of a new rural Chile whereby rural socio-economic 
differentiation, land concentration and rural proletarianisation appears to be intensifying, 
threatening the livelihoods of many peasant families. Given the hype surrounding the expansion 
of Chilean NTAXs, particularly the fruit export sector, there is a danger that the Chilean model 
will be regarded as a model worthy of emulation, when in reality Chile is yet to demonstrate how 
such growth can be made more inclusive and equitable despite 14 years of ‘growth with equity’ 
rhetoric from successive Concertación governments. It is, therefore, crucial that El Palqui’s story 
and stories from other localities like El Palqui be told so that we may come to better understand 
the negative distributional effects that outward-orientation can have in order to formulate better 
ways to mitigate such effects.  
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6. Local Transformations in El Palqui, Chile  
 
The following chapter will attempt to statistically show the results drawn from field work that 
took place in El Palqui, Chile, November 2004. The data will be merged with Murray’s previous 
data, which covers the period 1983-1994. Combined the findings suggest a marked and steady 
pattern of land concentration taking place within the Pueblo from 1983–200462. By far the most 
notable trend has been the steady proletarianisation and semi-proletarianisation of parceleros 
within El Palqui’s five parcelaciónes (Los Litres [LL], San Antonio [SA], Santa Rosa [SR], El 
Peñon [EP] and Puente Plomo [PP]). Replacing these small-growers are a select few, highly 
capitalised and highly aggressive, national and multinational export companies.  
 
In presenting these findings, the chapter is divided into two separate, yet interrelated parts, based 
on two different data sources, part (a) and part (b). The methods used and the targeted data 
sources intentionally mirror that of Murray’s (1997a) previous work in an effort to harmonise past 
and current findings so as to allow for a longitudinal study of land concentration within El Palqui. 
The entirely quantitative findings for part (a) have been derived from the regions land tenancy 
roles between the period 1983 and 2004, which track the change in ownership of each plot over 
time (see methods)63. Part (b), however, uses a mixed approach and contains both qualitative and 
quantitative data forms.  
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 Information for the pre-1983 period was not available. However, it is clear by comparing the number of parceleros in 
1983 with the number of originals that some had already sold prior to 1983. In his earlier research Murray (1997) was 
unable to say exactly which forces led to these early sales as most growers could not be contacted.  Nonetheless, he 
supposed that growers may have sold either to relieve debt with state agencies like INDAP, or - unaccustomed as they 
were to making relatively large amounts of money- may have been tempted to sell to make a quick buck, or, might have 
lacked the administrative experience or technical expertise to manage their land efficiently making quick-sale an 
attractive out.  
63
 Unfortunately, the roles are limited to showing changes among discrete plots and therefore do not allow us to trace 
the shrinking of parceleros (from 1994 onwards) which occurs when a plot owner decides only to sell part of his/her 
plot. If it were possible to track these changes, judging by the evidence from part (b), which tells us that the majority of 
small farmers interviewed have sold some land, the distribution of land within the region is likely to be even more 
skewed in favour of larger players than part (a) figures suggest. In the absence of plot size on the roles we can only use 
original plot size as the bench mark for measuring change. Furthermore, although a large number of parceleros in El 
Palqui are involved in grape production, several are not, and others practice multi-cropping, meaning one cannot say for 
certain that every land sale is due to a failure to successfully reconvert.  
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6.1. Land Transfers within El Palqui (1983-2004) (Part a) 
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                                    Figure 8a                                                                   Figure 8b 
Figure 8a Land transfers within individual parcelaciónes, El Palqui Chile, 1983-1994 
Figure 8b Land transfers within Individual Parcelaciónes, El Palqui Chile, 1983-2004 
 
Source: Generated from the roles of Impuestos Internos (various years) as are all part (a) findings that 
follow).  
Note: Comparing one parcelación with another will be misleading as each parcelación has a different 
absolute number of plots (for instance, in 1983 Santa Rosa (SR) had 46 original parceleros compared with 
only 5 in Puente Plomo). Thus, for a more accurate analysis comparisons should be made with in each 
individual parcelación over time.    
 
Beginning with figures 8a and 8b, and bearing in mind that there exists a mere 144 plots, one can 
almost instantaneously observe the high degree of fluidity within the El Palqui land market 
between the years 1983 and 2004. The graph (figure 8a) shows a steady rate of transfers, 
particularly between 1983 and 1994. The first two 3 and 4 year periods both share 23 transfers 
while the four years between 1990-94 recorded 21 plot transfers. Although, the exact numbers of 
transfers for the four year periods since 1994 are not attainable, it would appear that the 59 
transfers within the ten years since 1994 (1994–2004) are consistent with the past 11 years trend 
(1983–1994)(of 67 transfers) but displays a slight slowing down (see figure 8b). However, this 
difference could quite easily be explained by the extra year between 1983-1994. Indeed, by 
dividing the number of transfers by the number of years there appears even less difference 
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between the two periods, with an average of 6.1 transfers per year (1983-1994) and 5.9 transfers 
(1994-2004)64.  
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                               Figure 9a        Figure 9b 
Figure 9a: Land transfers according to size distribution, El Palqui, 1983-1994 (ha) 
Figure 9b:  Land transfers according to size distribution, El Palqui, 1983-2004 (ha) 
 
A similar result is found when land transfers are presented according to size distribution. As 
figure 9b demonstrates, transfers according to each size category have more or less remained 
constant between the two periods 1983-1994 and 1994-2004. The fewer transfers within the 
(≥5<10) category from 1994–2004 are likely to reflect the greater number of transfers that took 
place within this category in the early years, especially from 1983–1990 (see figure 9a). It is 
difficult to say for sure what drove this disparity to begin with. Perhaps initially larger plots were 
in greater demand due to their perceived scale benefits. Yet, as these plots (≥5<10) became 
scarcer, buyers turned their attention to the remaining smaller plots.  
 
Because of the general consistency between the number and size of those transfers between 1983 
and 1994, and 1994 and 2004, as might be expected, there is also little deviation between the two 
year groups in terms of the amount of hectares transferred.  
 
                                                 
64
 However, figure 1 and 2’s weakness is that they are both derived from discrete time periods; (1983-1986, 1986-1990 
etc) therefore, disaggregating by year is not likely to accurately reflect the actual year to year variability within the land 
market.  
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Figure 10: Land transferred for each size category in terms of hectares. 
Note: Graph displays only those size grouping for land from 1 to 20 ha. The reason is to exclude large land 
transfers so as to give a more accurate depiction of the amount of land being transferred among small-
farmers without the data being distorted by large one off sales. 
 
Hectares  1983-86 1986-90 1990-94 1983-
1994 
1994-
2004 
<5  24 31 52 107 103 
>5<10 83 92 40 215 168 
>10<20 42  13 55 37 
 
Table 1: Land transferred for each size category in terms of hectares 
 
Although in figures 8, 9 and 10, land transfers in terms of number, size distribution and hectares 
appear more or less constant – especially when broken down into one 11 year and one 10 year 
period- this does not necessarily reflect the rate of change or degree of fluidity within the land 
market over time (e.g. land-market velocity). Given the fixed number of plots within the sample 
area, as more and more land becomes consolidated among a few successful larger growers 
(owning more than one plot), there are effectively less ‘individual’ plots available to transfer, or 
in other words, fewer and fewer owners within each parcelación (see table 2).  
 
This is based on the assumption that larger growers or export companies are, in general, less 
likely to encounter financial difficulties and are, therefore, less likely to resort to selling their 
land65. They are also likely to manage their multiple plots, especially when adjacent to one 
                                                 
65
 This is not to suggest that larger players owning more than one plot do not and have not sold land- but as latter 
evidence will show, in general, they have been far more successful in retaining and expanding their holdings (see 
figures 11 and 12). 
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another, as if they are one entity, rather than as discrete plots, as appears on the roles. Thus, in 
line with this assumption, we would expect to see a slowing down of the rate of transfers as there 
are essentially less plots available for transfer. A more meaningful measure, therefore, would be 
to calculate the number of transfers as a percentage of the number of owners within El Palqui, as 
is presented below. 
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Figure 11: Number of absolute land transfers vs. the number of transfers relative to the number of 
owners in El Palqui in base years 1983 and 1994. 
 
As displayed above in figure 11, as a function of the number of owners remaining, land transfers 
have actually increased proportionally from 1994–2004 from 48% to 55%. The results would 
perhaps show an even greater divergence if it were possible to extricate the extra year included in 
the 1983-1994 data set. Still, while it is clear that land transfers have increased proportionally 
since 1994, overall, there is little major deviation between the two periods.  
 
These statistical patterns are also mirrored at the level of the individual parcelación. Looking at 
figure 8a and 8b, at first glance there appears significant variation throughout the years. For 
instance, in the initial period 1983–1986 San Antonio (SA) is responsible for approximately 40% 
of all transfers but records comparatively less in the next two periods, only to rise again slightly 
in the last period (again due to the decreasing absolute number of plots available) potentially due 
to the catch up effect already outlined. Los Litres (LL) on the other hand demonstrates a different 
transition, recording no transfers between 1983 and 86 and comparatively fewer than the other 
parcelaciónes in the following two periods up until 1994. 
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In percentage terms, however, some of these apparent trends seem less significant. For example, 
as in figure 11, figure 12 and table 2 below shows the number of land transfers within each 
parcelación for the two periods (1983–1994) and (1994–2004) as a function of the number of 
owners present in base years 1983 and 1994. 
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Figure 12: Number of land transfers among El Palqui’s five parcelaciónes as a percentage of (or 
relative to) the number of land owners in base years 1983 and 1994. 
 
Transfers as a % of owners in 
various base years 
SR LL EP SA PP 
No. of owners in 1983  46 34 31 22 5 
No. of transfers by 1994  24 7 17 16 3 
Transfers as % of owners in 
base year 1983 
52.20% 20.60% 54.80% 73% 60% 
No. of owners in 1994  38 32 22 15 3 
No. of transfers by 2004 21 11 14 11 2 
Transfers as % of owners in 
base year 1994  
55.30% 34.40% 63.60% 73.30% 67% 
 
Table 2: Number of land transfers among El Palqui’s five parcelaciónes as a percentage of (or 
relative to) the number of land owners in base years 1983 and 1994 
 
With the exception of EP and LL, relative to the number of owners in base years 1983 and 1994 
transfers have remained more or less constant throughout the years for 3 of the 5 parcelaciónes66, 
especially if we take into account the extra year included in the 1983–1994 interval. The increase 
for LL is most pronounced (just under a 100% increase). It is quite possible that the figures reflect 
something of a catching up effect given that LL had the fewest transfers from 1983-1994. 
                                                 
66
 Of course, there is likely to be much more variation between the years than the graphs suggest. But in order to 
compare with the last 10 year period it was necessary to aggregate past data. This is undoubtedly a limitation of my 
findings.  
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Although there may be another explanation linked to this parcelación relatively late adoption of 
‘monoculture grape production. According to Murray (1997a, p.129);  
 
As late as 1988 in LL the cultivation of the tomato remained at least as important as the 
cultivation of the grape. In this parcelación green beans also continued to form an integral 
part of the localised agricultural base (around 10% of surveyed land).67 
 
Thus, having arrived late to full monoculture-reconversión, there may have been a lag time of 
sorts before lower returns, increasing costs and increasing charges began to bite and generate 
debt. Moreover, as Murray observed in 1994, having arrived late, LL growers perhaps “failed to 
enjoy the successes characteristic of the mid–late 1980s” (Murray, 1997a, p. 31). Given these two 
interrelated factors, it is perhaps unsurprising that LL has displayed such a rapid rate of transfer’s 
among small-farmers within recent years. However, in spite of LLs’ farmers’ recent and rapid 
decline, overall, LL still retains the largest number of original parceleros (19 of 34). The peculiar 
nature of LL will be discussed in greater detail in part (b) of the results section.  
 
6.2. El Palqui’s Evolving Land Distribution and the Issue of Land 
Concentration  
So far it has been demonstrated that land transfers have continued to characterise El Palqui. It is 
clear from the findings that many smaller farmers are selling off their land while others are 
consolidating their holdings. What the transfer information does not necessarily tell us, however, 
is how this is affecting the distribution of land within the locality. That is to say, a greater number 
of land transfers does not necessarily mean less owners and greater land concentration if each 
parcel of land is sold and bought by another individual (perhaps another small producer), even 
though this is extremely unlikely. 
                                                 
67
 As a point of comparison,  already by 1988 San Antonio was almost 90% committed to grape production (Murray, 
1997) 
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Figure 13: Change in land distribution in El Palqui, in terms of percentage hectares owned, 1983-2004. 
Note:  Year 1999* represents the estimated mid-point between year 1994 and 2004 and is thus an estimated 
value. 
 
(ha) 1983 1986 1990 1994 1999* 2004 
<5  223 208 208 179.94 152.5 125.57 
 22% 20.50% 20.5 18% 15.20% 12.50% 
≥5<10 403 378.8 287.6 260.4 216.48 172.56 
 40% 37.40% 28.30% 26% 21.50% 17.20% 
≥10<20 173 162.6 177 201.02 200.7 200.47 
 17.10% 16% 17.40% 20% 20% 20% 
≥20<50 82.1 44.02 68.62 68.62 75.1 81.55 
 8% 4.30% 68% 6.80% 7.50% 8.10% 
≥50 133.4 219.7 274 295.23 360.3 425.45 
 13.10% 21.60% 27% 29.40% 36% 42.30% 
 
Table 3: Change in land distribution in El Palqui, in absolute terms and as a percentage of total hectares 
owned, 1983-2004. 
 
According to figure 13 it is possible to identify which categories have grown as a result of land 
concentration. There is a marked increase in the (≥50) category (from 36% in 1994 to 42% of 
total land by 2004) while the (≥10<20) category has remained essentially unchanged. The 
(≥20<50) groups shows a moderate increase from 6.8% to 8.10%. It is not difficult to see who the 
‘losers’ have been since 1994, however: small farmers, particularly those within the (≥5<10) 
category who have gone from owning 26% to only 17% of total land.    
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From the perspective of this thesis, however, perhaps the most important factor to consider relates 
to the successes and failures of those ‘original’ parceleros who (mostly) received their land 
during Chile’s agrarian reforms68. According to figure 14, it is clear that of 144 originals in 1983, 
only 48 (or one third) have retained ownership over their land. If we exclude LL from the results 
(which, as already shown in figure 5 has had fewer transfers overall (e.g. more owners), but 
proportionally more transfers in the last 10 years), the number of originals drops to a mere 28% 
(29/104: total minus LL).  
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Figure 14: Number of original parceleros remaining in El Palqui, 1983–2004 
 
1983 1986 1990 1994 2004 
No. of 
originals 
144 120 96 78 48 
No. as % 
of 
originals 
in 1983 
100% 83.30% 67% 54.20% 33.30% 
 
Table 4: Number of original parceleros remaining in El Palqui, 1983–2004 
                                                 
68
 By original, I am referring to those individual parcela owners present as of 1983. It is feasible that a few owners 
making up this group were not direct reform beneficiaries and bought their land from other ‘truly’ originals parceleros 
following the completion of the counter reform. Yet, further investigations reveal that these numbers are likely to be 
small making this assumption a satisfactory one for the purposes of this thesis.   
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Figure 15: Number of original parceleros remaining within each parcelación, El Palqui, 1983-200469. 
Note*: As above, data for the year 1999* has been inferred by taking the mid-point between periods 1994 
and 2004. In actuality, no data was able to be obtained for this period. Thus, these results should be read 
with caution. Furthermore, 1994–-1999 and 1999–-2004 are five year intervals which are compared with 2 
four year and 1 three year intervals. As such, once again the gradients presented are merely a rough guide. 
 
In terms of each individual parcelación, the same overall pattern emerges. All five parcelaciónes 
display a steady decrease in the number of original parceleros- albeit with some variation 
between parcelaciónes (see figure 15). For instance, SR, EP and SA all show a rather steep 
decline; with the largest of these, SR, going from 46 parceleros in 1983 to a paltry 14 by 2004 (or 
from 27 in 1994 to 14 in 2004). Similarly, SA and EP show a rapid decline, especially between 
the years 1986 and 1990, although both exhibited a slight levelling off between the years 1990 
and 2004. LL on the other hand, proved resilient in early years but has sped up slightly in recently 
years, most probably for reasons discussed above. PP is far too small a sample to draw any 
conclusions or patterns.   
 
                                                 
69
 It is worth noting that these figures are generally supported by parceleros and, if anything, are likely to overestimate 
the number of ‘original parceleros still remaining. For example, when asked how many ‘original growers’ remain 
grower 1 of SA informed me that he is the only grower left of an original 30 growers. Grower 2, claimed there were 
now only 9 of 50 originals in SR, and Grower 3 said only 12 of 35 parceleros remain in LL. For the entire locality, 
grower 4 remarked that “20 years ago there were 100 small farmers and now there are only 20 left”. The differences 
are most likely attributable to the exact definition of ‘originals’. For the purpose of this research, ‘originals’ refer to 
those growers who were on the roles as far back as 1983. Judging by the few land sales that occurred prior to 1983, 
most of those now considered originals are likely to have received their land during the agrarian reforms. However, a 
few small-farmers now thought to be ‘originals’ bought land off other parceleros during these early years. Thus, they 
are not likely to be considered ‘originals’ by other reform beneficiaries, but will be considered so for the purpose of this 
research. 
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Looking at table 5, there is little doubt which groups have benefited most from land concentration 
within El Palqui. Although the graph shows no change in regard to the number of players owning 
greater than 2 parcels between years 1994 to 2004, it does however, reveal the few key players 
who have consolidated their dominance within the region. 
 
No. of 
plots 
1983 1986 1990 1994 2004 
2 2 1 1 6 6 
3 1  1 2  
4  1 1 1  
5   1 1  
6     2 
7  1 1 2 3 
8  1 2 2  
9      
10      
≥10     3 
 
Table 5: Number of individuals owning greater than one plot, El Palqui, 1983-2004. 
 
For example, by 2004 three producers owned ten or more plots, three owned seven plots, two 
owned six, and six owned five plots. Furthermore, if we compare 1990 and 1994 with the findings 
for 2004, we see considerable land concentration taking place even within the larger groups. By 
2004, the locality’s top three land owners collectively owned an impressive 40 plots or 28% of 
the total number of original plots. This is likely to reflect the combination of larger growers 
picking away at individual plot holders as well as some land sales among medium size owners.  
 
Interestingly, the number of owners holding two plots has remained constant at six owners or 12 
plots (although two of the six are new owners since 1994 and one owner has sold one plot). Given 
the limited sample size, a tentative explanation may be that owners of two plots generally face the 
same barriers to expansion that individual parcela holders face (in fact, with an average land size 
of 10.75 hectares, many holders of two plots actually have less than some individual parcela 
holders). The relative unimportance of this category lays bare the harsh reality that few 
parceleros have managed to upscale and convert themselves into what Korovkin (1992, p.242) 
calls ‘peasant capitalists’, with most parcela land being sold to larger owners higher up the chain. 
As such, there are now seven individuals or companies who possess ≥6 parcels of land (74 plots 
in total).  
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Given such concentration it will come as no surprise that since 1983 the amount of land owned by 
the top five largest owners has increased from 21% of total land in 1983 to 44.5% of total land in 
2004 (see figure 16).  
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Figure16: Land owned by the top five owners, El Palqui, 1983-2004. 
 
 1983 1986 1990 1994 2004 
Land owned as a 
% of total (ha) 
21% 29% 32.50% 35% 44.50% 
 
Table 6: Land owned by the top five owners as a percentage (%) of total land, El Palqui, 1983-2004. 
 
Similar to above, below figure 17 shows the amount of land owned by El Palqui’s top nine and 
top five land owners in 2004 as compared to total land, the amount of land owned by growers 
with one plot and the amount of land owed by ‘original’ parceleros. But most importantly, it 
identifies which particular individuals or export companies make up El Palqui’s largest land 
owners. The graph shows that, collectively, the top nine land owners control a massive 60% of all 
of El Palqui’s agricultural land. In particular, one large family owned export company, Fruit 
Export, owns approximately 20% of the total land in El Palqui.  
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Figure 17: Land area (ha) owned by various groups, individuals, and export companies, El Palqui, as of 
November 2004. 
 
By looking at figure 18, it is possible to trace the recent growth or evolution of El Palqui’s top 
five owners over the last 14 years. During this time, Fruit Export more than doubled its holding 
between 1990 and 2004. Italian multinational, Unifrutti, on the other hand, has recorded steady 
growth since 1990 and remains a significant player in the local market. Likewise Aconex has 
grown considerably over the last ten years, as has Chilean multinational Rio Blanco. The only 
player to decrease in terms of hectares owned is LH Cortes.  
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Figure 18: Land area expansion (has) of top five land holders as of November 2004  (from 1990-2004). 
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6.3. Part (a) Summary of Findings  
According to the above findings, there can be little dispute that a considerable degree of land 
concentration and land consolidation has taken place in El Palqui since the time of Murray’s  
original research in 1994. Overwhelmingly, it has been small-scale producers particularly those 
original parceleros who received their land during the agrarian reforms, who have been squeezed 
out and pushed aside. The main beneficiaries have been large capitalist growers (LH Cortes and 
Fruit Export), including a number of large export firms, in particular, Aconex, Rio-Blanco and 
Unifrutti.  
 
But while these findings tell us the present distribution of land within El Palqui compared with 
previous years, and among which groups or companies the land has become concentrated, they do 
not tell us why certain individuals decided to sell their land. In other words, they do not tell the 
parceleros’ stories. For this reason, one to one interviews are essential in order to uncover the 
motivating factors underlying such sales.  
 
6.4. Grower Interviews, El Palqui, 2004  
The following data is based on a series of interviews with past and present land owners within 
three of El Palqui’s five, parcelaciónes. The majority of interviewees were previously 
interviewed during Murray’s 1994 investigation. The intention of the interviews is to try and shed 
light on, or derive causality for, the phenomenon which has seen approximately two thirds of El 
Palqui’s original parceleros dispossessed from their land while larger growers and export firms 
have expanded in their place. 
 
In 1994, of the 26 persons interviewed by Murray, 6 had already sold all their land by the time the 
interviews took place due to excess debt with export companies. Perhaps more concerning, of the 
remaining 20 growers, almost all had either precarious debt to land value ratios, were concerned 
about the continued expansion of export firms or expressed considerable pessimism as to the 
future role of parceleros as grape producers within the locality. In light of such ominous financial 
indicators and general grower pessimism, Murray (1997b) argued that without greater 
government intervention, many more parceleros would inevitably lose their land.   
 
Regrettably, ten years on, this prediction seems to have been an accurate one. During the course 
of my field work I was able to personally interview 14 of the remaining 20 growers interviewed 
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in 1994, and was able to attain credible information for five of the other six (see methods for 
justification). As figure 19 demonstrates, from 1994–2004 the numbers of parceleros owning 
land has decreased in all three parcelaciónes sampled. By far the biggest decline has occurred 
within the largest parcelaciónes, SR, where only two of nine interviewees remain, and SA where 
only 2 of 6 originals interviewees remain. LL growers standout with seven of an original 11 
remaining, with only one complete parcela sale since 1994. Overall, for the three parcelaciónes, 
only 58% of those interviewees still in possession of their parcela in 1994 remained in 2004, 
which is roughly consistent with the town-wide figure of 61.4% (48 growers). However, if we 
were to include the extra six who had already sold by 1994, this figure reaches 42% (remaining).  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Number of parceleros retaining land, 1994-2004 
Source: Field work, El Palqui. 2004  
Note: SR (2004) contains one individual who at present owns his parcela but is currently in court 
defending his title against an export firm. On his own admission he expects to lose his land in the very near 
future. Thus, it was decided, for statistical purposes, that his land will be considered sold, as to count him 
as a current grower would suggest he has been successful. Furthermore, the figures for 2004 are derived 
from a sample of 19 growers even though 20 originals remained as of 1994. Unfortunately, one particular 
individual was not able to be contacted and I was not able to find out any information relating to his 
current status. For this reason, throughout part (b) a sample size of 19 will be used rather than 20. 
 
As far as land concentration is concerned, these results represent just the tip of the iceberg. While 
figure 19 shows the number of ‘full’ parcelas sold, it does not, however, tell us to what extent 
semi-proletarianisation or ‘parcela shrinking’ has taken place. Thus, taking into account partial 
sales, as in figure 20, land concentration becomes even more pronounced. 
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Figure 20: Complete parcela sales vs. partial land sales, in the three sampled parcelaciónes, El Palqui, 
1994-2004. 
Note: Total sales include full parcela sales and partial parcela sales. 
 
Total sampled land 
(ha)  
Partial sales Complete 
sales 
Total land 
sold  
LL 82.05 26.2 7.8 34 
SA  49 0 25 25 
SR 30.32 5 17.8 22.8 
Total 161.37 31.2 50.6 81.8 
 
Table 7: Complete parcela sales vs. partial land sales, in the three sampled parcelaciónes, El Palqui, 
1994-2004 
 
According to figure 20 and table 7, of the 11 remaining owners in 2004, six have at one time or 
another engaged in partial land sales, meaning that of 19 growers still present in 1994, 13 had sold 
part or all of their land by 2004. In fact, as shown in figure 20, 38% of ‘all’ land sold within the 
sample group stems from such partial sales; and interestingly, 84% of these ‘partial sales’ derive 
from LL producers, for whom 77% of land sales were of the partial variety (see figure 20). Thus, 
once again LL stands out from the rest.  
 
There are a number of factors that might explain the LL peculiarity. Firstly, and consistent with 
the El Palqui wide findings, it is possible that LL growers’ comparatively late conversion to full-
monoculture grape production may have helped them ease into grape production by learning from 
the mistakes of other growers. Furthermore, despite missing the ‘peak price’ period, the silver 
lining is that their late arrival may have allowed them to avoid (perhaps inadvertently) the credit 
borrowing bonanza of the early ‘fruit rush’ period.  
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However, it seems relative land endowments may have also played a crucial role. For instance, 
the average land size of those remaining within the LL sample in 1994 (e.g. prior to partial sales) 
was 10.1 hectares (ha). But by 2004 this figure was only 7.9 ha as a result of 5 LL growers selling 
a combined 27 ha of land. Thus, potentially, those growers in possession of larger plots may have 
been able to use their land as a financial buffer, selling off a certain amount of land to settle debt, 
invest in machinery or improve remaining land without having to take on excessive debt to begin 
with.  
 
There is considerable support among parceleros for this theory. For example, grower 5, himself a 
LL grower, remarked;  
We sold some land to invest and improve some other land of ours. We don’t have big 
debts. [And somewhat paradoxically], we are fine as we are with a small piece of land. 
 
 Grower 8 also of LL, utilised a similar strategy; 
 
We sold some, about 8ha of rocky land. It would have been very expensive to get the land 
ready to plant. A lot of people got into debt trying to get the [rocky land] land ok. We just 
have to look after our small piece of land. 
 
Another LL grower, grower 3, mentioned that “before I used to have 12ha, but I sold 7 ha, 
because the water was not enough for that size land”. A further two growers from SR concur. 
Grower 6 mentioned that “some farmers do not want to get rid of their land so they have been 
selling their parcela little by little and do whatever they can to keep it like this”. Grower 7 is one 
such SR grower who sold 5 out of his 8.15 ha in 1997 “in order to pay the debt with Rio Blanco”. 
He now owns a bar and supplements his income by growing vegetables on his remaining 3.15 ha.  
 
Thus, if it is so that land size has played a key role in helping some growers remain viable, this 
may explain why SR growers- with a comparatively smaller mean land size of 5.07 ha- have 
exhibited such high grower failure. The overall figures also support this hypothesis. As displayed 
in table 8, of a 19 grower sample, 11 remaining growers in 2004 had a mean land size of 9.72 ha, 
as compared to a mere 5.6 ha for the eight who have sold their complete parcela. The results are 
even more convincing if we include those six producers (bringing the sample size to 25) who had 
already sold by the time of Murray’s visit in 1994. This raises ‘complete’ land sales by the time of 
2004 to 14 out of a possible 25 growers (with an average land size of 5.6 ha) as compared to the 
  
105 
overall sample average of 7.21ha in 1994. In fact, of the 14 sales, only one grower had over 10 ha 
of land (11ha). 
 
Average 
land size of 
26 pc 
sample 
Average 
land size of 
19 pc 
sample 
Average 
land size 
remaining 
pcs  
Average 
of land 
sold   
              
LL 8.45 9.9 10.1 5 
SA  8.4 9 10 8.3 
SR 4.9 5.07 6.34 4.45 
  
   
Total  7.21 8.13 9.72 5.6 
 
Table 8: Average land sizes within LL, SA and SR. 
Note: Numbers and words in italics are derived from the 19 person sample, which, as already explained, 
tracks those 20/26 persons who still retained their land as of 1994, less one individual for whom no details 
could be found.  
 
At first glance this explanation does not appear to fit with the SA situation. Contrary to this 
theory, SA has a high mean land size but still records a high grower failure. Only one individual 
has part of his land; all others have sold their entire parcela. There is, however, one possible 
explanation for this discrepancy. As a parcelación SA has a higher overall plot size, in part due to 
the inferiority of the areas land. This could explain why SA has displayed such high grower 
failure, as although the plots are large in absolute terms, they are ‘effectively’ small in terms of 
their productive capacity. Thus, in the words of Grower 8 (of LL) “a lot of people got into debt 
trying to get their rocky land ok”. Moreover, having arrived late to grape production it is feasible 
that LL growers might have learnt from the mistakes of SA growers, as alluded to by the three LL 
growers above. 
 
Of course the above discussion is based on average land, which given the high diversity of land 
sizes within the sample and the relatively small sample size within each parcelación, most likely 
skews the data. To some extent this bias can be avoided, by breaking the data down into size 
categories ≤5, >5<10, and ≥10 (as owned in 1994). By using this method we see that of 19 
growers still owning land in 1994, six received ≥10ha, and of this six five remained in business in 
2004. Yet, of the eight growers owning ≤5ha- only 3 remain economically viable. And of those 6 
owning >5<10 ha only three remained in 2004. If we include the six other producers who had 
already sold land by the time of Murray’s initial investigation, four of the six had ≤5 ha, and the 
other two had 5.6 and 8 ha; in total an average land size of just 5.02 ha. Therefore, despite the 
  
106 
data’s many qualifications, it would seem that land endowment has to some extent played a part 
in determining the successes of small-scale growers within the sample population; again several 
growers tend to concur;  
 
 The small farmer cannot compete with a big farmer that has 7 ha for example (Grower 
9). 
 
 I had to sell…my land was too small. With only 5ha I couldn’t afford anything (Grower 
10). 
 
I think for it to be profitable you need over 10 ha (Grower 11). 
 
Still, the fact that at least two growers with 3.6 ha and 4.5 ha of land respectively have remained 
viable producers tells us that there are other important forces at work. The following offers some 
insight as to what those factors are. 
 
6.5. The El Palqui ‘Debt Crisis’ 
If relative land size is a critical factor determining the viability of small-producers, the 
mechanism in which this limitation is most likely to be felt by growers is through its relationship 
with debt levels. The reader will recall, that the majority of small-scale producers in El Palqui 
have managed to reconvert only by borrowing credit from export firms to fund the initial set up 
costs (reconversión) and any additional running costs (including chemical inputs, labour, 
technical support and advice, commission on exports, and interest payments). Thus debt, albeit 
temporary debt, as with most financial ventures, is an integral and expected part of the 
reconversión process. It can, and does in many instances, provide opportunities for investment 
and growth. Of course, it is when returns consistently fail to cover credit and charges (as was the 
case in El Palqui during the 1990s) that debts begin to spiral out of control and reach 
unsustainable levels. In this context, a person with a larger endowment of land has a number of 
advantages over smaller land holders.  
 
Firstly, although it generally cost more to improve and prepare larger areas of land, many 
investment costs (especially one off investments, such as the purchase of land, machinery or an 
irrigation system) are scale sensitive. That is to say, a parcelero with a larger parcela may 
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achieve economies of scale because he or she is able to lower their ‘average costs’ by spreading 
‘fixed costs’ over a greater number of units (e.g. costs per unit (ha)) (Gwynne, 2003). Larger 
owners may also benefit from greater negotiating leverage when establishing contracts and in 
terms of the procurement of inputs such as fertilisers and pesticides. Also, having a larger plot can 
allow for greater diversification, reducing ones exposure to market fluctuations (see table 9 
below).  
 
Secondly, owning a larger piece of land, to a certain extent, offers a financial buffer in the sense 
that a larger holder in financial difficulty may be able to sell part of their land to bring debt levels 
down to a manageable level. Thus, owners of smaller plots are essentially more vulnerable to 
external conditions – although this is not necessarily so if the land is of poor quality and takes a 
lot of money to bring up to productive standard or if a grower takes on more debt simply because 
he or she believes they have a larger productive base.  
 
In his 1994 field work Murray (1997b), uncovered disturbingly high debt levels among many 
growers, with six individuals having already sold due to debt with export companies. In addition, 
at this time 24/25 (who grew grapes) admitted to being under financial strain due to low prices; 
10/26 specifically mentioned they were worried about debt; 14/26 were concerned about either 
the expansion of firms or the lack of transparency in contracts; and 3/20 unfortunately predicted, 
correctly, that they would eventually have to sell (Murray, 1997a).  
 
Given the level of debt and the high degree of pessimism among growers during the mid-1990s, it 
is not all that surprising then that parceleros have continued to face the same financial 
constraints. According to the 2004 data, of 13 parceleros who had either sold half or all their 
parcela, when asked what motivated them to sell land, all 13 mentioned financial difficulties of 
some kind; nine specifically mentioned excessive debt; three stated scale difficulties (i.e. 
insufficient funds to improve land, water shortages, high interest payments relative to the small 
size of their plot and two of the three said producers needed at least 10 hectares to remain 
economical); and one simply stated “he needed the money”. Combined with the six growers who 
lost their land before Murray’s field work in 1994; this constitutes 19 out of 26 growers who have 
either sold all or part of their land (13 having sold their entire parcela). And of this 19, most 
recorded facing financial difficulties of some kind, 15 of whom specifically mentioned debt. 
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Also of concern is the apparent lack of expansion or entrepreneurial dynamism among 
parceleros. While on the one hand, 11 of the original 26 producers have managed to hold on to 
their parcelas, it is not as if they are in a position to expand. Of the 11 interviewed who still 
owned their land, only one individual had bought more land (4 ha), and holding 13 hectares to 
begin with; this particular person can hardly be considered representative of the overall sample.   
 
Finally, few have had the means or the wherewithal to diversify their productive base and reduce 
their exposure to market risks. For example, as seen in table 9 below, of the 11 remaining growers 
in 2004, 54% only grew grapes, 25% only grew vegetables and another (27%) grew both grapes 
and vegetables. Most alarming, however, was the lack of diversity among grape growers. While 2 
individuals grew 3 or more varieties, 45.5% grew just one variety, and 58% grew no more than 
two varieties. These figures change little when the extra 4 interviews outside of the longitudinal 
study are included. As might be expected, the largest growers show the greatest degree of 
diversification. In fact, the average land size for those growers producing only one variety of 
grapes was just 6.4 ha compared with 15.6 ha for those growing one or more varieties. If we 
include the extra 4 non-longitudinal interviews, again these figures change little at 6.5% and 
16.6% respectively.  
 
production   
 
Growers from 
1994 remaining in 
2004 
Including extra 4 
interviews 
 
grape monoculture 6 8 
  
  
1 grape variety  5 6 
2 grape varieties 2 4 
3 grape varieties  1 2 
4 grape varieties 1 1 
  
  
grapes and 
vegetables  5 5 
  
  
vegetables 3 3 
  
  
total growers 23 28 
 
Table 9. Level of diversification among parceleros, El Palqui, 2004 
Note: Right column includes the extra four interviews formed in addition to the longitudinal survey. 
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6.6. From Land Concentration to Land Stabilisation? 
Since 1994, it is clear that land concentration has persisted within El Palqui, such that, today, only 
around a third of El Palqui’s original small-scale growers remain. It is difficult to say for certain 
what will come of the remaining third. However, there appears at least to be some signs that the 
land market (or land concentration) is beginning to stabilise. There are a number of reasons that 
may explain why El Palqui looks to be approaching stabilisation 
 
• ‘Economic selection’ over time 
Over the last two decades many- but certainly not all- small-scale growers have attempted to 
reconvert and failed. Thus, those still in business at the time of my field work are likely to have 
been in business for some time. In an ‘economic-darwinist’ sense, one might say that they 
represent those growers who have been economically ‘selected’ for their relative efficiency and 
business acumen (Murray, 1997a). If this is so, we would expect to see land sales begin to 
decelerate after a peak period. Indeed, grower 12- a medium sized producer (with 24 ha), packing 
plant owner and employer of 16 persons - referring to land sales, commented, that he expects 
“that things are going to be stabilised in about a year”; although as discussed later not all 
growers are this optimistic.  
 
 Structural changes  
It would also seem that there has been a number of important structural changes that have taken 
place within the pueblo that have helped empower small-scale farmers in terms of their dealing 
with the export companies. Particularly noteworthy, has been the evolution of a more competitive 
credit market (relatively speaking). The reader will recall that in the past, most credit could only 
be attained from the export companies and it usually came with rather strict borrowing conditions 
(Gwynne, 2003, Murray, 2002a). Yet, today, it would seem some banks are offering an 
alternative credit source which is to some extent reducing grower dependence on the export 
companies and helping to break down the asymmetrically skewed power relations that have for so 
long characterised small-producer /exporter relations in El Palqui.  
 
During the course of the interviews, a number of growers indicated –often with a sense of pride 
and accomplishment – that they no longer relied on the export companies for credit. For instance, 
of 12 grape growers for which information could be attained (as this is not part of the longitudinal 
study I have included the other four interviews in my sample population), only three (25%) were 
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in debt to companies (another 4 did use some short-term company credit, but did not consider this 
to be debt70), 8 (66%) utilised bank loans (7 of which exclusively), and 2 also had INDAP loans 
(but for horticultural production only).   
 
   
Debt 
With 
   
Chemical 
Inputs  
  
Buyer  
Grape 
Growers  debt company  INDAP bank Use  financier  export method  
Grower 8 yes      yes yes high purchase highest bidder  
Grower 17 yes    sometimes   yes himself highest bidder  
Grower 15 yes  yes yes yes yes independent dist contract (CCC) 
Grower 3  yes      yes yes bank highest bidder  
Grower 14 yes  yes     yes company contract (CCC) 
Grower 1  yes      yes yes company contract (CCC) 
Grower 13  yes      yes yes bank highest bidder  
Grower 18  yes      yes yes company contract (CCC) 
Grower 19 
        yes company  contract (CCC) 
Grower 12 yes      yes yes himself contract (CCC) 
Grower 4  yes      yes yes himself highest bidder  
Grower 2  
  yes     yes company contract (CCC) 
 
Table 10: Credit/debt sources and grape produce buyers, El Palqui (2004) 
Note: The following graph includes only those growers in 2004 that grew grapes not those growing 
horticultural products. .  
 
Still, it seems only a select few of the sampled population (5 of 12 interviewed who grew grapes) 
have been able to completely free themselves from the notorious CCC system so they can sell 
their produce (either on the vine or off the vine) to the ‘highest bidder’. In terms of the wider 
pueblo, it is difficult to say for certain how many growers are currently selling to the highest 
bidder- although one parcelero put the figure at a mere 10% (Grower 13, 2004). This is 
unfortunate as selling to the highest bidder confers a number of advantages, as grower 13, (who 
bought his 15 ha of land in 1982), explains;  
 
 [I]n the past a lot of people got loans from the companies then couldn’t pay them back 
so they lost their land…that is why we get a loan from the bank so I can choose the buyer. 
I don’t give grapes on consignment…if you do that they just tell you tales”. They [the 
export companies] are not healthy….they are not honest. 
                                                 
70
 Company annual credit advances are only considered by growers to be debt if following the resolution of liquidations 
there remains outstanding payments to firms. Thus, although some growers record using company credit this does not 
necessarily mean (in the eyes of growers) that they are in debt to the companies.  
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Grower 18 agrees;  
 
As you know the loan comes with a tie to them (e.g. the company loans) and then we lose 
the parcela. I prefer to pay the bank interest” [because then] “the buyer comes and 
offers a certain amount and we sell it to the best buyer. 
 
Thus, growers that are able to sell to the highest bidder, not only achieve a greater degree of 
producer autonomy, but also receive prompt payment and absorb fewer risks than those who rely 
on the traditional CCC system. As grower 14 explains,  
 
We used to sell on consignment so if anything went wrong with the fruit and it was not 
sold they didn’t pay me.  
 
What’s more, indebted producers are restricted to selling their produce to the same company to which 
they are indebted, even when offered a better price elsewhere; It’s all the production for them or 
nothing” (Grower 15). 
 
 Alternative strategies  
While only 5/14 growers have fully liberated themselves from the CCC system by selling to the 
highest bidder, another two have in effect broken free by leaving grapes and returning to more 
traditional and arguably less volatile horticulture based agriculture. As grower 16, describes; 
 
we took the grapes out [in 1998] when things started to get bad…the export business 
became bad and the debt started to increase…it was never a good price…We planted 
cucumbers, tomatoes and green beans.  
 
Another grower, grower 17, similarly sold five out of 8 ha in 1997 to pay off debts and moved 
into vegetable production. Grower 9 has employed this low-return, but low-risk, strategy from the 
outset and credits this with helping him maintain control over his land. In his own words, he 
describes his reservations towards the exportation of grapes;  
 
“I don’t like to grow grapes because I would have to sell to the export companies or do 
business with them. This has made a lot of farmers lose their parcelas. I don’t want to run 
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the risk. It’s safer with tomatoes and beans…the small farmers always end up exporting 
with companies because they cannot export by themselves. If they could I would probably 
grow grapes”  
 
 Institutional learning and grower attitudes  
Even for those producers who are still reliant on the CCC system, however, there seems to be a 
number of other positive improvements within the locality. One such improvement relates to the 
attitudes of the parceleros themselves. No doubt, having witnessed the many follies and failures 
of the past when many “who had land…couldn’t even read or write sometimes”, and the 
ruthlessness in which the large export companies have acquired land, growers are now 
understandably cautious and wise to the practices of the export companies; “now people know 
what to do” (Grower 3). In the past, around half of the 26 growers interviewed voiced concerns 
about the transparency of the export firms’ contracts and the liquidations and 2004 was no 
exception. In 2004, grower 6, who sold in 1998 to Rio Blanco, told me; that in the beginning the 
companies set out to “conquer” the small farmers; 
 
It all started with the agrarian reform. The big pieces of land were divided and the small 
farmers were given the opportunity to have land. The rich…well I don’t want to sound as 
if I consider the rich the enemy- no- people always talk….[but] maybe the rich thought 
‘well, now we give them the land but one way or another we will get it back in the future’ 
and they did 
 
They did this by getting the producers into debt by giving us bad returns…they came here 
with a document with a price saying that this was the price of the fruit,…and the price of 
the packaging and processing [but]…what was supposed to be profitable wasn’t 
so…there was no way that this information was true…I will always state that the returns 
that they gave us were always lower than what they used to get in the US for example. If 
this had been different, one year we could have done bad and the next year one could 
have recovered…I’m just speaking for myself. I never wanted any company to fill my 
pockets; I just wanted what I needed at home to keep my family and pay for my 
children’s’ secondary school expenses…I was always getting negative results even with a 
good production…I was sinking…I sold my parcela before they took it away from me 
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Others indicted a similar lack of regard for the practices of the export firms71. For example, 
grower 13, (who now sells to the highest bidder) remarked that “the export companies tell you 
tales…they are not honest”. Grower 14 knows first hand what this can mean for growers;  
 
One didn’t know anything about prices…the companies just came and brought the 
liquidation and showed the debt in the liquidation. I’ve already had to sell everything; my 
tractor, my machinery. I’ve got nothing and I’ve worked so hard. And now I’m old... (He 
cries)…they don’t leave you in peace until they get your land.  
 
 Technological empowerment  
There is now some evidence that modern technology, namely the Internet, is helping to empower 
small-farmers operating within the global market place. During the course of my field work, 
several interviewees mentioned that in the past they had almost no idea what prices their grapes 
were fetching in overseas markets and suspected the export companies of manipulating prices to 
their advantage. Yet, on two separate occasions, growers told me how the internet is “making it 
easier to stay in touch and check prices” (Grower 14, 2004), helping break down information 
asymmetries and hold the export firms to account. Although, over time one would perhaps expect 
that growers become wise to such price manipulation, particularly as the more vulnerable, 
ignorant, growers exited the market.  
 
 Legal changes  
In the past Murray (1997b) identified the lack of legal redress open to parceleros (due to costly 
legal fees) as a key hurdle to attaining a better deal for parceleros. In 2004 grower 6 indicated 
this problem still exists;  
 
there used to be some private lawyers offering advice because they knew there were 
problems here, but I suppose they wanted to make some profit…like everybody else. It is 
difficult for the government to intervene when it is only private companies. 
 
Although, one grower, grower 14, told me that “now with this government things might be 
different. I have a state solicitor. If I win I pay 10%, if not, I pay him nothing”. Unfortunately, I 
                                                 
71
 Such a lack of transparency in CCC contracts is not unique to El Palqui, however.  Jarvis (1994, in Gwynne, 2003) 
recorded similar quasi-legal practices being used by transnational fruit export firms in other parts of Chile.  
  
114 
was not able to establish just how wide-spread the practice of using state solicitors is. But in 
principle, it could be critical in helping to hold the export firms to account.  
 
Overall, therefore- at least when compared with the past- there seems to be a greater sense of 
optimism among grape producers within El Palqui. While most growers continued to express how 
difficult it was for small-farmers, and all but one were unhappy about how the prices have 
evolved, most accepted that farmers were better off now than in the past and said there is 
generally more work available. Overall, there was little mention of debt or the prospect that they 
may lose their land. Of all the interviews, only one grower was heavily indebted to the export 
firms and faced the immediate and imminent threat of losing his land.  
 
A good number (6 of 12) had every intention of growing grapes in the future. For those who 
wanted out, it was not so much due to debt but rather a desire to free themselves from what most 
agreed to be a constant struggle to stay afloat. At least two growers were considering growing 
alternative crops. Only one mentioned he would like to expand; “we would like to buy more land 
and we’ll see if we can get some citrus fruit- probably apples. But the grapes are the best (Grower 
1)”. Several mentioned the government’s free trade agreements, and were hopeful that these 
agreements would improve external markets conditions;  
 
Lets’ hope that the new free trade agreements may help…they think it will be better…we 
talk about these things at the bar sometime. 
Grower 16; 
 The future of the export business “looks good, especially due to all the trade agreements 
that they are signing.  
 
Another two indicated that they would like to grow grapes if it meant they did not have to rely on 
the export companies.  
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6.7. Contested futures  
Despite some of the positives discussed above, looking to the future, there appears to be no 
consensus among parceleros in regard to their role as producers within Chile’s ever dynamic 
fruit-export sector. For instance, when asked, a few growers were very optimistic “the future is 
very good for the exporter” (Grower 2); “the future looks good, especially due to all the trade 
agreements they are signing” (Grower 16). Others, however, were far more pessimistic; “the 
small farmers are going to disappear” (Grower 4); “I see it bad for small farmers” (Grower 
9).Yet, in general, the majority agreed things were tough and highly uncertain but held on to some 
hope; “it depends on the prices” (Grower 13); “It is uncertain, we never know what its going to be 
like” (Grower 8). Several growers mentioned how costs are increasing while prices remain the 
same. “The problem is that, everything; the labour, pesticides, etc, goes up except the prices” 
(Grower 15).  
 
Still, from an outsider’s perspective, one sees a group of small-farmers who are still very much 
dependent on large export firms, and precariously reliant on one single crop species (grapes) with 
limited diversification occurring. Thus, in light of this chapter’s findings, perhaps the only 
certainty is that the international economy can be a merciless place for small players. And if one 
thing is for sure, in the absence of any government assistance, whatever happens to El Palqui’s 
growers is likely to be beyond their immediate control.    
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7. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Having already established the contextual background underpinning and motivating my research, 
and having outlined the results in the previous chapter, it is now timely to consider these findings 
in light of my research’s central question and sub-questions. Throughout, I will also seek to 
clarify my position through the use of selected quotes from the growers themselves.  
 
7.1 Central Research Question Revisited  
 
(1) How has land tenure transformed in El Palqui since the mid-1990s, and to what extent has 
land-concentration72, semi-proletarianisation and full-proletarianisation continued to 
characterise the region? 
 
Although land transfers have slowed marginally in absolute terms, they have increased in a 
relative sense (e.g. as a percentage of the number of owners and plots still remaining in base year 
1994). Overwhelmingly, the largest number of transfers have occurred among those growers 
owning <10 hectares. Yet small-grower to small-grower transfers have been few and far between 
(horizontal transfers). The vast majority of transfers have taken place between small-growers 
(parceleros) and comparatively large Chilean owned and foreign owned fruit export companies 
and a select number of large capitalist farmers (vertical transfers/or vertical accumulation).  
 
This pattern is observed both among the population as a whole and within the three sampled 
parcelaciónes. Thus, we can conclude that- as a direct consequence of vertical transfers within 
the locality – land has indeed become more concentrated among a minority of larger players, 
meaning there are now fewer land holders overall compared with 1983 and 1994. There is no 
consensus among parceleros as to when this process of land concentration will plateau. Although 
given the vulnerability of small farmers within the grape export sector, there is good reason to 
believe that in the absence of concerted government assistance, land concentration will persist.  
 
 
                                                 
72
 Land concentration is defined as: the process whereby a minority of- usually larger land owners- due to various 
reasons- progressively acquire greater and greater amounts of land over time, often at the expense of smaller growers.  
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7.2. Sub-Questions Revisited  
 
7.2.1. Sub-question (1)  
(1) What factors explain the continuation or discontinuation of land concentration; 
and what structural barriers may have inhibited small-scale producers from 
taking full advantage of the fruit export boom?  
 
A central component of neo-structuralism is a concern for and an acknowledgement that diverse 
individuals, social-groups, classes, communities, regions and nations face different structural 
barriers which may reduce their ability to equally participate economically, socially or politically, 
both domestically and internationally. Neoliberalism on the other hand, with its tacit assumption 
of policy neutrality, tends to be ahistorical in nature and therefore generally indifferent to the 
many complex histories, different geographies and underlying structural constraints faced by 
different genders, socio-economic groups, cultures and communities. As already outlined, this 
thesis rejects neoliberalism in favour of neo-structuralism, thus accepting that there are indeed 
structures that have a conditioning influence (although not a full influence) over various 
individuals and groups living within different geographical spheres.  
 
In the El Palqui context, it is clear that due to successive Chilean governments’ unbridled faith in 
free market resource allocation, policy makers have neglected to appreciate and address the many 
structural constraints facing small growers. Such barriers include physical capital constraints, 
socio-economic constraints, legal constraints, social capital constraints, socio-psychological 
constraints and economic constraints. For clarity these are considered discreetly below. Although 
in reality these constraints intersect and interrelate constantly.  
 
 Physical structural constraint (e.g. inadequate land endowment and scale 
limitations)  
Prior to reconversión most parceleros had inadequate land to effectively compete with medium to 
large scale producers who have been able to reduce their per-unit costs by spreading their fixed 
costs over a greater productive base, and through greater bulk buying power. Yet, scale factors 
have also been important between parceleros and within the separate parcelaciónes. During the 
creation of individual parcelas an attempt was made to rationalise the ‘parcelisation’ process by 
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dividing land according to its productive potential rather than its physical size. This resulted in 
considerable size variation between plots. Anecdotal evidence suggests this process was not 
always carried out accurately, with some growers maintaining that a handful of growers received 
a lucky draw.  
 
On balance the evidence suggests having a larger plot confers certain benefits but only in so far as 
one combines this with a prudent management strategy; after all, a number of growers went into 
to debt trying to improve the bulk of their larger sub-standard land (e.g. San Antonio growers). 
Used properly, however, owning a larger parcela can act as a financial buffer in that part can be 
sold, so long as debts do not reach a critical level. Interestingly, it appears this strategy is not 
peculiar to El Palqui but has been employed among apple contract farmers in Curicó, Chile, 
where larger average land sizes have allowed some growers to “trade-off land in order to settle 
debts” (Murray, 1997a, p.293). It seems those El Palqui growers who arrived late to grape 
production but owned considerable land were able to do just this (e.g. Los Litres growers) partly 
as a consequence of witnessing the problems faced by San Antonio growers, who despite having 
large land reserves, made the perilous mistake of trying to improve the bulk of their inferior land.  
 
• Socio-economic structural constraints 
Owning physical capital is just one ingredient for the successful management of one’s productive 
assets. One must also possess the know-how, expertise and motivation to get the best out of their 
physical resources. Such ‘human capital’ is not innate but learnt through formal education and 
throughout one’s life experiences. Most of El Palqui’s growers grew up with little formal 
education, were barely literate (either written or financially), and knew virtually nothing of 
managing grape production let alone exporting in the global market place. Yet these individuals 
were somehow expected to arrive at fair terms with companies with far superior information at 
their disposal (Gwynne, 2003).  
 
These types of power asymmetries are not unique to El Palqui, however, but are a feature of 
contract farming throughout Latin America. According to Clapp (1988) for instance, in Latin 
America a “contract is typically his/her first experience of vertical integration in the agricultural 
sector” (p.13). This makes growers, as in El Palqui, particularly vulnerable to exploitation from 
more knowledgeable agents like export companies (Clapp, 1988). Thus, it is possible that the 
growers of El Palqui did not truly appreciate the risks associated with selling in the volatile 
international market place, and may not have fully understood the one sided nature of the 
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contracts they ‘voluntarily’ agreed to. After all the companies were not only selling an idea but a 
potential future of hope and prosperity; the following picks up on this point in more detail. 
 
 Socio-psychological /cultural constraints and grower myopia  
In addition to exploiting the knowledge differential between grower and company, Clapp (1988, 
p.13) argues that psychological factors may help to explain why growers may even ‘freely’ sign 
contracts “even if it was to his or her immediate disadvantage”. Referring to the phrase “the 
magic of the modern”, Clapp argues that throughout Latin America growers are often seduced by 
the prospect and associated status of being ‘progressive’ ‘modern’ farmers. It is certainly possible 
that these forces were at work in El Palqui, and may help to explain the extraordinarily rapid 
conversion to monoculture grape production.  
 
 Legal constraints  
Despite the clear information disparities between El Palqui’s parceleros and the export 
companies, few- if any- legal lines were open to help growers attain better bargaining positions 
and negotiate better terms. This is both a concern when initially signing contracts, but is just as 
important come liquidation time. A number of growers, both in 1994 (Murray, 1997a) and 2004, 
were concerned as to the transparency of the ‘liquidations’ (accounts) and suspected the firms of 
‘inventing’ certain costs. Others such as Jarvis (1994) have recorded similar practices being used 
by export firms in Chile. One cannot say for sure if and how such illegal practices took place. Yet 
given the vastly superior information flows available to the export companies and the lack of 
legal channels available to growers, one might argue that there is at least considerable room for 
such practices to go on with little threat of impunity. Regrettably, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the legal profession itself has to some extent also taken advantage of small-growers. 
One grower in 1994 told Murray (1997a) that he had to pledge one third of his land to have his 
case defended in the courts. 
 
 Barriers to harnessing social-capital and cooperation  
Social-capital refers to those links and relationships that exist among groups, communities or 
even nations which can help to bring people or groups together for mutual gain, and an important 
aspect of social-capital is cooperation. Murray (1997a) found in 1994 that compared with other 
fruit growing regions (e.g. Curicó), El Palqui growers tended to be particularly individualistic and 
as such relied less on cooperative arrangements; although it certainly does not help that at the 
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national level there has been little regulatory support, institutional guidance or economic 
incentives for such collective organisations (Gwynne, 2003). Thus, by failing to organise 
collectively, El Palqui farmers, like many Chilean peasants, have not capitalised on the improved 
economies of scale (in terms of the procurement of inputs and attracting finance capital), or 
improved bargaining positions that such cooperation can bring. 
 
 Economic structural constraints  
Perhaps the most notable constraints faced by growers stems from the lack of credit facilities 
open to El Palqui’s small-producers. Once again this is not uncommon in rural areas throughout 
Latin America where informal credit lending is usually characterised by exorbitant interest rates, 
and institutional credit is often hampered by a perception that repayment is hard to enforce from 
smallholders while “the seizer of land or animals offered as collateral is problematic”(Binswanger 
and Rosenzweig, 1984, p.15). In El Palqui’s case, parceleros lack of experience in viticulture and 
low asset base would certainly not have helped their risk profile. After all setting up grape 
production is a costly, risky and technical business, especially when working under a ‘neoliberal 
regime’ where “government intervention is normally restricted to micro-scale farmers…and 
subsidised credits are rarely available to small-scale commercial farmers…” (Gwynne, 2003, 
p.316). Thus, in the absence of alternatives, essentially those El Palqui growers wishing to 
reconvert had little choice but to embrace ‘dependent capitalisation’ (Korovkin, 1992, p.249) by 
relying on large fruit export companies.  
 
In sum, El Palqui’s parcerleros have faced a myriad of structural constraints which have 
conditioned the nature of their insertion into the global economy. Importantly, many of these 
structural constraints are not unique to El Palqui, or Chile for that matter, but are common 
throughout Latin America among peasants wishing to take part in the non-traditional agricultural 
export sector. For instance, Carter, Barham and Mesbah (1996) found similar ‘structural 
impediments’ (e.g. credit scarcity, low relative access to information and poor training) affecting 
small-scale growers during their investigation into Guatemala’s agro-export boom.  
 
Furthermore, new dangers are just around the corner. In the future as labour costs increase Chile 
is going to have to learn to compete more and more in terms of quality. In 1994 the 10 largest 
firms put in place standardisation procedures so to some extent this process has been underway 
for some time (Murray, 1997a). The plethora of bilateral and multilateral Free Trade Agreements 
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(FTAs) are likely to aid the sector by facilitating greater market access73. Yet, often such 
agreements come with stricter phytosanitary and environmental requirements, which means 
growers often have to invest in new technologies and standardisation procedures which are not 
scale neutral. As one interviewee remarked; 
  
There’s a lot of talk about the new code of agricultural practice [whereby] they [the 
companies] demand that the producer has a tidy parcela with more elegant packing 
stations, with the latest technology etc. The prices are the same as 10 years ago but the 
production costs keep going up. Another grower told me, “companies are asking us to do 
this [certify the land and employ the code of agricultural activity] due to the free trade 
agreements, especially the one with the US. 
 
In addition, as Kay (2002, p.490) points out, with greater international integration “the size of the 
farm and its level of capitalisation is going to become even more important as new technologies 
and new economies of scale favour large enterprises”. Thus, FTAs are likely to have 
disproportionate costs for small growers, and paradoxically, may even reduce ‘market access’ for 
parceleros; not to mention the effects even cheaper food imports would have on the  
already beleaguered traditional crop sector. 
 
7.2.2  Sub-Question (2) 
(1) What roles have export companies and their contract systems played in El 
Palqui?  
 
As outlined above, parceleros insertion into the global economy came to be completely 
dependent on large export firms for credit, technical expertise and market access. By signing such 
contracts growers relinquished considerable autonomy for the opportunity to export their produce 
internationally. Working on a consignation basis (whereby growers only received payment 
following the sale of their produce in foreign markets) this entailed absorbing the lion’s share of 
economic risk (Gwynne, 2003). In the words of grower 14, under consignation “if anything went 
wrong with the fruit and it was not sold they didn’t pay me”. 
                                                 
73Under successive Concertación governments Chile has negotiated numerous strategic bilateral (e.g. Chile-U.S. FTA) 
and regional free trade agreements (e.g. P3: Pacific Three Agreement, with New Zealand, and Singapore) and economic 
cooperation agreements (e.g. MERCOSUR) with various nations. More recently, in August 2006 President Michelle 
Bachelet signed a free-trade agreement with China and in November with Colombia (Pro Chile, 2006).  
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Conventional economic theory would predict that a supplier would only willingly internalise such 
risks if the expected returns were considerable. However, this is based on the assumption that 
there exists alternative supply arrangements for growers (as is usually the case with contract 
farming in ‘developed economies’, where even contracting itself is just one of many options 
available to growers e.g. auctions, spot markets etc), or in other words a competitive functioning 
buyers market. Ordinarily, when competitive condition exists, the buyer (or exporter)- who seeks 
from a contract a steady predictable supply of produce at a pre-specified standard of quality, and 
the grower, who seeks a guaranteed buyer, will engage in a bargaining process that results in both 
parties sharing a fairer distribution of the risks. If the buyer were to try and transfer too many 
risks onto the supplier the supplier would simply look elsewhere and vice versa.  
 
Normally, where competitive conditions exist, such a one sided contract- where one of the parties 
involved absorbs a far greater proportion of the risks without being dually compensated with 
higher potential returns- is only likely to exist in the ‘short run’ due to firms exploiting a growers 
ignorance or poor business acumen. In the long run, however, such a contract can only be 
sustained if one or another section of the industry holds a monopoly position 
 
In the case of El Palqui, the absence of alternative credit facilities (e.g. ‘working capital’) and 
grower ‘ignorance’ has indeed created a situation whereby growers absorb a disproportionate 
share of the risks in exchange for low returns. But more importantly, this contractual relationship 
has persisted over the ‘long run’ due to the CCC systems ‘lock in clause’ which specifies that a 
grower must sell exclusively to his/hers creditor until all debts are settled. Thus, despite on the 
surface appearing as if there are several export companies competing with one another for 
suppliers, in reality, this restrictive clause has enabled firms to manufacture market failure 
achieving not only semi-permanent monopoly positions but semi-permanent bi-lateral monopoly 
positions.  
 
There are parallels here between the CCC system and that of ‘debt-peonage’ which was often 
employed by estate owners under the hacienda system (otherwise known as ‘debt bondage’). 
Exploiting the short term needs of largely poorly paid workers, in the past estate owners would 
encourage debt (usually through advances) as a way of bonding labour to the land. Given that 
payment was usually in-kind, the system also worked to lower the owner’s market risks by 
creating a captive market for produce grown on the estate (Bernstein, 2000; Newson, 1996; 
Sachs, 2005). In El Palqui export firms use a similar technique to bond suppliers and reduce their 
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risks by offering generous credit to growers (for both off farm and on farm purposes) and 
specifying that growers buy inputs through the firm (chemical inputs and even contract labour)- 
often above market price.  
 
For Clapp (1988) and others (Davis, 1980; Kloppenburg and Kenny, 1980), arguing from a 
Marxist perspective, this constitutes a form of ‘disguised proletarianisation’ in the sense that 
growers in effect lose their control over “the means and the mode of production”. The firms 
“secure the farmer’s land and labour, while leaving him with formal title to both… [thus] the 
farmer’s control is legal but illusory”. This represents the ultimate position for a firm as the 
“propertied labourer [is] on the one hand a landlord, and on the other a labourer who cares for 
corporate plants” (Kloppenburg et al, 1980, p.23 [point also supported by Kay, 1981). As is the 
case with banks, Clapp (1988) argues that firms will have an interest in ensuring that indebted 
farmers neither repay nor default. The intent is to ‘perpetuate the debt’ which the firms consider a 
small price to pay for a steady supply.  
 
This analysis has application- albeit, not full application- in the El Palqui context, where it seems 
the companies have not only used debt to entrench supply lines, but also as a means of  usurping 
the means of production. For instance, if a grower took on debt and managed to use the capital to 
become a viable producer then the firm would benefit from a good supplier. If, however, the 
grower was unable to pay back the debt, so long as the debt did not exceed the value of the 
debtor’s asset base (e.g. land), then the firm could recoup its costs and expand its production by 
forcing the sale of its supplier’s land.  
 
To what extent this was a conscious and planned strategy by firms operating in El Palqui is 
unclear. A representative from Unifrutti told me that the companies “never had any intention of 
owning land”, but were essentially forced to buy the land due to farmers “imprudent spending 
practices”. Perhaps this is true of the early years when, despite the military government’s grip on 
power, the spectre of expropriation still loomed over the countryside (Korovkin, 1992). More 
recently however, if it is true that the export firms never intended to involve themselves in 
production, why have they insisted on maintaining their lands rather than putting them up for 
resale?  
 
While it seems there are credible concerns regarding the transparency of contracts, information 
asymmetries, lack of legal redress available and grower ignorance, speculating on the firms’ 
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motives is far more problematic. To what extent the firms purposely used illegal practices or 
intentionally exploited small-grower ignorance is far more controversial. Let us assume that all 
dealings between grower and firm were in accordance with the rule of law then; did the growers 
not decide to sign contracts, receive advances and reconvert their parcelas of their own free will? 
According to Clapp (1988) this is generally the attitude of agribusiness writers who “are content 
with a very narrow legal conception of autonomy” whereby the contract “appears as an uncoerced 
and mutually beneficial agreement between two free and equal agents” (p.8). 
 
Writers of a libertarian persuasion, such as Nozick or empirical libertarians such as Hayek and 
Freidman would likely concur. As to Hayek “the market is an impersonal force like ‘Nature’, akin 
to an economic game with winners and losers, whose outcomes can be good or bad, but never just 
or unjust [or indeed ethical or unethical]” (Hayek, in Barr, 1993, p.46). Thus, they would most 
likely say to a grower, no body forced you to sign this contract, you did so in accordance with 
your own free will, you have benefited from your misguided short term consumption, you may 
have miscalculated the risks but nonetheless you must be held responsible for your actions. 
Natural rights libertarians like Nozick are likely to take this even further, maintaining that any 
intervention from a higher authority to try and prevent a particular person or group from 
borrowing money (or borrowing a certain amount) is belittling, discriminatory and reeks of the 
kind of paternalism which violates the sanctity of personal sovereignty (Barr, 1993).  
 
The above kind of thinking tends to take a very narrow conception of human society, however. 
For those who at least accept the premise that relations between different individuals, classes and 
institutions are underlined by power asymmetries, will more than likely accept that creditors must 
also take some responsibility in their lending and this includes following certain ethical 
guidelines. After all, not all individuals are equally financially literate. Indeed, on their own 
admission, many parceleros lacked formal education, many could not even read or right, and few 
could afford assistance from lawyers and accountants to help them negotiate contracts and 
manage their funds more efficiently. Such was the exuberance of the moment that it must have 
been psychologically demanding for growers- usually accustomed to a rather austere life – to 
resist the temptation to increase their material wealth and social status as exporters (e.g. the 
‘magic of the modern’). The firms’ apparent willingness to lend such large sums of money no 
doubt contributed to the perception among growers that such debts were sustainable. To be sure, 
under the CCC system companies maintain a very close watch over production, monitoring crops 
and advising growers what, when and how to plant as well as which inputs to use (Gwynne, 
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2003). Thus, given their close interaction with growers, if growers were on occasion spending 
unwisely, why then did the export companies not take steps to halt the spiral of debt?  
 
I would argue that the firms must take considerable responsibility for their frivolous lending. Yet  
interestingly, among various parceleros there is no consensus on this issue. When asked to 
explain the reason for such high grower failure among parceleros, a number of growers blamed 
poor returns and accused the companies of acting dishonestly and manipulating the accounts to 
their advantage (Grower 13, Grower 15 and Grower 6, chapter 6.6) In contrast however, others 
such as grower 1 said;  
 
The parceleros are the ones to blame really”. One has to be a good manager…if the 
company gives me money I have to use it to work not to party and drink. Sometimes we 
had to go to Ovalle to cash checks and other grower-friends were in town and asked me if 
I wanted to stay but I said no I have lots of work to do.  
 
Another three growers- all of which are still viable producers- were less critical but agreed with 
grower 1. Grower 8 told me “I think its bad administration on their part”, grower 5 said “It all 
depend on one’s hard work”, and grower 15 believed “it’s about good administration, hard work 
and having good friends”.  
 
Generally speaking those who had lost their land due to debt tended to be the most sceptical and 
critical of the export firms, although this was not necessarily always the case. One successful 
grape grower, grower 13, who refuses to work with the companies (as already mentioned earlier) 
remarked quite candidly; 
 
I don’t give grapes on consignment…if you do that they just tell you tales…they [the 
export companies] are not healthy…they are not honest.  
 
Another, grower 9- who mistrusted the companies from the beginning- continues to specialise in 
horticultural crops because;  
 
In order to grow grapes I would have to sell to the export companies or do business with 
them and this has made a lot of farmers lose their parcelas.    
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7.2.3. Sub-question (3) 
(3) To what extent might past and present structures at the national level – 
particularly neoliberalism - have contributed, influenced or conditioned the 
present state of affairs in El Palqui vis-à-vis land ownership, socio-economic 
differentiation and the role of the fruit export sector?  
 
Whether the firms acted irresponsibility in their lending or whether the growers are guilty of 
imprudent spending is perhaps not the issue. The real issue is why such a situation was allowed to 
transpire in the first place – and for this the Chilean government needs to take responsibility for 
allowing such dramatic and rapid socio-economic differentiation to continue unchecked and for 
so long.  
 
Arguably, the role of government should be to protect and promote the wellbeing of all its 
citizens. This means pursuing development policies and maintaining a socio-economic 
environment which provides opportunities for all citizens, not just a privileged few as has been 
the case under neoliberalism. In the context of El Palqui, and from a neo-structuralist point of 
view, had the Chilean government- both under military rule and various successive 
democratically elected governments- not harboured such a dogmatic anti-state, anti interventionist 
bias, then the government may have been able to regulate and mediate relations between the two 
contractual parties in a way that precipitated a more socially equitable fruit export boom.  
 
7.3. Reconversión Revisited and Reassessed  
Chile’s fruit export boom has been criticised for favouring medium to large producers over the 
likes of minfundistas and for facilitating the ‘casualisation’ of labour relations within the Chilean 
countryside (Kay, 2002). However, as this thesis is primarily concerned with the fruit booms 
effect on parceleros, this group takes centre stage. Suffice to say, however, that minifundistas, 
due to their very small land holdings and various other structural constraints, have been almost 
entirely excluded from participating directly in the ‘boom’ as producers (Kay, 2002)74. As Collins 
and Lear (1995, p.200) explain;   
 
                                                 
74
 Although it is likely that many minifundistas supplement their incomes by working as part time workers within the 
fruit industry (e.g. ‘semi-proletarianisation’). 
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[the fruit industry’s] expansion has been limited largely to the better educated and 
economically more sophisticated growers…Chile’s small-farmers, including the remnant of 
land-reform beneficiaries were largely precluded from the fruit boom, mainly because they 
were insufficiently large and lacking the resources to gain access to technology and technical 
assistance offered by the fruit exporters, banks, and consulting agronomists. 
 
Thus, for Collins and Lear (1995) the focus tends to be on those structural barriers that prevent 
growers from embracing reconversión in the first place, in particular the lack of access to 
agribusiness’s financial and technical infrastructure. This implies that if growers were perhaps 
able to tap into this supplier/exporter nexus, then they would have the resources and means to 
take advantage of the fruit industry’s expansion. However, as I have shown in this thesis, the 
ability to reconvert and the ability to remain viable in the long run are two separate matters. In El 
Palqui, despite receiving on average nine times as much land as most minifundistas (Kay, 2002) 
and been large enough to attract considerable interest and capital from agribusiness, nearly two 
thirds of the locality’s small-farmers who reconverted have failed to remain viable in the long 
run. In fact, paradoxically, it could be argued that their involvement with the fruit export firms 
(and access to company credit), rather than their lack of involvement, has been the primary 
mechanism generating debt, proletarianisation and socio-economic differentiation within El 
Palqui75. This is consistent with Gwynne’s (2003, p.311) argument that; 
 
In those spaces that have become more embedded into global capitalism (through production, 
exchange, investment and technology flows) higher rates of growth…can reinforce the 
strongly differentiated nature of dependent capitalism and the tendency for economic 
development to be concentred in the ‘upper circuits’ (linked to TNC in particular) with little 
trickle down to the ‘lower circuits’ (such as small-scale farmers) 
  
Indeed, it is certainly feasible that had they not converted their land to grapes in the first place, 
like grower 9, many growers would still retain ownership and control of their land. This appears 
to be the case in other parts of the Guatulame Valley, where micro-farmers - too small to attract 
the attention of large TNC - have “survived and even prospered in the Valley” (Gwynne, 2003, 
p.319).  
 
                                                 
75
 Other research tends to support the idea that grape contract farming with agribusiness (Korovkin, 1992) and tomatoes 
cultivation under contract (Peppelenbos, 1996) tend to result in proletarianisation and the socio-economic 
differentiation of the peasantry. 
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It is argued, therefore, that post-reconversión structural constraints are every bit as important as 
pre-reconversión constraints. However, this is not to imply that reconversión per se is a 
completely flawed concept. But rather that ‘market-led’ reconversión alone is no panacea for 
rural development: that is of course assuming that the aim of the Chilean government is not just to 
generate growth but to foster ‘growth with equity’, as it frequently claims (Kay, 2002).  
 
7.3.1 Reconversión into the future  
It is time to consider both new ideas and draw on past lessons. The way reconversión has been 
pursued to date requires alterations. Critics of state intervention need to be reminded that the 
Chilean fruit export sector was not born entirely of the ‘free market’, but owes considerable 
thanks to past government interventions, most notably Frei’s fruit plan of 1968 and Allende’s 
extensive land reforms (see chapter 5.4.- 5.7.). As Kay (2000, p.465) argues, “this does not mean 
[however] a return to the centralised type of state intervention of the populist period before 
1973”. Although, it does mean that from a neo-structuralist perspective, there is no reason why 
government intervention cannot continue to play an important enabling role in the industry to 
ensure the “benefits of growth and modernisation” reach those groups marginalised or excluded 
during military rule (1973-1989) (Kay, 2002) and thereafter. It is argued that had the Chilean 
government taken a more active role it could have help offset some of globalisations more 
regressive aspects, perhaps averting such rapid and wide spread grower failure. 
 
Unless operating under a command economy, however, governments cannot generally prevent 
someone from selling their own land, force them to spend their money carefully, or force them to 
work hard. That said, however, states can help provide certain individuals or groups with the right 
tools to help protect them from extra-economic exploitation and provide for a degree of equality 
of opportunity. A number of policies could have been used, and still have relevance for those 
parceleros remaining today. They generally relate to the specific structural constraints outlined 
under sub-question two.  
 
 Opening legal channels  
Short of a new round of politically volatile land reforms and turning back the clock, there is little 
that can be done to directly alter existing land endowments and educational attainment among 
older growers (yet not their children of course). However, they offer important clues as to where 
  
129 
intervention can be useful. I would argue that the central barrier to small-scale farmers has been 
the almost entire reliance on the export companies (which is of course indirectly related to their 
small-size). A degree of accessible, and most importantly, impartial, legal advice (state funded or 
subsided) prior to signing contracts and following the resolution of the liquidations may have 
helped prevent export firms from exploiting grower ignorance and potentially ‘inventing costs’. 
Fortunately, there is some indication that the state is beginning to take a more active role with one 
grower (Grower 14) telling me of a state solicitor who is helping him defend his land in court. 
How widespread and accessible such support is, however, unclear. More research needs to be 
done into this area. But it certainly appears to be a positive.  
 
Besides legal assistance, however, a number of other growers mentioned how the internet is 
making “it easier to stay in touch and check prices”. Although it also has the potential to help 
growers make better informed investment decisions. The degree to which the internet and other 
technological breakthrough are helping to empower growers vis-à-vis trans-national companies in 
El Palqui and indeed throughout the Latin American continent is also unclear, although it is 
certainly an interesting question worthy of deeper investigation.  
 
 Fostering cooperation  
Another way the government could have assisted growers is by fostering cooperatives among 
growers to allow for scale benefits and greater bargaining power with export firms. Korovkin 
(1992, p.247) describes how small-scale grape producers in Rinconada formed such a collective 
(the Orolonco Society) which “served as an intermediary in their relations with the fruit 
corporations” helping to protect them against ‘unfair’ contracts and receive better prices for their 
produce. Yet, despite having been once part of cooperatives, parceleros in El Palqui exhibit a 
comparatively high degree of individualism which has led to a sub-optimal level of cooperative 
organisation. Thus, providing economic incentives is one way the state could encourage such 
organisation- although merely helping to set up the ‘regulatory framework’ (Gwynne, 2003), 
provide advice and institutional capacity is a crucial first step in sparking such mutually 
beneficial arrangements. 
 
 Providing alternative credit or subsidised credit facilities  
I have all ready described in earlier chapters how a number of farmers have more recently 
wrested themselves from the export companies by taking on bank loans (once only the privilege 
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of large farmers) (Gwynne, 2003) which offers them far greater autonomy, fewer risks and higher 
returns as they are able to sell to the ‘highest bidder’. Moreover, although it is difficult to 
measure, throughout the interview process it was discovered that those growers who had achieved 
this level of independence from the firms (as opposed to ‘disguised proletarianisation’) displayed 
a certain sense of pride and accomplishment that from a wellbeing perspective, should not be 
understated.  
 
Had the government provided either subsidised credit or simply alternative credit (either direct or 
through a private/public partnership with the banks) to growers this would have likely achieved 
similar multiple aims. First, it would have reduced the power differential between grower and 
firms. As with contractual relations in most economically ‘developed’ nations, growers could 
have negotiated terms with any number of firms which would likely result in a more equitable 
sharing of the risks and returns whilst still conferring technological benefits to the grower. Not 
able to utilise ‘lock-in’ clauses, any attempt by firms to invent costs would simply result in 
companies losing their suppliers to rival competitors. It would be in the firms’ interest therefore 
to support growers rather than exploit their ignorance. Second, growers would have greater choice 
in terms of where they bought their inputs which is also likely to save them money76. Thirdly, 
with no potential conflict of interest (i.e. to usurp growers’ land), the government could have 
‘rationalised’ the credit/advances process, including checks and balances and monitoring to 
ensure credit was used prudently- which would have avoided the myopic credit bonanza of the 
early years77.  
 
Such policies go beyond creating a more equitable distribution of the ‘fruits’ of the fruit export 
boom, however. They also have an important secondary function in the sense that they are likely 
to contribute to the political sustainability of reconversión, and ultimately the integrity of the 
export model and the capitalist system itself. Yet one major caveat remains: given that firms were 
attracted not just to Chile’s natural comparative advantage but also its human engendered 
competitive advantage (i.e. the liberal labour repression model), it is questionable that firms 
would have invested in the Chilean fruit sector to the same degree had they not been able to 
                                                 
76
 That said, it is not uncommon in contract farming- especially given the specific quality standards, environmental 
standards and phyto-sanitary requirements of many markets- for buyers to demand that certain types and levels of 
inputs are used by growers. 
77
 It is not lost on the author that such state credit could engender a degree of ‘moral hazard’ (e.g. in the credit context, 
irresponsible borrowing) if growers believe the government is likely to go soft on repayment and growers begin to see 
such support as a right as was the case with the ‘anticipo’ (advance) given to reform beneficiaries under the Allende 
government (Kay, 2002).  
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utilise their superior power position and information flows to exploit both growers, labour and the 
environment. 
7.4. Final Remarks and Conclusions  
In chapter (2.3.) it was explicitly stated how I intended to take a political-economic approach to 
my analysis. This compels us to view the changes in El Palqui as intimately linked to the wider 
political-economic struggles that have taken place and continue to take place in Chile. In this 
context, grower failure of parceleros and consequent land concentration is not merely a ‘natural’ 
process in the evolution of the Chilean economy, but rather can be traced back to the military 
government explicit, and to a lesser degree the Concertación governments’ tacit, anti-state, non-
interventionist bias.  
 
Indeed, since the initiation of land reform under Alessandri, then Frei and Allende, Chilean 
farmers- particularly parceleros- have been caught up in ideological battle between the forces of 
socialism on the one hand and neoliberalism on the other. Most recently they have been the 
victims of the assumption-ridden totalising neoliberal model: a model which tends to view 
development in a very narrow sense, where the ‘wellbeing’ of a nation is crudely assumed to 
correlate to, and improve with, a rise in a number of broad macro-economic indicators which are 
often indecipherable to the majority who feel their effects. In achieving its ends, neoliberalism 
shows little mercy. It has little patience for, or at least turns a blind eye to, the many complex 
histories, different geographies and underlying structural constraints faced by different genders, 
socio-economic groups, cultures and communities. Stripped of history, and in the eyes of neo-
liberals, everyone is essentially the same in terms of their barriers, hopes and desires. Those who 
fail economically (e.g. parceleros) thus only have themselves to blame. Besides, are not the 
economy and the country better off as a whole to be cleansed of such inefficiencies anyway? Is 
this not simply the natural order of things? From this perspective grower failure is not necessarily 
something to be lamented but is merely a method of separating the week from the strong, the 
efficient from the non-efficient, or to use the language of Chilean policy circles- the ‘viable’ from 
the ‘non-viable’ (Korovkin, 1992, p.239).  
 
It is attitudes such as these that the growers of El Palqui had to face under the military regime’s 
neoliberal agenda and its continuation under the various democratic regimes since 1990. Thus, 
given the high degree of policy continuity throughout the democratic transition, it is perhaps 
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unsurprising that reconversión remains a key centre piece of the Chilean government’s 
agricultural policy. Continued growth in the fruit export sector, particularly in table grapes, has 
helped to sustain the predominance of this policy. But despite the emergence of a new 
entrepreneurial class, proletarianisation, land concentration, and social differentiation continues to 
take the shine off what has undeniably been a truly remarkable reinsertion into the global 
economy (Kay, 2002).  
 
Certainly in the case of El Palqui, in the wake of continued land sales since 1994, parceleros are 
rapidly joining the ranks of ‘semi-proletarianised’ minifundistas or ‘fully proletarianised’ wage 
labourers, while those who retain land (excluding those ‘few’ who have been able to sell to the 
highest bidder) represent little more than a ‘disguised proletariat’. In light of this reality, it is 
argued that the Chilean countryside is developing a neo-biodalist character, coupled with a new 
form of ‘debt-peonage’, which is gravely reminiscent of Chile’s pre-reform- arguably semi-
feudal- hacienda system. Only today it is not large inefficient estates which dominate the 
countryside but medium to large, highly capitalised, capitalist farmers and agribusinesses. Which 
begs the questions, is ‘market led’ reconversión the most desirable model? And if not, what 
alternatives may there be, and which groups ought to drive these initiatives (e.g. markets, 
governments or non-governmental organisations etc.)?  
 
There is already some indication that the Chilean government, under Bachelet, is reassessing its 
role vis-à-vis the economy and is poised to take a more active role in steering Chile towards a 
new stage in its economic development. In what is perhaps the closest to a neo-structuralist 
approach yet, the Bachelet government has openly declaring it’s intention to take a more 
supportive approach towards the rural economy, by promoting “public policies for quality 
control, public-private cooperation and a change in the productive focus [towards value added 
products in particular]”. But perhaps most importantly, while international integration and export-
led growth remains firmly on the agenda, Bachelet has explicitly stated that all policies will need 
to be ‘inclusive’, and must provide opportunities for all Chileans, with a particular “emphasis on 
small-scale family farming”. These ‘inclusive’ ideals are encouraging, but we will have to wait 
and see if the Bachelet government can deliver on these goals.  
 
7.4.1. Some Research reflections  
Earlier on in this dissertation I stated that it is not the explicit intention of this thesis to offer the 
final say as to the merits of neoliberalism in El Palqui, in Chile or indeed in Latin America as a 
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whole; and this position still holds. I have, however, been able to uncover continued land 
concentration in El Palqui since 1994 thus confirming Murray’s (1997) earlier predictions that in 
the absence of government intervention “the economic decline of the peasantry is unavoidable” 
(Murray, 2002b, p.220). I have also shown how such land concentration has for the most part 
occurred due to small-growers accumulating excessive debts with fruit exporting companies 
whose ubiquitous presence throughout the Chilean countryside is in itself a direct result of the 
government’s conscious effort to court foreign investment and allow the market to allocate 
resources, which is in turn all part of successive governments’ wider neoliberal agenda. By 
focusing on a specific locality with specific actors, it has been possible to paint a more detailed 
and relevant picture of how the ‘global’ conditions the local; a focus which cuts through the often 
polarising and assumption ridden debates which surround globalisation and neoliberalism at the 
national or international scale.  
 
Whether this rural transformation can be said to be good or bad, or just or unjust, however, is 
beyond the direct scope of this thesis. All change requires adaptation and the adoption of new 
ways of living, creates new opportunities and carries with it new threats. Ultimately the final say 
as to the merits of neoliberalism ought to be decided upon by the community at large – not merely 
the perspective of the parceleros who are but one – albeit important- part of the local community. 
For instance, during my stay I made the comment to a very helpful local resident- himself the son 
of a parcelero who had only recently been forced to sell his land- that ‘it must be sad that so 
many have lost their land?’, in which case he responded, “perhaps, but it has not affected 
employment”. Indeed, on the positive side, El Palqui, and indeed Chile as whole continues to 
enjoy success in non-traditional exports and this has lowered the nation’s hitherto precarious 
reliance on volatile copper exports. In El Palqui at least, the fact that firms have bought land and 
are now directly involved in production as well as exporting indicates that they intend to stay for 
the long hall and cannot merely up and leave should markets conditions take a turn for the worse. 
This gives them a stake in El Palqui, and despite fewer individuals owning land, locals are still 
likely to benefit from the flow of technology and techniques, employment and economic 
multipliers which together help to retain the local population and maintain the integrity of the 
pueblo78. That said, more research needs to be done to paint a more complete picture of El 
Palqui’s agrarian change under neoliberalism, particularly in relation to economic multipliers, 
wage rates, job security and working conditions. But perhaps most importantly, more work must 
                                                 
78
 Gwynne and Ortiz (1997) in Kay (2002) found that despite land concentration, the fruit boom, especially given the 
labor intensive nature of grape production, has at least helped maintain the local population. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests this is still the case, although more research is necessary to say for certain.  
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be done to illuminate the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of the locals that have actually lived 
this dramatic and tumultuous transformation. 
 
7.4.2. Conclusion  
In Conclusion, there is little doubt that, in purely economic terms, Chile remains one of the most 
successful examples of non-traditional agro-export led growth in Latin America (Collins and 
Lear, 1995). In 1975, non-mineral exports made up just over 30% of total exports, whereas now 
they account for about 60% (US Dep of State, 2006). But rural poverty, despite improving under 
Concertación leadership, remains high at one quarter of the rural population while land 
concentration, socio-economic differentiation and poor and precarious working conditions 
continue (Kay, 2002). Moreover, some question the long term environmental, economic and 
possibly political sustainability of a growth model dependent on the exportation of low value 
primary products (Barton, 1998; Murray, 2002b)79. As Barton (1998, p.16) points out “In many 
ways, Chile’s natural resource dependence has not changed considerably, merely shifted from 
mineral resources to the exploitation of other natural resources…exposing Chile to issues of long 
term economic insecurity and instability”. Furthermore, the myriad of FTAs Chile has already 
signed and are actively pursuing may create opportunities for medium to large producers, but 
pose difficulties for small farmers, not to mention the fact that their strict legal conditions will 
reduce the ability of governments to ‘favour their own nation’. Regarding employment, if land 
concentration persists and average land sizes increase there is the added danger that labour may 
be substituted for new labour saving technologies (Carter et al, 1996).  
 
Thus, in light of my research’s findings and the ‘future threats’ outlined above, this thesis argues 
that the Chilean state ought to have taken, and should still take, a more active role in addressing 
those structural limitations faced by diverse groups within rural Chile. As only through targeted 
state intervention can Chile’s tremendous macro-economic success be harnessed in such a way 
that benefits all Chileans and for which secures the future viability of the Chilean peasantry. 
                                                 
79
 For instance, according to Barton (1998, p.15), Chile’s “perennial dependence on its natural resource base” has 
changed little with the expansion of non-traditional exports with over 80% of the nations exports earnings still coming 
from natural resource extraction.  
  
135 
Appendices  
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. General 
1a. Name? 
1b. What is the size of your parcela? 
 
2. Production and output 
2a. What crops did you have planted on your parcela last year? What was the land area occupied 
by each of these crops (please treat each different variety of grape separately)?  
2b. Five years ago?   
2c. Ten years ago? 
2d. What was the output for each of these crops last year (please treat each variety of grape 
separately)? 
2e. Five years ago? 
2f. Ten years ago? 
 
3. Tenancy 
3a. Are you the owner of your plot? y/n 
Landowners 
3b. If the response to the above is yes, since when have you been the owner? 
3c. How did you come to own the land? 
3d. Since you came to own the parcela have you purchased any additional land? y/n 
3e. If the response to the above is yes, what was the quantity purchased and when did the 
purchase take place (please detail each individual instance of land purchase you have been 
involved in)? 
3f. From whom did you buy the land in each instance? 
3g. How much did you pay in each instance? 
3h. How did you raise the money to fund this purchase? 
3i. Since you came to own the parcela have you sold any part of it? y/n 
3j. If the response to the above is yes, what was the quantity sold and when did this sale take 
place (please detail each individual instance of land sale you have been involved in)? 
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3k. To whom did you sell the land in each instance? 
3l. How much did you receive in each instance? 
3m. What was the reason you sold land in each instance? 
3n. Do you rent any land on top of that you own? 
Non-landowners 
3o. If you are not the owner of your land, from whom do you rent it? 
3p. What is the annual payment for this? 
 
4. The market for grapes 
4a. To whom and in what proportion did you sell your grapes last year? 
4b. Five years ago? 
4c. Ten years ago? 
4d. What price did you receive per box last year? 
4e. Five years ago? 
4f. Ten years ago? 
4h. Are you satisfied with the way prices have evolved? y/n 
4i. With which of the above mentioned buyers (if any) do you sell your grapes under contract? 
4k. For what period of time are you contracted to sell grapes to each purchaser with whom you 
have a contract? 
4l. Would you please detail the general nature of this contract and detail any specific conditions 
which you think are of interest? 
 
5. Credit 
5a. Have you used credit in order to meet the running costs of your parcela over the last ten 
years? y/n 
5b. Can you give some examples of what this credit was used for? 
5c. Have you taken credit from export companies responsible for the purchase of your grape 
production? 
5d. What has been the rate of interest with the various companies? 
5e. How much time do you have to repay this credit? 
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5f. Are you in debt with any of these companies or any other institution? y/n 
5g. What is your current level of debt with each of the above? 
5h. When did this debt begin with each of the institutions/companies to which you are indebted? 
5i. Do you plan to obtain more credit in the future? 
5j. For what purpose? 
 
6. Investment and technology 
6a. What types of machinery do you use on your parcela? 
6b. If yes, when did you buy each of the machines mentioned? 
6c. How did you pay for each of these machines? 
6d. Do you share any machinery with other farmers near to you? 
6f. Do you use fertilisers on your grapes? y/n 
6g. If yes, when did you start use of fertilisers? 
6i. How do you pay for the use of fertilisers? 
6j. From where do you purchase your fertilisers? 
6k. Who informed you of the type of fertilisers that would be best for use on your parronales? 
6l. Do you use pesticides or herbicides? 
6m. If yes, when did you start use of these? 
6n. How do you pay for pesticides/herbicides? 
6o. From where do you purchase your pesticides/herbicides? 
6p. Who informed you of the type of pesticides/herbicides that would be best for use on your 
parronales? 
6q. How do you pay for your pesticides/herbicides? 
6r. What irrigation method do you use for your grape production? 
6s. If you use goteo when was this installed? 
6t. Do you think your water supply is sufficient to maintain production over the coming years? 
6u. Do you have any investment plans for the future? y/n 
6v. If yes, what are your plans? 
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7.  Labour 
7a. Who works on your parcela full-time? 
7b. Do you have to employ extra persons at any particular time of the year? 
7c. If yes, at what times is extra labour employed and how many are employed? 
7d. Where do these workers come from? 
7e. Do any members of your family work off the parcela at any time during the year? y/n 
7f. If yes, when do they work off-farm and in what type of job? 
 
8. The future 
8a. Do you intend to continue cultivation of the grape in the future? 
8b. Do you which to reduce, maintain or increase your level of grape production? 
8c. How do you see the local market for grapes and the situation for farmers of similar size to 
yourself over the coming years here in Los Litres? 
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